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SUMMARY OF RESEARCH: 
The introduction, and evolution of securitisation over the years, has made a 
phenomenal contribution to the area of corporate finance.  Securitisation is a 
specialised area which has evolved to deliver considerable advantages to banks 
and their corporate and government clients, a sub-subjected explored in this thesis.  
Securitisation is defined as using the cashflow, creditworthiness and collateral of 
receivables to raise finance from the capital markets.  To date, research on the 
subject of securitisation has produced a few textbooks and numerous articles written 
by academics and practitioners.  The ambit of these writings addresses three 
questions, namely, what is securitisation; how does it work in practice; and how can 
securitisation be developed so that it can continue delivering advantages in the 
evolving world of corporate finance.   
Securitisation is very much a practical subject, and given that the author had 
very little, if any, practical exposure to the subject prior to developing this thesis, the 
author, admittedly, felt challenged to ascertain significant issues that could be 
developed to the extent that such development represents an original contribution to 
knowledge.  Case law in the US had already explored the most significant issue 
regarding securitisation, namely, true sale.  Armed with a solid theoretical base of 
knowledge that author looked for inspiration, and discovered it during the initial days 
when the Enron scandal hit the headlines.   
In short, the Enron scandal involved using the concept of securitisation to 
facilitate financial crime.  The masterminds (if its appropriate to use such 
description) of the scandal, as this thesis will unfold later, cleverly used thousands of 
securitisation and hedging transactions to raise funds in order to give financial 
creditability to a giant corporation which on the surface appeared prosperous but, in 
reality, was breathing to a large extent on borrowed funds.  This scandal, in which 
securitisation was used, inspired the author to develop the originality of the thesis by 
focusing on the issue of securitisation and financial crime.  Given that financial crime 
is a huge area to explore, the author narrowed the focus to look at money 
laundering, and address the question:  
 
Can the practice of securitisation facilitate money laundering? 
 
To approach this question and answer it at doctorate level required a solid 
understanding of what securitisation is and how it works in practice.  Using 
textbooks, articles and conversations with practitioners, the thesis documents under 
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Part 1, what securitisation is and how it works in practice before moving on to Part 2 
to look at if and how securitisation can facilitate money laundering.    
 
Part 1 
Chapter 1 examines the definition of securitisation.  It assesses some 
current definitions before the author provides a justifiable alternative, aimed at 
clarifying the definition of securitisation.  Further, the author has analysed and 
described in detail the true nature of securitisation so that it can be better and easily 
understood.    
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the crucial role of the credit rating agency 
instructed by the banker to analyse the pool of receivables using a credit rating 
analysis.  A credit rating analysis tests the receivables against three kinds of risks – 
credit risk, structural risk and legal risk.  This chapter, based on both published and 
confidential material and detailed discussions with rating agencies, examines in 
detail the credit, structural and legal risks involved and why these risks can be 
detrimental.  An understanding of credit rating analysis, as the author discovered, 
assisted in determining the shortfalls of such analysis, and in researching to answer 
the question posed in this thesis since, as the author discovered, the shortfalls in the 
credit rating analysis contribute to demonstrate that securitisation can facilitate 
money laundering.  
Chapter 4 examines the legal issues that affect the originator, and secondly, 
the SPV.  Securitisation is used either to remove the receivables from the 
originator’s balance sheet or used to raise favourably rated finance.  In the former, 
the transfer must be structured as a true sale so that the legal or equitable title to the 
receivables is assigned to the SPV, thus, allowing the originator to remove the 
receivables from its balance sheet.  In the latter, the originator is not concerned 
about removing the receivables from its balance sheet and therefore, just pledges 
the receivables to the SPV, which in turn uses them to support the bond issue.   
 True sale is achievable by correctly documenting it in the transfer agreement 
and complying with the law of the jurisdiction in which the receivables and the 
originator are situated.  In the US, case law has shown that courts are not easily 
convinced by an agreement that documents a true sale and may rule that the 
transfer is nothing more than a secured lending.  For the first time this case law is 
examined comparatively with the UK position regarding true sale and ends with 
original suggestions as to how securitisation can be better understood.   
Chapter 5 discusses the legal issues faced by the SPV – e.g. bankruptcy 
remoteness, correct formation and legal and regulatory hurdles when issuing 
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securities.  These complex issues are examined and documented so they can be 
better understood.   
 
Part 2 
Chapter 6 provides an innovative analysis focusing on if, and how, 
securitisation can facilitate money laundering.  As stated earlier, the inspiration 
behind this research was sparked by the fraudulent activities committed by certain 
executives at the energy giant that once existed as Enron.  The Enron scandal as it 
unfolded and was reported, uncovered what is now a known fact, that securitisation 
can be used and abused to commit fraud, a fraud which will be discussed later in 
this chapter.  Although the wrongful activities behind the Enron scandal only 
demonstrate that securitisation can be used and abused to raise funds in a 
fraudulent manner, such disclosure inspires one to think whether securitisation can 
be used and abused to commit other forms of financial crime.   
To narrow the inquiry to the extent that it can be practically tested, one 
needs to formalise a workable hypothesis that connects the activities behind the 
Enron scandal, securitisation, and money laundering.  Thus, the question, is it 
possible for securitisation to be used and abused so as to facilitate money 
laundering, then becomes, as a working hypothesis: if the activities behind the 
Enron scandal are related to the vulnerabilities of a securitisation transaction, then 
such vulnerabilities may be exploited to the extent that a securitisation transaction 
may facilitate money laundering.  The author provides an affirmative answer before 
demonstrating the affirmative answer in both a theoretical and empirical context.   
Chapter 7 further develops the original discussion on money laundering and 
securitisation with an off-the-wall, yet innovative look at traditional theories on white 
collar crime, and asking two questions: 
 
i. What are the reasons for those involved to take advantage of the 
 vulnerability demonstrated in chapter 4 and commit a white collar crime? 
 
ii. Who is likely to engage in white collar crime? 
 
 The work ends with a chapter summarising the research findings. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Securitisation is one of those areas which does not have many publications 
that can assist an inquiring mind.  The leading textbooks are both written by US 
authors, Jason Kravitt and Steven Schwarcz, which provide a good understanding of 
securitisation and how it works in practice.  Kravitt (1996) provides a very much 
practical viewpoint of the subject given that he is well respected practitioner in the 
area of securitisation, whereas, Schwarcz (1993) provides a good academic slant to 
the subject.  Vinod Kothari (1999), a practitioner and an academic, provides an 
examination of securitisation that is largely based on the works of Kravitt and 
Schwarcz.  In order to understand securitisation and gain the ability to write chapters 
1, 4 and 5 the author relied heavily on these texts (and any articles referenced 
therein) and the academic articles listed in the reference list.  Other useful textbooks 
were Philip Wood’s authoritative book, The Law and Practice of International 
Finance, and Ravi Tennekoon’s Law and Regulation of International Finance, each 
of which provided some of the basic information that assisted in understanding the 
work of Kravitt and Schwarcz. There is nothing original stated in the chapters 1, 4 
and 5, except the author analysis of the definitions of securitisation.   
 Chapter 2, in contrast, provides some originality based on publications 
released by Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s Investor Services.  Existing work on 
credit rating, namely, Kravitt (1996), Schwarcz (1993) and Kothari (1999) do, in fact, 
discuss credit rating but do not provide much detail, and certainly do not 
demonstrate how credit rating works in practice.  Standard and Poor’s were more 
helpful than Moody’s, in that, they released much of the materials which were used 
to write chapter 2.   
 Chapter 6 is largely based on personal communications with certain 
professionals either by telephone or email.  The confidential research behind 
chapter 6 could not be found in any textbooks simply because it was an unexplored 
area of securitisation and money laundering.  However, textbooks and articles, as 
referenced in the chapter, were used as a primary source to provide an 
understanding of money laundering.  Chapter 7 follows on from chapter 6 with an 
innovative discussion of white collar crime and securitisation was based on 
textbooks and articles written by academics who discussed traditional theories of 
white collar crime.  The area of white collar crime, admittedly, does have a large 
number of textbooks and articles supporting it, however, the author intentionally 
chose to focus on traditional theories and how these relate to securitisation and 
white collar crime.  The textbooks and articles used do not discuss securitisation, 
nor the angle from which the author approached the discussion in chapter 6.  
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Instead, they provide a good understanding of white collar crime so that such 
understanding could be used as part of the discussion in chapter 7.  The author’s 
contribution is such that it expands the area of white collar crime with an innovative 
look how traditional theories of white collar crime relate and help explain why certain 
individuals would commit white collar crime using securitisation. 
 
Calvin R. Roy
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CHAPTER 1  THE NATURE OF SECURITISATION 
 
1. WHAT IS SECURITISATION? 
Securitisation is a financing technique which, due to its complexity, is 
sometimes inaccurately defined by some commentators.  At first sight, securitisation 
can be mistaken for an offshoot of factoring.  However, a closer comparison shows 
a marked difference (chapter 1, pg. 3).  Securitisation has been defined, albeit 
inadequately, in a number of ways.  For example, Elmgren (1995: 14) defines it as, 
‘the process of converting receivables...into securities that...[are]...traded on the 
capital markets’.  Another academic defines it as, ‘a financial technique that actually 
replaces non-tradeable balance sheet assets with freely negotiable bearer 
securities’ (Goris, 1994: 8).  Finally, it is rather elaborately defined as, ‘a device of 
structured financing where an entity seeks to pool together its interest in identifiable 
cash flows over time, transfers the same to investors either with or without the 
support of further collaterals, and thereby achieves the purpose of financing.  
Though the end-result of securitisation is financing, but it is not "financing" as such, 
since the entity securitising its assets is not borrowing money, but selling a stream of 
cash flows that was otherwise to accrue to it’ (Kothari, 1999: 2). 
A close analysis of how securitisation works in practice shows the inaccuracy 
inherent in the cited definitions.  Securitisation merely consists of utilising balance 
sheet assets as security and financial support to raise off-balance sheet finance 
from the capital markets.  It is not exactly ‘converting receivables...into securities’ as 
Elmgren puts it because a receivable is an amount of income, a derivative of a 
contractual relationship between a creditor and debtor, which has an unalterable 
legal characteristic.  It is not possible, theoretically or practically, to change the legal 
or obligatory characteristic of a receivable into one of a security that is traded on the 
capital markets.   
The second definition is also misrepresenting securitisation.  It is true that it 
is a financing technique but it does not ‘actually replace non-tradeable balance 
sheet assets with freely negotiable…securities.’  As just stated, receivables have 
their own legal identity which derive from a contract.  The terms of such contract or 
the governing law of such contract cannot recharacterise the receivable once it 
exists.  The receivable is intangible property with an unalterable identity created by 
law.  Thus, it cannot be replaced as Goris states in his definition, nor does his 
definition hold much accuracy within the context it was written. 
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The definition documented by Kothari is useful to a certain extent but rather 
confusing when examined.  The definition starts by defining what is generally called 
non true sale securitisation or secured lending, that is, transferring receivables to a 
separate legal entity (structured as a corporation or a trust) which, in practice, is 
called the “special purpose vehicle” (“SPV”) under an arrangement whereby the 
receivables are pledged as security in exchange for a loan from the SPV.  Kothari’s 
definition mentions non-true sale securitisation by saying that securitisation is ‘a 
device of structured financing where an entity seeks to pool together its interest in 
identifiable cash flows over time, transfer the same to investors either with or without 
the support of further collaterals, and thereby achieve the purpose of financing.’  It is 
true that the originator transfers receivables to the SPV, but what Kothari fails to 
state in his definition is how and in exchange for what the receivables are 
transferred.  
Kothari goes on to say, ‘though the end-result of securitisation is financing, 
but it is not "financing" as such, since the entity securitising its assets is not 
borrowing money, but selling a stream of cash flows that was otherwise to accrue to 
it.’  This sentence is rather confusing since in the event that the originator is 
transferring under a non-true sale securitisation (or secured lending), the originator 
is in fact borrowing funds from the SPV in exchange for a security interest in the 
pool of receivables – the end result is financing.  Kothari says that the end result is 
financing but then shifts the focus of his definition on to true sale securitisation.  He 
says that the end result is not financing but selling a stream of receivables.  It seems 
that this definition is based on a wavering focus that shifts unjustifiably between non-
true sale and true sale securitisation without placing securitisation in its correct 
context.   
A true sale securitisation is what some commentators say is a real 
securitisation (Kravitt 1996; Lupica 1988; Schwarcz 1993).  Their perception has 
been based largely on the fact that this type of structure is the common structure 
used since the inception of securitisation.  This kind of structure has also been 
labelled as secondary securitisation and mistakenly, as structured finance (Kravitt, 
1996: 11; Schwarcz, 1993: 41).  The true sale structure puts in to practice the 
second of the two reasons why the originator would arrange a securitisation – the 
reason will be examined later in this chapter.  However, to aid current discussion, 
the originator composes a securitisation because it has receivables which it wants to 
remove from its balance sheet.  Under true sale the originator transfers the legal and 
beneficial rights in the receivables to the SPV.  
A definition which reflects securitisation with more accuracy is one which 
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captures the actual technical process of securitisation, such as, securitisation is 
utilising the historical and predicted performance, the collateral, creditworthiness 
and cashflow of an entity’s assets as security to raise finance from the capital 
markets.  The process of securitisation is carried out by the party which actually 
utilises the receivables to raise finance.  Depending on the structure the party can 
either be the originator or the SPV (Kravitt, 1996: 18).  
 If a definition of securitisation focuses exclusively on the actual process of 
isolating identifiable receivables and then transferring them to another entity, this 
whole operation also describes factoring.  Factoring is a historical arrangement 
whereby an entity sells book debts (receivables) to another entity in exchange for 
funds – usually at a lower price than the face value of the debt.  How those funds 
are raised is immaterial in the factoring transaction.  Thus, in effect, if a definition of 
securitisation focuses exclusively on the act of isolating – an entity identifies book 
debts (receivables) and then sells them to another entity – such definition arguably 
reflects factoring. 
 However, what distinguishes securitisation from factoring is that 
securitisation involves the actual use of those receivables in order to raise funds to 
purchase the receivables.  Securitisation is not merely the act of isolating the 
receivables (which is factoring) but also includes the method of using such 
receivables to raise finance in order to purchase the receivables. 
 Thus, the party which engages in the securitisation is the party which uses 
the receivables to raise the purchasing finance, and this can be either the originator 
or the SPV depending on how the securitisation transaction is structured.  Where 
the transaction is structured as a non true sale transaction, the originator pledges, 
under a loan and security agreement, the receivables as security to the SPV in 
exchange for a loan, funds which the SPV secures from capital market investors.  In 
practice, the originator will grant a first priority security interest in the receivables to 
the SPV, which the SPV will register.  It is then free to use that security interest and 
grant a sub-security interest to capital market investors.  A sub-security interest can 
only be granted once the first security holder has registered its security interest 
(Goode, 1988).   
Conversely, where the securitisation is structured as a true sale transaction 
using a receivables purchase agreement then the SPV is the party securitising the 
receivables since it is raising finance (and giving a security interest in the 
receivables to the investors) in order to purchase the ownership in the receivables.  
The originator cannot utilise the receivables as security to raise finance or grant a 
security interest because it does not hold title of ownership – an entity can only give 
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a security interest if it holds title of ownership in the underlying asset (Goode, 1988).  
Thus, if the originator has transferred the receivables under a true sale it no longer 
holds title of ownership in the receivables and thus, cannot use the receivables as 
security to raise finance.  The bonds which are issued are supported by, inter alia, 
the cashflow of the receivables and such receivables act as security in the event of 
default.  Thus, the party using the receivables to raise finance is the party which 
truly undertakes the securitisation – the other party acts as the facilitator (Kravitt, 
1996: 20).  
 
2. THE PROCESS OF SECURITISATION 
There are three distinct types of structures which allow an entity to 
‘securitise’ intangible assets in the form of receivables, namely, non-true sale (or 
secured lending), true sale and structured finance (Kravitt, 1996: 4-5).  Although the 
structures may be distinct, the actual process of securitisation within each structure 
remains the same.  The process is constructed by three transactions involving three 
parties: 
 
1. The entity (originator) that wishes to raise finance sells or pledges intangible 
assets to a legally separate entity called a special purpose vehicle.  This 
vehicle can be a company or a trust. 
2. The SPV issues bonds or certificates in the capital markets so that it can 
raise funds to purchase the intangible assets from the originator or lend 
funds to the originator (depending on the structure). 
3. The SPV pays the originator the purchase price or gives a loan from the 
proceeds of the bond or certificate issue. 
 
2.1 THE FIRST TRANSACTION 
 
"...The entity...that wishes to raise finance..." 
In a securitisation structure the entity seeking to remove receivables off its 
balance sheet in exchange for funds is called the 'originator' because it originates 
the receivables. The originator can be either a corporation, trust or a financial 
institution.   
The requirement that triggers the initiation of the securitisation arrangement 
is that the originator must be a creditor in an existing contractual relationship.  The 
nature of the contract is not as important as the fact that the originator must have 
fulfilled or has ascertained its obligation under the contract.  Where this has not 
occurred the originator is not in a position to translate the contract as an intangible 
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asset.   
From a credit rating perspective contractual rights become assets when the 
originator has fulfilled its obligation and anticipates the financial benefit to 
materialise (Standard and Poor’s, 1993i).  It only becomes an intangible asset once 
the originator fulfils its obligation and waits for the co-party to fulfil its payment 
obligation – until the originator has not fulfilled its obligation the receivable is known 
as a contingent receivable (Schwarcz, 1993: 56).   
 
"...sells/pledges assets..." 
As mentioned, the intangible asset which the originator generates is the 
expected payment obligation of the co-party in the contractual relationship.  This 
expected payment obligation is only of value to the originator in the context of 
securitisation (and from a financial perspective) if it produces reliable cashflow 
(Schwarcz, 1999).  This intangible asset that produces a cashflow is called a 
receivable which, in practice, is an amount of interest and principal (or just principal) 
paid to a creditor as a payment obligation under a creditor-debtor contractual 
relationship (Standard and Poor’s, 1993v: 61).  The receivable may consist only of 
principal where the underlying obligor does not pay interest as part of the debt.  
Usually such a receivable would be a trade receivable where the underlying debtor 
is paying for the cost of the goods or services purchased without incurring or 
obligated to pay interest (Standard and Poor’s 1993k: 11).  
Since the inception of securitisation many different types of receivables have 
been found to be suitable assets for purposes of securitisation.  The characteristics 
that determine suitability according to Standard and Poor’s (1993v; 1993r) include: 
i. receivable selling or pledging that is not prohibited by contract; 
ii. the receivables result from products delivered or services performed; 
iii. the receivables generate a predictable cashflow; 
iv. the default risk of the receivables can be predictable; 
v. the receivables must have a high liquidation value; 
vi. the receivables must secure a credit rating that is higher than the rating 
assigned to the originator; 
vii. the security interest in the receivables must be perfectable when sold; and 
viii. the receivables must be capable of being pooled together. 
 
Where the originator is a corporation continuing a business for profit, it may 
be the case that the originator has borrowed money and is subject to an anti-
disposal covenant in the loan agreement.  Anti-disposal covenants are commonly 
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utilised to ensure that the lender acquires some comfort that the borrower will 
preserve its assets, which, inter alia, are essential to the continuity of the borrower's 
business (Penn, Shaw and Arora, 1987: 6.48).  A lender who has extended a loan or 
an overdraft will be concerned that the borrower does not reduce its liquid assets to 
a level which can trigger financial difficulty.  When selling or pledging receivables the 
originator needs to ensure that the sale or pledge of such cashflows will not be 
deemed by any lender as reducing the liquidity of the company to a threatening 
level.   
The receivables sold must be guaranteed payments so that the SPV does 
not suffer from non-payment (in practice, called credit risk).  To avoid this problem 
the originator must only sell or pledge receivables from underlying contracts which 
have been completed from the originator's part.  The originator must have delivered 
the goods to its co-party or performed its required obligation to the satisfaction of its 
co-party and is in a position to expect payment for such goods or services.  The 
underlying contract must be valid under the law of the jurisdiction in which, either 
party (if an international agreement) or the parties are established and operate their 
business.   
The originator must sell receivables that are predictable.  This predictability 
must also extend to prepayment.  The degree of predictability is essential 
knowledge for the originator as this will determine the type of security the SPV will 
need to issue, in that, the payment pattern of the receivables will determine the 
payment pattern on the securities.  The degree of predictability will depend on 
whether the underlying contract contains within it an amortisation schedule and a 
final maturity date.  An amortisation schedule will set out the payment pattern, i.e. 
the amount and frequency of the payments from the co-party.   
For example, in a contract for a mortgage the payment pattern is indicated 
for the entire period of the mortgage.  The borrower knows the amount and 
frequency of the repayment.  The maturity date is the date on which both parties’ 
obligations expire according to the terms of the mortgage contract.  The maturity 
date of the receivables will determine the maturity date of the security issued.  For 
example, a mortgage obligation with a maturity date of 25 years is ideal to issue 
long term securities, i.e. 10-15 year bonds (Standard and Poor’s, 1993a).  However, 
in contrast, a credit card obligation has no maturity date therefore, the securities can 
only be short-term so that reinvestment in new receivables can be undertaken 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993r). 
According to Standard and Poor’s (1993r: 17) prepayment of loans is a 
controlled risk because the SPV can reinvest the prepaid principal in new 
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receivables.  The only loss is the lost interest which was expected.  Historical 
statistical data held by a credit rating agency can assist in predicting prepayment 
patterns of individual types of receivables (Standard and Poor’s 1993a: 5; Moody’s 
Investor Services, 1996).  Prepayment of loans often occurs, in the case of 
mortgages, when the borrower wishes to sell the property or, in the case of other 
instalment based loans when the borrower receives a lump sum of money which is 
used to prepay a loan.  The condition of the housing market or a fall in interest rates 
often influences prepayment (Standard and Poor’s, 1993a: 5). 
The risk that the borrower may default under the loan can be remedied.  For 
example, in a mortgage contract if a default occurs on part of the borrower the 
lender is in a position to take charge of the mortgaged property.  Further, an 
insurance policy will absorb any loss sustained should there be a shortfall in the 
security.  Where there is a risk in other types of receivables this is usually remedied 
by purchasing extra receivables or overcollateralising the securities issue so that the 
economic impact of any default is reduced to its minimum.  Overcollateralising in this 
context means purchasing additional receivables so that the pool supporting the 
securities issue is fractionally excessive (see chapter 2). 
For the receivables to act as security to back a securities issue, the 
receivables must be of similar type.  They must have similar characteristics such as 
payment patterns.  For example, to issue long term securities long term receivables 
are needed.  If the pool of receivables consists of receivables with different payment 
patterns and maturity dates then this will lead to what is called a mismatching of 
receipts and payments (Standard and Poor’s, 1993m), and further, can pose a major 
liquidity risk, ultimately resulting in a disastrous loss for the issuer.  The originator 
must have a sufficient amount of similar receivables to support a securities issue.  
Securitisation is an expensive operation.  To make it economical the originator must 
sell or pledge the right amount of similar receivables to the SPV so that the 
receivables can support the securities issue.  An insufficient amount may lead to an 
undercollateralisation of the securities issue. Undercollateralisation is when the 
cashflow and security supporting the securities issue is insufficient to absorb default 
risks and investor payments at the maturity date (see chapter 2).  Although credit 
enhancement facilities may be used to provide liquidity support, an issue that is 
overcollateralised will secure a better credit rating than that which is 
undercollateralised (Standard and Poor’s, 1993r).  
The originator needs to transfer the receivables to the SPV in a manner 
structured as a sale at arm's length.  This sale of the receivables is contained in a 
document called the Receivables Purchase Agreement (Kravitt, 1996).  This is 
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signed by the originator and the authorised signatories of the SPV.  This agreement 
contains all the contractual terms relating to the sale of the receivables.   
 If the receivables are pledged as security for a loan from the SPV then the 
loan and security agreement must give the SPV a first priority interest in the 
receivables so that they give the support needed.  The security interest must be 
perfected according to law of the jurisdiction in which the receivables are based.  
The essence of the loan and security agreement or the Receivables Purchase 
Agreement is to ensure that the receivables once pledged or sold are removed from 
the originator’s other assets so that the receivables are utilised solely for the bond 
issue (Kravitt, 1996; Schwarcz, 1999).  
 
2.2 THE SECOND TRANSACTION 
 
"...SPV..." 
The special purpose vehicle is the receiving entity sponsored by the 
originator to satisfy the legal, accounting and bankruptcy principles.  The law of the 
jurisdiction in which the originator and the SPV operate should observe the SPV as 
a separate existing entity. 
Securitisation structures utilise either a public or private corporation or a trust 
as a SPV.  In the UK both structures are commonly called securitisation.  In the US 
a structure utilising a trust is called a pass-through transaction whereas a structure 
which facilitates securitisation using a corporation is called a pay-through 
transaction (Kravitt, 1996). 
The trust involved will be one whose purpose is to purchase the receivables 
and pay investors.  In this structure the originator transfers receivables to a trust 
which is specifically established to purchase the receivables and carry out duties 
essential to the maintenance of the structure.  One of the essential duties is to 
convey acquired payments from the underlying receivables to the investors on a 
timely basis.  Independent trustees are elected to carry out the duties with a trust 
manager, who has overall control of the trust. 
In the US, tax law together with trust law has created three types of trusts, 
namely, grantor trusts, owner trusts and a master trusts, which are widely used 
when securitising receivables.  In the UK only two types of trusts exist, namely, non-
trading trusts and a trading trusts. 
A grantor trust is established specifically so as to enable it to acquire a non-
taxable status under U.S. Dept. of Treasury Regulations – s.301.7701-4.  The trust 
is structured to enable it to acquire a non-taxable status.  For it to maintain this 
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status the trust (1) must not engage in a profitable business (2) must not be 
empowered to vary the terms of the investment, and (3) must only issue ownership 
interest based on a single class of securities.  The first of these requirements means 
that the trust should not hold itself as a trading trust.  Therefore, it cannot be used if 
reinvestment in new receivables is sought (reinvestment is discussed in chapter 2).  
Because the trust will secure a non-taxable status, taxation is levied on the investors 
who pay as though they directly own their pro rata share in the underlying 
receivables.  If the trust fails to maintain the non-taxable status then inevitably it will 
be taxed as a company or an owner trust.  A grantor trust is used when securitising 
instalment obligations with defined amortisation schedules and fixed final maturity 
dates, such as mortgages, car loans and other instalment loans.  The reason for this 
is that income from the receivables will flow freely and merely pass-through the 
grantor trust to the investors.  There is no need to reinvest income in new 
receivables as the securities issued and the receivables will have long maturity 
dates and further, the securities will certainly expire before the receivables expire, 
save for an early default of the receivables (Kravitt, 1996: 78-81).  The grantor trust 
is the English equivalent of a non-trading trust.  The non-trading trust works in a 
similar fashion to a grantor trust (Bloomberg, 1997: 54).   
An owner trust will not qualify as a non-taxable trust because the appointed 
trust manager is empowered to deal with the cashflows of the receivables in an 
instructed and prudent manner.  Instead of the income flowing from the receivables 
to the investors, it is withheld by the trust manager and paid according to the income 
demands of the investors.  An owner trust will issue interests in the trust backed by 
receivables with different maturity dates and amortisation schedules.  Since an 
owner trust can engage in business activity, it can reinvest principal payments 
received from the receivables in new receivables so that the investor's interest in the 
trust remains at the original level – this also viewed as overcollateralisation – a form 
of credit enhancement (Kravitt, 1996: 78-81).  The receivables are usually short-
term obligations, i.e., credit card receivables, which expire rapidly.  As a result the 
trust manager ensures that the trust's pot of receivables is not exhausted.  To do 
this the trust manager purchases new receivables and thus maintains a stable pot 
giving the investors a continuing and stable interest in the trust. 
A master trust is utilised so as to enable the issuer access to multiple 
markets simultaneously.  The originator transfers the receivables to a master trust 
which will issue more than one class of ownership certificates. 
 
"...issues bonds or certificates..." 
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Once the SPV has agreed to purchase or receive the receivables from the 
originator, it needs to find the necessary finance in order to pay for them.  It does 
this by issuing securities publicly or privately.  Typically, the SPV will either issue 
bonds or certificates. 
A trust will fund the acquisition of the receivables by issuing equity-like 
interest in the trust in the form of trust certificates to investors.  These certificates 
represent an undivided fractional beneficial ownership in the underlying receivables 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993s). 
In a private placement of certificates, participation certificates are offered, 
giving the investors an interest in the receivables as opposed to in the trust as is the 
case in a public offering.  The important distinction between private and public 
offerings is that in the former, the investor has a direct link with the receivables due 
to the interest the investor acquires in the receivables and can enforce rights without 
an intermediary, whereas in the latter, the investor normally has an indirect link with 
the receivables as the investor owns an interest in the trust only.  This is because 
the link with the receivables is through an intermediary (normally a trustee) who is 
utilised by the issuer to handle the physical administration of the issue for reasons of 
convenience and cost effectiveness.  In the event of a default on part of the issuer 
the trustee will enforce rights on behalf of the investors.   
Alternatively, a trust may issue commercial paper – a short-term security (it 
usually expires within a year) and so is suitable for short-term receivables.  Where 
the SPV is a corporation the acquisition of the receivables will be funded either by a 
bond issue or a commercial paper issue.   
 
2.3 THE THIRD TRANSACTION 
The third transaction entails the SPV paying the proceeds of the bond or 
certificate issue to the originator either as the purchase price or as a loan.  Since the 
bond/certificate issue may not raise the needed finance, the SPV relies on the 
underwriting facility provided by the lead manager (the bank instructed to carry out 
the bond issue) so that all of the finance needed can be paid to the originator.   
 
3. TYPES OF SECURITISATION 
 Securitisation has been used in three types of distinct structures – distinct in 
their nature and result.  What determines the appropriate structure is the intention of 
the originator since it holds title of ownership in the receivables at the outset.  The 
three types of structures exist due to the dichotomy of securitisation – either to sell 
or pledge receivables to raise finance.  These three types of structures are generally 
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known as non-true sale, true sale and structured finance (Kravitt, 1996: 4-5; Kothari, 
1999: 11).   
3.1 NON-TRUE SALE SECURITISATION 
 Here the structure is composed by the originator, with the aid of the 
investment banker, with the aim of raising favourable rated finance.  The originator 
is the party which owns the receivables and it will have a trading history.  Its balance 
sheet will have both an assets and liability page.  Depending on the extent of its 
existing borrowing, the originator may desire to raise additional finance.  The options 
are either to approach its banker or approach investors in the capital markets.  Bank 
borrowings may require security or the balance sheet may not permit further 
borrowings against collateral.   
The alternative method would be to raise finance from the capital markets 
through a debt issue.  A debt issue will only be permissible if the balance sheet 
allows it, and therefore the final option may be to use any receivables generated by 
its business as collateral for further borrowings.   
 From an accounting perspective the borrowing against the receivables 
remains on the originator’s balance sheet due to the rules of consolidation (Elmgren, 
1995: 47).  Where the primary aim is to raise favourable rated finance this poses no 
concern for the originator.  The originator’s ability to borrow from the capital markets 
is limited by its corporate credit rating.  Any bonds issued by it using its assets as 
collateral will be successful to the extent of its corporate credit rating.  A higher 
rating (AAA) will secure a favourable rate of finance from the investors – favourable 
in the sense that the originator repays the principal with interest calculated at a 
lower rate, thus, making the borrowing a cheaper alternative to bank borrowing.   
 The securitisation is structured such that the originator isolates a pool of 
receivables which are pledged to the SPV as security against as loan raised by the 
SPV from capital market borrowing, for example,    
 
    
    receivables 
                               
         bonds                              bonds          
 
  loan            proceeds 
 
                                          (Source: Elmgren, 1995) 
 
 Since the bonds are supported by the receivables, the credit rating agency 
will analyse only the receivables in order to give a credit rating to the bond issue 
 
originato
r 
 spv investors 
bank
er 
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(see chapter 2).  The structure is enhanced with guarantees, and additional 
receivables which are purchased periodically throughout the life of the bonds using 
a reinvestment programme.  With this support and the reliability and 
creditworthiness of the receivables, the credit rating agency will typically give the 
bond issue a high rating – usually AAA (Elmgren, 1995; Standard and Poor’s, 
1993r).  In this way, the originator has secured AAA rated finance using its 
intangible assets as a favourable alternative to bank borrowing.  Further, the finance 
raised through the SPV will appear in the originator’s balance sheet as a lost cost 
liability (Sargent, 1989; Standard and Poor’s, 1993r).    
 
3.2 TRUE SALE SECURITISATION  
 The true sale structure puts in to practice the second of the two reasons why 
an originator would arrange a securitisation, that is, it desires to remove receivables 
off its balance sheet.  Receivables are intangible assets which derive from 
contractual obligations with third parties – in the form of payments.  An entity in 
active trade will accumulate several receivables which, although are in fact an asset, 
also hold an element of risk.  This risk is non-payment or default risk – the debtor 
may not pay the originator.   
Under a true sale structure the originator sets up a SPV and transfers, under 
a receivable purchase agreement, a pool of receivables.  The true sale transfer 
allows the originator to relinquish the legal and equitable ownership in the 
receivables and pass this to the SPV.  The crucial element of the transfer is the 
operative language used in the Receivables Purchase Agreement.  For present 
purposes, however, the operative language of the transfer is drafted with the effect 
that the sale takes place between two separate parties at arm’s length, whereby the 
originator sells and assigns all of its rights, title, interest and benefits in and to the 
transferred receivables.   
A spin-off effect of the true sale language is that, given the sale is between 
two separate parties, the SPV’s assets are not merged within the estate of the 
originator in the event of the originator’s bankruptcy and consolidated into the 
balance sheet of the originator (Sargent, 1989: 65). 
 
3.3 STRUCTURED FINANCE 
Structured finance is using securitisation in an ingenious way to achieve a 
specific result.  It differs from non-true sale and true sale structures in that it uses 
other financial products in addition to securitisation to achieve a specific result.  For 
example, assume that Scooby Do Ltd, a credit card company, wishes to remove 
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receivables off its balance sheet.  It holds talks with the banker, who informs Scooby 
Do Ltd. that a securitisation would be a viable option.  The banker further informs 
Scooby Do Ltd. that the market in London has taken a battering in the aftermath of 
Enron so any bond issue may not be successful – successful in the sense that not 
all of the bonds will be sold – but a bond issue in Tokyo would be more successful.  
The banker contacts its Tokyo office and asks them to issue the bonds to Japanese 
investors.  The bonds are issued and sold and the SPV enters into a currency swap 
agreement with the Tokyo banker, which will act as the paying agent in Tokyo.  
Thus, as the receivables are paid in sterling they are converted into yen, by virtue of 
the swap, and the investors are paid in yen.                                           
 
 
 
 
            receivables 
     bonds            bonds 
 
 
 proceeds 
 
 
 
 
                         swap payments 
                         in sterling are paid 
                         through the London banker 
                         to the Tokyo banker 
             (Source: Standard and Poor’s, 1993d) 
 
The originator has successfully issued bonds in Tokyo and raised the desired 
finance by removing the receivables.   
 The securitisation can utilise either a non-true sale or true sale structure in 
order to raise the finance.  It depends on the balance sheet – whether receivables 
need to be sold or pledged.  However, in order to achieve a specific result (in the 
above example it was issuing bonds in Tokyo and paying in yen) an additional 
product is incorporated into the structure.  Other common products are interest rate 
swaps which aid the originator to achieve a desired interest rate result.   
 
3.4 PARTIES INVOLVED 
 A typical securitisation involves the following key parties: 
 
1. Originator:  the entity which originates the receivables.  It is the party which 
initiates the securitisation by either selling or pledging the receivables.  The 
originator works with the banker in composing the structure. 
 
originato
r 
 spv 
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banker 
investo
rs 
London 
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2. SPV:  the entity which purchases or takes a security interest in the 
receivables from the originator.  The SPV is, typically, a thinly capitalised 
entity with narrowly defined purposes and activities, and has independent 
trustees/directors. 
3. Investors: the investors may be individuals, or institutional investors like, 
mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies.     
 
Aside from these three primary parties, the other parties involved are: 
 
1. Obligor(s): the obligor is the originator's debtor – the underlying debtor with 
whom the originator has established a contractual relationship which gives 
rise to the receivable.  The amount outstanding from the obligor is the 
receivable that is transferred to the SPV.  
2. Rating Agency: since the investors take on the risk of the asset pool rather 
than the originator, a credit rating agency assesses the strength of the 
receivables and the mechanism designed to ensure full and timely payment, 
the extent of credit and liquidity support provided and the strength of the 
legal framework.  
3. Servicer: collects the payment due from the obligor, follows up with 
delinquent obligors and pursues legal remedies available against the 
defaulting obligors.   
4. Agent and Trustee: accepts the responsibility for overseeing that all the 
parties to the securitisation perform in accordance with the securitisation 
trust agreement - it is appointed to look after the interest of the investors.  
5. Structurer or Banker: an investment banker, responsible for bringing together 
the originator, credit enhancers, the investors and other parties. 
 
The entire process is broken up into separate parts with different parties entering 
into different contracts.  When all the contracts and parties are brought together, the 
whole process facilitates a securitisation. 
 
4. WHY SECURITISE? 
 Securitisation has prospered for two reasons, namely, it allows an entity to 
sell intangible assets and remove the associated risk, or to utilise isolated intangible 
assets as support for raising finance instead of relying on the entity’s business 
operations for support.  Underlying the prosperity of securitisation are certain 
benefits which the securitisation industry and commentators have voiced.  For 
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example, Schwarcz (1993: 14-16) and Elmgren (1995: 21-24) highlight the following 
benefits which they believe securitisation delivers: 
 
1. Raise favourable rated finance  
Securitisation has been used as a process to raise low cost finance from the 
capital markets by issuing debt securities.  In the absence of this process an entity 
can still issue debt securities but it will rely on its business reputation and operations 
as support for the securities.  For example, an entity that desires to issues bonds 
conventionally will approach a credit rating agency for a bond rating.  The agency 
will examine entity’s corporate rating and its business operations.  The corporate 
rating is a good indicator as to the entity’s ability to repay any debt borrowed from 
the capital markets.  Thus, this would be a factor in the credit rating’s determination 
of the bonds rating.  Typically, an entity’s bonds are rated very similar to its 
corporate rating.  The reason for this is because the issued bonds are as good as 
the corporate issuer.  If the corporate issuer has a lower rating then invariably its 
bonds are rated to reflect this.   
 However, securitisation allows the entity to borrow from the capital markets 
regardless of its own corporate rating.  What makes securitisation unique is that the 
rating assigned to the bonds issued by the SPV is based primarily on the 
receivables.  The rating agency focuses its analysis on the reliability and strength of 
the receivables which act as primary support for the bonds issued.  The entity 
originating the receivables is analysed to the extent of its ability to pass on the 
payments from the receivables to the SPV.  Where the receivables are existing 
rights to payment then the rating agency focuses on the receivables.  However, 
where they come into existence at a future date (future receivables) then the agency 
analyses the originator’s ability to create the receivables.  In any event, the rating of 
the bonds reflects the reliability and strength of the receivables and whether they 
pose any risk to the investors (Elmgren, 1995: 24). 
 In this way, the entity can sell or pledge receivables to the SPV in exchange 
for funds which have been raised with an interest rate that reflects primarily the 
quality of the receivables.  The securitisation structure is composed so that it 
acquires a high investment grade – AAA – which will pay investors a low rate of 
interest since there is little, if any, risk affecting the investors.  Additional support is 
incorporated into the structure so that investors do not carry any risk of non-
repayment.   
 Moreover, the majority of investors are laypersons who do not understand 
the technicalities behind bonds.  They want information in a simple form.  Thus, 
  16 
when they purchase bonds they look to the rating assigned and the rate of return.  
The private investors, however, are capable of understanding the technicalities 
behind the bonds so look to the assigned rating before deciding to look further into 
the bonds.  Therefore, in order to invoke interest in the bonds, the entity would strive 
to acquire a rating which will aid the success of the bond issue.  A higher rating 
would invoke interest without further enquiry and result in a successful bond issue. 
 
2. Transfers risk  
 Receivables are intangible assets which appear on an entity’s financial 
statements as earned income or in the case of future receivables, as potential 
income.  The assets aid the entity to continue its business operations and provide 
liquidity.  However, as stated earlier, these intangible assets do carry an element of 
risk – the risk of non-repayment or default.  An entity cannot predict the exact extent 
of this risk in each fiscal year, and thus, keeps in reserve an amount of money which 
will absorb some degree of this risk. 
 For banks, they must adhere to strict rules pertaining to capital adequacy 
and have in reserve capital which will absorb some degree of risk and loss.  For 
banks and non-bank entities competition and the drive towards prosperity can place 
the entity in a position where its capital reserve needs to be monitored.  This capital 
reserve ceiling can affect an entity’s ability to grow beyond its reserve.   
 Securitisation allows an entity to transfer the risk inherent in intangible assets 
and free up capital reserve.  The ability to transfer risk occurs in both a non-true sale 
and true sale structures.  In a true sale transaction the risk is transferred due to the 
legal assignment inherent in the receivables purchase agreement.  In a non-true 
sale transaction the receivables are isolated, transferred to the SPV and become the 
‘property’ of the SPV when it perfects the security interest (Shenker and Colletta, 
1991: 2).  This process allows the risk to be transferred because firstly, the 
receivables have been exchanged for received funds from the SPV, thus, 
eliminating any risk of non-payment or default for the originator, and secondly, any 
risk that is transferred to the SPV is covered by credit enhancement – the risk is 
ultimately transferred to those who provide loss cover who are strong enough to 
absorb it.  Thus, the effect of securitisation is the creation of a link between entities 
willing to accept the risk of non-payment or default but who subsequently transfer it 
on.   
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3. Transforms the receivables into cash 
 Although the receivables have created a right to payment from the 
underlying obligor or the potential for payment, the receivables have not produced 
the payment in tangible form.  Securitisation allows an entity to transform an 
intangible receivable into a tangible receivable.  Or in the case where the right to 
payment does not exist other than the potential to earn that right, securitisation 
allows the entity to transform this right or potential right into a tangible asset.  It 
provides the liquidity which is expected at a later or unpredictable date.  Thus, the 
effect of securitisation is that it accelerates the evolution of the receivable – from 
intangible to tangible form.   
 
4. Maintains an active market 
 Securitisation has developed an active market for asset backed securities.  
These securities are debt securities that are supported by the receivables.  The 
market developed in the US before growing in other countries around the globe.  
The continuous development of securitisation allows the market to remain active. 
  
5. Off-balance sheet finance 
 The ambit of this work does not include a discussion on securitisation from 
an accounting perspective.  However, securitisation is associated with what 
accountants call “off-balance sheet finance” thus, it is worth a brief mention.  “Off 
balance sheet finance” occurs when the originator acquires funds from the SPV 
which do not appear on the originator’s balance sheet as borrowing.  Even though 
the SPV borrows the funds from the capital markets and transfers it to the originator, 
the originator’s balance sheet will record this acquisition as funding received in 
exchange for receivables sold or pledged and not as a strict borrowing since the 
received funds do not carry any risk or liability which would need to be recorded.   
 
5. EVOLUTION OF SECURITISATION  
The concept of securitising assets was developed in the US in the 1970’s 
when the first transaction was launched.  It involved mortgages, which were 
purchased from the secondary mortgage market by a special purpose vehicle.  The 
mortgages were guaranteed by a government agency known as the Government 
National Mortgage Association (GNMA), which ensured the creditability of the bond 
issue and the overall structure.  The process set the foundation for the future 
(Kravitt, 1996: 21).   
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 During the 1980’s securitisation was seen as a process which could enable 
other entities to raise finance or remove risk-embedded assets off its balance sheet;  
and the concept that any form of cashflow can be securitised was born (Schwarcz, 
1994).  Mortgages were a popular asset used in many securitisation deals and deals 
were creatively named.  A pool of mortgages supported securities called 
“collateralised mortgage backed securities” (Standard and Poor’s, 1993x).  
Alongside these deals, originators started to isolate pools of credit card receivables 
and used these as support to issue securities.  For example, Citibank isolated a 
portion of its credit card receivables into a pool and issued securities backed by the 
pool.  This enabled Citibank to remove risk-embedded assets of its balance sheet 
thus providing finance for other business operations (Moody’s Investor Services, 
2000: 4). 
Securitisation structures are either based on existing receivables or future 
receivables.  The difference is that a structure supported by existing receivables 
relies on rights to payments which exist or can be ascertained.  The originator is 
party to a contract which has created an intangible asset.  For example, a bank is a 
party to a contract for the provision of a mortgage.  The mortgage repayments are 
based on an established payment pattern from which the bank can ascertain the 
amount and frequency of the repayments.  This payment pattern assists the credit 
rating agency in determining the strength and reliability of the right to payments.   
In contrast, future receivables are rights to payments which will come into 
existence at a future date or will potentially come into existence.  For example, a film 
production company raises finance to fund part of the production costs.  The film is 
yet to become an asset and its rewards are yet to become an intangible asset.  
Nevertheless, bonds may be issued supported by the predicted cashflow pattern 
since the credit rating agency will analyse the production company’s ability to 
produce the film and market it appropriately in order to achieve the predicted 
rewards.  The payment pattern and rights, although do not exist, can be predicted to 
materialise at a predictable date (upon completion of the film) or has a strong 
possibility of existing.   
Securitisation of future receivables is perhaps a more risky transaction since 
the investors have to be convinced that they will achieve the stated return.  The 
credit rating agency factors into its rating criteria the uncertainty of the 
materialisation of the predicted receivables – the asset which is to produce the 
predicted receivables may fail to produce them.  Since the originator relies largely 
on its business plans to produce the predicted income, the credit rating agency 
requires additional external support to cover any miscalculations which later become 
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apparent in the business plans.  The risk for investors investing in securities backed 
by future receivables derives from the fact that the rating assigned to the securities 
reflects, in part, predicted business plans and, in part, the originator’s ability to 
produce the assets.  Conversely, securities backed by existing receivables are safer 
because the rating assigned reflects, in part, actual invoices awaiting payments and, 
in part, the originator’s ability to pass on the receivables to the SPV.  The credit 
rating agency will focus on where the risks exist.   
It is interesting to note that a securitisation of existing receivables relies less 
on credit enhancement than a securitisation of future receivables.  The reason 
behind this is that the pool of existing receivables consists of actual generated 
receivables which will materialise into a cashflow at a known date, whereas a pool of 
future receivables consists of a generated opportunity to produce receivables.  In 
the former, the payment pattern can be predicted and any shortfall or weakness can 
be made good.  In the latter, the payment pattern cannot be accurately predicted, 
save for the business plan, thus it is difficult to conceive the extent of any shortfall or 
weakness. 
The future of securitisation is that it will continue to exist in a good economy 
for many more decades. Although, securitisation is hailed for its benefits, it does 
have a major restriction – it is only workable in a good economy and if all predictions 
materialise reasonably (Moody’s Investor Services, 2000b: 7).  In a suffering 
economy investors become sceptical and cautious about investments – they have a 
tendency to shift funds into secure investments.  Capital markets are a safe 
investment, but a securitisation relies largely on the ability of the originator to pay 
the SPV and funds passing unhindered to the investors.  The credit risk inherent in 
each receivable is a crucial risk which is assessed by the credit rating agency.  If the 
receivable fails to pay then this ultimately impacts on the investors.  For this reason 
the credit rating agency scrutinises the pool using worst case scenarios (discussed 
in chapter 2) to ensure that in a bad economy the investors are not affected or at 
least any loss can be measured and compensated for using external credit support.  
A good economy is essential to ensure that the underlying obligors pay what is due 
so that the receivables materialise from rights to payment to actual tangible assets 
which are ultimately passed on to the investors.   
It is true that external credit support can be incorporated into the structure to 
compensate for any loss, but it is worth noting that this support is a carefully 
measured loss coverage package and is limited to those predictable losses which 
are associated with credit and structural risks.  Thus, any predictions made need to 
reflect closely with reality.  For example, in the late 1990’s a number of credit card 
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structures were causing losses and triggered external credit support to compensate 
investors (Moody’s Investor Services, 2000b: 9).  Although, testing scenarios were 
used to calculate the credit and structural risks, it is difficult to predict exactly how 
the pool will perform – the credit rating agency’s testing is only guidance as to what 
loss to expect, it is not an accurate prediction of what to expect.  Thus, the 
performance of the pool needs to reflect closely with the predictions made by the 
credit rating agency.  A factor like a sudden global recession can not be predicted – 
the events of 9/11 could not be predicted thus, the post-global recession could not 
have been part of the testing criteria.  
The securitisation industry has experienced phenomenal growth since its 
inception.  Today, more countries are experimenting and utilising securitisation 
because of its benefits.  But what has fuelled the growth?  The two key reasons why 
an entity engages in a securitisation are either to raise finance which is favourably 
rated or to remove risk-embedded assets off its balance sheet (Moody’s Investor 
Services, 2000: 5-6).  A common reason for using securitisation in both scenarios is 
competition.   Financial institutions strive to profit by offering a range of financial 
products which require a good balance sheet.  For example, discounted loans and 
pensions funds require the financial institution to have sufficient capital and financial 
reserves.  Thus, securitisation allows the financial institution to remove risk-
embedded assets off its balance sheet and free up capital to cover another type of 
risk.  It also provides finance instantly which can be invested in new projects.  
Globalisation and the surge in cross border activities have increased competition 
among financial institutions, and consequently has created opportunities for financial 
engineering.  Securitisation allows the financial institution to increase its lending 
capacity without having to find additional deposits or capital infusion.  The financial 
institution becomes more visible to the outside world and investors through the 
process of securitisation. 
A non-financial entity also strives for profit and seeks new opportunities to 
prosper.  Securitisation allows this entity to remove any risk-embedded assets off its 
balance sheet and gain access to instant funds.  Further, the entity can gain access 
to favourable rated finance which is not limited to its corporate rating.  Moreover, 
any dips in the economy may cause an entity to re-think and restructure its 
operations so that any loss can be compensated for by gaining from other 
opportunities.  Securitisation allows an entity to gain funds and invest in new 
projects.   Nations can also benefit by gaining access to finance using a rating that is 
higher than its sovereign rating. 
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Another strong reason for the growth of securitisation is the increasing shift 
towards seeking alternative financing sources as opposed to traditional commercial 
loans from financial institutions (Feeney, 1995).  Downgrading in corporate and 
sovereign ratings has led entities to seek alternative financing options.  Raising 
finance through securitisation does not rely on an entity’s business operations – the 
focus is on the strength and reliability of the receivables which act as support for the 
bonds.  A bond issue created through securitisation is rated according to the 
receivables as opposed to the entity generating the receivables. 
 
6. FUTURE OF SECURITISATION 
 The future of securitisation is certain as long as competition exists and 
ratings of entities and nations continue to fluctuate.  Ingenuity has created 
innovative structures which use various intangible assets.  The following are a few 
ideas that the author suggests are the potential for securitisation. 
 
1. Repairing and developing infrastructures: securitisation can allow a nation to 
repair and develop its economic infrastructure by utilising generated cashflows or 
potential cashflows to raise finance.  For example, Iraq holds a rich supply of oil 
which can assist greatly in its development.  The government of Iraq can create a 
company or a trust which owns the oil reserves and contracts with other nations to 
supply oil.  The proceeds of these contracts will generate receivables and future 
receivables.  These can be sold to a separate SPV who issues bonds to raise 
finance for developing the nation’s infrastructure.  The finance raised is not affected 
by Iraq’s sovereign rating. 
 
2. Pensions: Recent economic changes have affected pension funds in the UK 
to the extent that fund have lost value.  Securitisation can be used to resolve certain 
problems in relation to pension funds.  For example, assume a pension provider 
creates a scheme whereby pension seekers enter into an arrangement of depositing 
a fixed amount of money frequently into a fund.  These deposits are receivables 
which can be used to support a short or mid-term bond issue to raise funds.  The 
proceeds of the bond issue can be invested into a fixed interest bearing investment.  
The interest earned from the fixed investment can be used to pay interest on the 
bonds – the remainder is profit.  After the life of the bonds the invested amount will 
continue accruing interest at a fixed rate.  The pension seeker is then free to 
drawdown the pension and receive an amount which has not been greatly altered by 
economic conditions. 
 
  22 
3. Transport: The falling condition of the London Underground has sparked 
many initiatives to re-finance for reparatory work.  Proceeds from users can be used 
to support bonds and raise vital finance.  Proceeds of the bonds can be 
proportionately split to handle operating and repair costs.   
  
 The next generation of securitisation structures may include substituting 
bond issues for bank borrowings.  Instead of raising funds from the capital markets, 
the SPV may use the receivables to support repayments on a syndicate loan.  The 
risk is spread amongst a syndicate of banks who are then free to transfer the risk on 
to others through a securitisation.  Structures can be developed which can assist 
mergers – an entity uses the generated and potential receivables of a target entity to 
raise funds to purchase the target entity.  
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CHAPTER 2 CREDIT RATING AND SECURITISATION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the previous chapter, securitisation is using the creditworthiness, 
collateral and cashflows of receivables as support for the securities.  According to 
Standard and Poor’s (1993r: 3), prior to any added enhancement, it is imperative 
that such support is sufficient to give potential investors the needed comfort to view 
the securities as a safe investment.  Calculating the sufficiency of such support and 
evaluating the inevitable risks are tasks which an untrained potential investor is not 
competent to undertake.  Additionally, because of the ingenuity and innovation of 
this type of financing investors need to have this technicalities of securitisation 
interpreted into terms which are understandable and disclose fully the risks involved, 
risks which are increasingly becoming distinct from those risks inherent in 
conventional bond issues (Standard and Poor’s, 1993g: 5).   
Therefore, an intermediary needs to interpose and undertake the tasks of 
calculating the amount of support needed and evaluating what risks are inherent in 
or can foreseeably be imposed on the securitisation structure which will 
consequently affect investors. This intermediary is a credit rating agency.  Within the 
industry two rating agencies stand out for their experience and reputation for rating 
securitisation transactions, namely, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s Investor 
Services.  This chapter is based largely on their publications and detailed 
discussions with their rating analysts in London and New York. 
 
2. CREDIT RATING 
Because securitisation is a distinct form of raising capital through a bond 
issue, there are complex risks involved in the operation which are not necessarily 
inherent in a conventional bond issue.  As stated earlier, the difference between 
asset-backed securities (the product of securitisation) and conventional bonds is 
that the former are supported by the creditworthiness, collateral and cashflows of 
receivables of an entity whereas the latter are supported by an entity's business 
performance.  Although at first sight the two type of securities look similar, in that an 
entity's performance supports the securities in both cases (receivables can only be 
generated by performance), there is, however, a distinction visible upon close 
analysis.   
In a conventional bond issue the rating agency will test an entity's business 
performance and its financial stability using worst case scenarios (discussed later in 
this chapter) which best reflect the risks exposed to investors in its business or 
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securities.  However, in an asset-backed securities’ issue the rating agency will test 
the actual receivables using worst case scenarios which best reflect the risks 
exposed to investors.  
Asset-backed securities provide interest and principal payments to investors 
solely from the payment pattern of the receivables.  There is no other source of 
income for investors in asset-backed securities.  Although credit enhancement 
facilities such as external guarantees and overcollateralisation may be incorporated 
into the structure, their primary purpose is to provide the SPV with liquidity whenever 
receivable payments for a particular payment period fall short of sufficiency 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993g: 3-5).  Investors have no claim for payments from the 
originator of the receivables because the receivables have been legally assigned or 
pledged to the SPV – this is known as non-recourse finance because the SPV has 
no recourse to the originator, save and except where the transferred receivables 
have defaulted. 
A rating agency will, typically, receive from an investment banker (on behalf 
of the originator) a request for a rating.  On numerous occasions both parties will 
hold detailed discussions regarding, inter alia, the receivables, the structure and the 
economics of the operation.  Numerous documents are reviewed by the agency 
before any indication of a rating is made.   
The rating agency will view the securitisation structure from an investor's 
point of view.  That is, will an investor receive the principal on maturity together with 
interest payments as promised by the issuer?  The rating agency will scrutinise the 
securitisation structure to discover risks which may ultimately impede cashflows to 
the investors.  According to both Standard and Poor’s (1993r: 2-4) and Moody’s 
(2000: 7-9) the risks inherent in a typical securitisation structure can broadly be 
named as collateral risk and structural risk.   
 
3. COLLATERAL RISK 
The SPV is an entity with no financial assets and structured so that it can 
only raise finance by using the receivables it intends to purchase as security and 
income.  Therefore, the receivables it intends to purchase need to be financially 
strong in order to meet all of the SPV's obligations under the securities issue.  
Collateral risk analysis is associated with the credit quality of the receivables.  From 
an analytical perspective collateral risk is any weakness in the collateral which will 
reduce its financial strength.  Any weakness in the collateral, if not rectified, can 
affect the SPV's obligations towards investors and third parties such as the trustee, 
custodian and the paying agent.   Each asset pool is distinct in nature and this 
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distinction will dictate the type of collateral analysis undertaken and the type of 
structure used to amortise the securities.   
Collateral analysis is ‘closely examining the ingredients of the pool of 
receivables and breaking each ingredient down to its core to ascertain, with near 
accuracy, the risks involved or that may be imposed on the pool of receivables 
through testing scenarios’ (Moody’s, 2000: 15-16).  An example provided by 
Standard and Poor’s (1993a: 19) is, assume a pool of 100 mortgages, each with a 
life of 20 years and a yield of 6% p.a. (excluding principal).  The ingredients of the 
pool consists of a 20 year long right to claim payments from a debtor, a benefit 
which financially provides interest at 6% p.a. and the aforementioned multiplied by 
100.  A critical analysis shows that, firstly, a 20 year long claim to payments can 
easily be cut short if the debtor becomes insolvent, secondly, the benefit of 6% p.a. 
interest can become a loss (an interest rise if the 6% is a fixed rate or an interest 
rate fall if the 6% is floating) and finally, if any debtor defaults and repossession 
results then the content of the pool will drop. 
Collateral analysis scrutinises the collateral using historical data gathered by 
the rating agency concerning the type of assets in the pool.  The data is used to 
show the performance pattern of a pool under normal economic conditions.  Testing 
scenarios are then added to distort the performance patterns according to the 
desired rating.  For example, assume a pool of 100 mortgages, each with a life of 20 
years with a fixed yield of 6% p.a.  Now assume that historical data dictates that 
over the life of the pool (twenty years) 20 mortgages will default and cease to exist 
within the first 10 years and thereafter there is an invariable reduction of 1 mortgage 
every 5 years from the pool.  This historical default pattern is then used with the 
pool's contents to produce cashflow simulations of the pool throughout its life.  If the 
pool can afford to pay the SPV's obligations then it is assigned a bottom rating - 'C' 
(Standard and Poor’s (1993a: 20). 
If, however, the SPV wishes to have this rating increased then the rating 
agency will apply the testing scenario according to the desired rating.  These 
scenarios assume the pool to experience worst-case economic conditions to 
establish whether investors will be paid as promised.  The higher the desired rating 
the worse the economic assumptions made.  The distinction in asset pools not only 
dictates the type of collateral analysis but also dictates the type of amortisation 
structure.  That is, how the collateral is used as security and support the securities 
and pay investors.  Assume that a pool is a large pot in which cashflows from the 
underlying debtors are consistently deposited in equal amounts over a set period of 
time.  This pot of money is used as security and support for securities.  The SPV 
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can use this pot to amortise its obligations to investors by using either a cashflow 
structure or a market value structure.  To determine which of the two is appropriate 
the rating agency undertakes a cashflow analysis and a market value analysis of the 
pot (collateral).  The purpose of the analysis is to determine how the investors will 
receive their principal and interest payments in a timely manner.  The analysis 
consists of examining both the life expectancy of the pot and the securities which 
the SPV intends to issue. 
Both Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s believe that if the life expectancy of 
the collateral closely matches the life expectancy of the securities then a cashflow 
analysis will show that a cashflow structure is appropriate (Standard and Poor’s 
(1993a: 34; Moody’s, 2000: 19).  The reason for this is that, assume a pot with a life 
expectancy of 5 years, that is, for a period of 5 years the pot will receive receivables.  
Now assume that the SPV intends to issue securities with a life expectancy of just 
under 5 years.  The cashflow structure is appropriate because as receivables are 
deposited investors can be paid both interest and principal proportionately and this 
performance pattern can be forecasted.  Normally, investors are paid interest during 
the interest-only period which is usually three quarters of the securities' life.  After 
this period principal can either be paid proportionately with interest payments over 
the remaining period of the securities' life or in a lump sum just prior to the date on 
which the securities mature. 
Alternatively, the pot of receivables can be used to pay the SPV's obligation 
using a market value structure.  Again, the analysis for this structure also consists of 
examining the life expectancy of the pot and the intended securities.  However, what 
determines this structure as appropriate is if the life expectancy of the collateral 
exceeds the life expectancy of the intended securities or issue programme.  An 
example provided by Standard and Poor’s (1993a: 38) is, assume a pot of 
mortgages with a life expectancy of 10 years.  Now assume that the SPV intends on 
issuing short-term securities with a life expectancy of 6 years or a revolving 
programme in which two shorter-term securities of 3 years are issued consecutively.  
When the securities mature the pot still has a life expectancy of 4 years. The SPV 
can again issue another class of 3 year securities with 1 year remaining on the pot's 
life.  This is when a market value structure proves beneficial in that the pot can be 
liquidated (the remaining assets sold in the secondary market) and proceeds used 
to amortise an issue.  Under a typical market value structure the life of the pot 
exceeds the life of the securities.  Interest is paid on the securities during the 
interest-only period and the received principal is reinvested in new receivables thus 
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overcollateralising the structure.  After the interest-only period has expired the pot is 
liquidated so that the principal is repaid when the securities mature. 
Although there are minor variations in the way cashflow and market value 
structures are operated, these variations are usually due to the intended programme 
of issuance and how it is appropriately supported by the collateral. 
Another factor, according to Moody’s (2000: 22-23), which can influence the 
SPV to adopt a market value structure is if there exists an active secondary market 
for the assets in the pool – ‘a pre-requisite’ in the opinion of Standard and Poor’s 
(1993a: 38).  The SPV needs to ensure that if it decides to opt for a market value 
structure the remaining assets can be sold to meet the principal demand when the 
securities mature. 
 
4. STRUCTURAL RISK 
To recap, the collateral analysis examines the credit quality of the pot of 
receivables.  The performance pattern of the receivables is dictated by the 
underlying contracts between the originator and debtors.  Using historical data and 
testing scenarios the rating agency will have produced cashflows which forecast the 
performance pattern of the collateral according to the desired rating.   
Once a collateral analysis has been conducted the rating agency's then 
conducts a structural analysis of the pool of receivables in order to ascertain the 
structural risks, that is, those risks which affect payments from the underlying 
receivables reaching the investors. 
As Moody’s correctly states, no two pools of receivables will behave in a 
similar manner (2000: 26-27).  For this reason the rating agency will shape the 
structural analysis to suit the pool of receivables.  The key concerns according to 
Moody’s (2000: 28) and Standard and Poor’s (1993r: 14) in the structure are:  
 
• interest mismatch  • cashflow allocation 
• reinvestment   • prepayment 
• loss allocation  • liquidity 
• commingling 
 
The SPV will receive receivables at different yields.  Some may be at a fixed 
rate while some at a floating rate based on underlying base rates.  The securities it 
issues can either be at a fixed or floating rate but certainly with a lower yield than it 
receives on the receivables.  Because of this difference in the interest rates – 
viewed as profit – the rating agency will suggest that this difference in the yields is 
deposited into a fund account and used primarily for expenses which arise 
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periodically throughout the life of the SPV.  The fund account must be with a bank 
rated at least equal to the securities.  In the event that a bank becomes insolvent 
funds can be frozen in all accounts.  Therefore, the bank's rating can affect the 
overall rating of the issue. 
The concerns relating to prepayment and reinvestment are, often, viewed as 
related, in that whenever prepayment is triggered concern for reinvestment is 
consequently triggered.  The performance pattern of a pool is, to a certain extent, 
dictated by the behaviour of the underlying debtors.  It can easily be the case that a 
debtor prepays and fulfils its obligation prior to the expected date – typical situations 
include a debtor refinancing debts at a lower rate.  The inevitable effect of 
prepayment is that the pool has decreased and received a lump sum of principal.  
Since prepayment is an event that cannot be accurately predicted, the SPV needs to 
safeguard the pool from falling below the required amount to meet all obligations.  
The safest way is to reinvest any prepaid principal in new receivables. However, 
there is the risk that the SPV may find it difficult to purchase similar yielding 
receivables to those that were prepaid.  The rating agency will, however, offer 
guidance, using a criterion, as to the type of investment and yield needed to 
continue the cashflow pattern (Moody’s, 2000: 29).   
Prepayment is an event which can occur unpredictably during the life of the 
pool.  Although historical data can indicate approximately a prepayment pattern of 
an asset pool, the SPV safeguards against this risk by purchasing additional 
receivables so that the structure is overcollateralised during the interest-only period 
of the securities.  
Cashflow allocation is only a significant concern if no cashflow distribution 
mechanism is in place (Moody’s, 2000: 29).  The mechanism which facilitates 
cashflow allocation is devised by taking into account the performance pattern of the 
collateral, the payment pattern and structure of the securities.  The degree of 
concern for the distribution mechanism will reflect the number of different classes of 
securities issued by the SPV.  The SPV needs to ensure that if it issues a multiple 
class of securities, investors, regardless of their class of security, will receive 
interest and principal payments timely and fully.    
However, subordinate structures (used to issue multiple class of securities) 
have an inherent advantage in that they can allow loss allocation to occur within the 
structure without an effect on the SPV.  The loss is distributed to investors of the 
subordinate class of securities.  Because these investors expect a higher yield than 
the higher class of securities they are exposed to a higher risk of non-payment.  
Usually, the subordinate class of securities is rated lower than the higher class of 
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securities and in some cases they are known to be unrated thus, placing the risk of 
the securities entirely on potential investors.  If the operation is a success then these 
investors can easily make a handsome profit but if it fails then these investors have 
more to lose and may not receive their expected return. 
Once the receivables have been assigned by the originator, the originator 
will remain a party to the structure to the extent of acting as a servicer.  The servicer 
is obligated to receive payments from the underlying debtors and convey these on to 
the SPV.  As well as acting as servicer the originator also engages in its own 
business.  This can easily lead to the originator commingling its receipts with those 
from the SPV's receivables.  This concern becomes significant in the event of the 
originator's insolvency/bankruptcy because the originator's accounts and assets can 
be 'frozen' thus, causing a delay in the cashflow allocation.  In practice, to safeguard 
against this risk the SPV will open a 'lockbox' account into which the originator 
deposits receipts.  This account is cleared daily and proceeds are moved to the 
SPV's personal account.  A 'lockbox' account is distinctive in that the originator can 
only deposit funds and not have access to the benefits whereas the SPV can only 
have access to the benefits and not deposit funds.  Moreover, a 'lockbox' account 
cannot be treated as the originator's asset even if it can access the account for 
depositing (Moody’s, 2000: 30-31). 
 
5. INFLUENCE OF SOVEREIGN RATING ON SECURITISATION 
The aforementioned discussion focused on the analysis undertaken and 
risks inherent in securitisation structures.  Although collateral and structural risk 
discovery is vital when assigning a rating, sovereign risk analysis has also become 
increasingly significant.  During the infancy of securitisation, structures were 
composed in a manner that all participants and components existed in one 
jurisdiction.  Now that securitisation has developed – 30 years later – this is not the 
case anymore.  
Today, a typical structure incorporates international participants and cross 
border issuances.  Because of this trend towards globalisation sovereign risk 
analysis is certainly an important and inevitable subject of analysis in asset-backed 
securities.  
Sovereign risk analysis originally focused on the ability and willingness of a 
particular country's central bank to make available foreign currency on order for the 
government or corporate borrowers to repay foreign currency debt obligations 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993b: 3).  The sovereign rating of a country reflects this 
ability and willingness.  Because asset-backed securities have changed due to 
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globalisation this original sovereign analysis is vital.  Participants such as liquidity 
providers and swap counterparties need to be assessed with a sovereign risk rating 
in mind.  A swap counterparty who is swapping currency needs comfort that foreign 
currency will be available for it to undertake its obligations under the swap.  
Similarly, a liquidity provider may be called upon to provide foreign currency and 
therefore needs comfort that foreign currency will be available.  
However, due to the expansion of asset-backed securities in a global 
context, two other types of analysis have been incorporated into the sovereign risk 
analysis.  These are domestic currency risk analysis and bank deposits in foreign 
branches risk analysis. 
 
1. Foreign currency risk analysis 
This analysis seeks to measure the ability and willingness of a country's 
central bank to make available foreign currency for borrowers to service foreign 
currency debt (Standard and Poor’s, 1993b: 4-5).  The analysis is based on two 
possible scenarios, firstly, a country's borrower may default on its foreign currency 
debt obligation due to the country's deficient foreign exchange earnings, and 
secondly, there could be a sudden cashflow interruption in foreign exchange 
earnings thus, creating a liquidity problem.  With these scenarios the rating agency 
will assess the likelihood of a borrower unable to convert its domestic currency 
cashflow into the required currency in the time required. 
This analysis can form the basis of estimating long-term vulnerabilities in a 
country's pattern of generating wealth and the ability to repay foreign obligations. 
Political factors are also incorporated into the analysis to discover if a country's 
ability and willingness to repay foreign obligations are affected.  According to 
Standard and Poor’s (1993b: 5) acts such as a radical change in leadership or 
trading policy can easily add weight to the significance of political factors in the 
analysis.  Once these factors are assessed the rating agency can assign a 
sovereign rating.  This sovereign rating acts as a "ceiling" for foreign currency 
denominated securities of any entity that falls under the country's political control.  
For example, assume that the UK has a foreign currency rating of AA, any entity 
regardless of how financially strong it is can only be assigned a maximum AA rating 
for any foreign currency issues.  This is true even if the entity's domestic bonds are 
rated AAA (Standard and Poor’s, 1993b: 5).  The reason for the ceiling derives from 
the fact that all foreign currency payments are under the control of a country's 
central bank.  The central bank of a country has the legal power to impose controls 
on funds flowing in and out of its country. 
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Foreign currency risk analysis is undertaken in a structure in which the 
originator sells receivables to a SPV which then issues securities denominated in a 
currency different to the currency of the underlying receivables.  The SPV needs to 
ensure that foreign currency is available to repay investors.  In practice, SPVs (in 
similar structures) are located in countries with a high foreign currency sovereign 
ceiling so that the ceiling cannot limit the rating of the issue.  Furthermore, banks are 
used which are located in countries with high sovereign ceilings and so are other 
parties who offer monetary support in foreign currency. 
 
2. Domestic currency risk analysis 
The analysis for domestic currency risk is different to foreign currency risk 
analysis.  The main reason is that a government has more control over its own 
monetary, regulatory and legal environments than it has outside its sovereign 
jurisdiction.   
The rating assigned to government debt acts as a ceiling to all domestic 
issues of any entity within the government's political control (Standard and Poor’s, 
1993b: 7).  Government debt is always assigned the highest possible rating due to 
the fact that it can easily meet its local currency obligations through taxation or 
money creation.  Likewise, domestic currency obligations of a corporation are not 
subject to the same risks that are inherent in any of its foreign currency obligations.  
For example, foreign earnings can be withheld in political crisis.  Furthermore, the 
central bank has no control mechanism for domestic currency like it does for foreign 
currency. 
Therefore, according to Standard and Poor’s (1993b: 7) it is possible for an 
entity to have a domestic currency rating higher than its foreign currency rating.  For 
example, Denmark’s domestic currency rating (as at 22 October, 1997; Standard 
and Poor’s, 1993b: 8) was AAA whereas its foreign currency rating is AA+ and is 
predicted as remaining stable.  Other examples are, India with a domestic currency 
rating of BBB+ and a foreign currency rating of BB+ (as at 22 October, 1997; 
Standard and Poor’s, 1993b: 8) and the respective AAA/AA- domestic versus 
foreign currency ratings held by Portugal (as at 22 October, 1997; Standard and 
Poor’s, 1993b: 8).  However, the analysis for domestic currency rating focuses on a 
number of factors including political and economic risks within the country itself. 
 
3. Deposits in foreign branches risk analysis 
In a typical securitisation the cash generated by receivables is held in trust in 
a deposit account at a bank.  The deposits may become quite sizable and can affect 
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the credit quality and rating of the issue.  However, in many cross-border issues the 
issuer will deposit the cash in a foreign branch of a bank until it is needed to pay 
investors residing in that country.  Because cross-border issues are becoming 
increasingly popular the assessment of monies held in foreign branches of banks is 
another part of the sovereign risk analysis which can influence asset-backed 
securities.  
Each bank in its home country will have a deposit rating assigned based, in 
part, on that country's foreign currency and domestic currency sovereign ceiling.  
This deposit rating is reviewed periodically by rating agencies.  However, in cross-
border issues, how should deposits be rated if they are held in a foreign branch of a 
bank?  
A foreign branch of a bank becomes subject to the sovereign power and 
legal environment of the branch's host country.  Any deposits held in the foreign 
branch can only be rated (that is, acknowledged as a creditable source of monetary 
support for investors) if the host country has been assigned a sovereign ceiling for 
bank deposits.  All of the much used financial centres of the world have sovereign 
ceilings for bank deposits (Standard and Poor’s, 1993b: 15-18).  
In such cases the deposit in the foreign branch will be rated lower than either 
the rating of the parent bank or the sovereign ceiling for bank deposits of the host 
country.  If the sovereign ceiling is lower than the rating of the parent bank then an 
unconditional guarantee could possibly raise the deposit's rating to the level of those 
in the home country.  For example, assume a parent bank rated AAA with a branch 
in a country with a sovereign ceiling of BBB.  If the parent bank provides an 
unconditional guarantee then the branch's rating will be raised to the rating it would 
have been assigned if it was operating in its home country (Standard and Poor’s, 
1993b: 15-18). 
In general, it is understood that banks are liable for claims on their foreign 
branches.  However, actions of a host country may prevent the foreign branch from 
servicing its liabilities in a timely manner.  In this instance the parent bank may be 
held to service the foreign branch's liability.  However, because any deposit contract 
is governed by the host country's law, courts of another country can generally refuse 
to contravene the host country's sovereign authority, thus relieving the parent bank 
of the obligations of its foreign branch. 
Therefore, in conclusion, issuers in cross-border transactions need to select 
with care foreign branches of banks which are used to deposit cash for investors or 
to route money around because the sovereign ceiling for deposit rating can certainly 
influence the overall rating of the securitisation. 
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CHAPTER 3 CREDIT RATING IN PRACTICE 
 
This chapter seeks to demonstrate how different assets in a pool are 
analysed by the credit rating agency in order to establish a near accurate yet reliable 
indication of the risks associated with the assets. 
The assets used for demonstrating have been carefully selected to reflect 
the difference in the rating agency’s analysis.  Securitisation has been undertaken 
using different types of assets which require different approaches when analysing 
credit and structural risk.  This part of the chapter will demonstrate Standard and 
Poor’s analysis respecting mortgage, credit card receivables, trade receivables, 
future receivables and synthetic securities. 
 
1. MORTGAGES 
Mortgages were the first type of asset used for securitisation (Standard and 
Poor’s, 1993n: 1) and are ideal for securitisation purposes because of their inbuilt 
security of taking charge of the mortgaged property and furthermore, the proceeds 
of the insurance policy which covered any deduction in security. 
 
1.1 COLLATERAL RISK 
A rating agency will first assess the collateral risk, that is, the risk associated 
with the credit quality of the mortgages which support the securities issued.  There 
are two main concerns which the rating agency underlying the rating agency’s 
analysis.  These are according to Standard and Poor’s (1993a: 22-23): 
 
1. Delinquent payments – which occur when the borrower fails to make the 
required payments; and 
2. Default – which occurs when the borrower has defaulted severely so as to 
allow the lender to repossess the mortgaged property. 
 
Both delinquent payments and default causes cashflow problems for the 
SPV.  This consequently affects the investors as cashflow disruption will affect the 
timely conveyance of payments to the investors. 
 
1. Delinquent payments 
A credit rating agency will class delinquent payments or arrears as either 
short-term or long-term.  Short-term arrears are those which consist of overdue 
payments amounting to less than two months, whereas long-term arrears are those 
which are in arrears for more than two months.  Short-term delinquencies are initially 
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viewed as the effects of administration errors or acts, such as a change in the 
borrower’s direct debit instructions, which can easily be rectified. 
However, they can also be the initial signs of long-term delinquency 
behaviour if not rectified within the first month of arrear.  For example, in countries 
such as Sweden where banks do not have automatic debiting facilities this creates 
the potential for defaulting on payments (Standard & Poor’s, 1993q: 3).  Long-term 
delinquencies are observed closely as they provide a reliable indication of 
underlying asset performance from which projections of future liquidity and credit 
cover usages can be made.  These projections need to be accurately made so as to 
prevent any downgrading of the rated issue.   
However, arrears can be distorted quite easily (Standard and Poor’s, 1993a: 
23-24).  Firstly, in a falling interest rate environment long-term arrears can be 
overstated.  For example, if a borrower has arrears of £1000 and his monthly 
repayments are £550, the arrears will be classified as short-term because the 
overdue amount is less than two months of payments.  However, if interest rates fall 
and the borrower's monthly repayments are reduced to £450, the arrears are then 
classed as long-term even if the total amount has remained at £1000.   
Secondly, the decline in pool size over an issue's life can overstate 
percentage arrear levels.  A pool reduces in size as mortgages repay and the non-
performing mortgages remain at the same level.  Thus, percentage arrear levels can 
increase while the absolute arrear values remain constant if performing mortgages 
are being redeemed from the pool.  And finally, arrears can be artificially lowered by 
programmes in which lenders allow a capitalisation of a borrower's outstanding 
payments.  This increases the value of an individual's loan while removing that 
portion of arrears from the lenders portfolio, even though no payments have been 
made. 
 
2. Default 
A borrower's performance pattern for any mortgage is, of course, dictated 
and influenced by external economic conditions.  However, for a rating agency to 
predict performance by analysing every cause of economic effects is expensive and 
time consuming.   
Therefore, the analysis is reduced to analysing four factors which relevantly 
affect performance (Standard and Poor’s, 1993a: 24-25): 
 
1. Loan-To-Value (LTV):  The borrower's proportion of equity in the property is 
an incentive to continue payments.  A borrower with a LTV nearing 100% will have 
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no personal investment or equity in the property and thus, no incentive to maintain a 
continuing payment schedule in a falling house price environment. 
 
2. Income multiple requirements:  This requirement plays a key role in any 
negotiation for a mortgage.  The lender has a formula which calculates the 
maximum amount available for a particular borrower.  The income multiplier will vary 
according to the salary scales, inflation and general economic conditions of a 
particular country. 
 
3. Products:  Innovation has played a considerable part in creating many types 
of mortgages. Today, investment linked mortgages are still a fashionable product 
and inbuilt assistance like deferred interest rates have helped more people become 
homeowners.  However, as mortgage products advance, their analysis of risk differs 
to reflect their characteristics.  For example, a deferred interest rate is a beneficial 
element for a first time buyer but the rating agency will take a negative view of this.  
Because first time buyers will be obligated to pay reduced or discounted repayments 
for the first 12 months (at least), historical data held by rating agencies shows that 
after the initial period of low interest payments comes a rise in interest payments.  
Borrowers are practically unaware of the floating rate interest that will be payable 
once the fixed rate period expires.  Interest rates are reviewed monthly and adjusted 
accordingly.  Therefore, lenders cannot speculate future rates when mortgages are 
first contracted for. 
 
4. Borrower's status:  The creditworthiness of borrowers in the underlying asset 
pool is, in part, an indication of the creditworthiness of the whole securitisation.  
Enhancement facilities are used to strengthen any shortfalls in credit at the initial 
stage.  Due to huge losses sustained by banks during the 1980-90 recession in the 
UK, credit providers now use a tight credit criteria which effectively test each 
potential borrower's capacity to maintain a credit obligation.  The rating agency will 
evaluate the credit criteria used by the lender when assessing the creditworthiness 
of the asset pool.   Credit criteria will vary slightly to reflect each type of 
mortgage.   
 For example, a repayment mortgage involves the borrower paying principal 
and interest payments simultaneously and thus, requires a borrower with the 
capacity to maintain a consistent record of credit obligations, i.e. make timely 
payments of the required amount.  However, under an endowment mortgage, the 
borrower will pay the lender interest payments only and assign the beneficial interest 
in an endowment policy to the lender.  The onus is on the borrower and the fund 
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manager of the endowment policy to secure sufficient capital to pay the principal 
when it is due.  Because the principal is created by market forces acting upon a 
regular deposited amount in a fund, this is reflected in the credit criterion used by 
the lender to assess a potential borrower of an endowment mortgage.  The credit 
criterion is slightly relaxed if the borrower invests in a fund with a reputable and 
experienced fund manager.  This is often a condition precedent in the mortgage 
contract.   
 Self certification loans and non-status loans, however, require no credit 
checks and borrower assessment is based on very lax criterion.  Usually a lower 
LTV ratio is imposed on borrowers so that the property has equity which can be 
used as a cushion to absorb credit risk. 
 
1.2 CALCULATING LOSS 
The rating agency's primary concern is the likelihood of investors receiving 
full and timely payments.  Each pool of mortgages is analysed using historical data 
models which can predict the pool’s performance.  “Stress scenarios” are then 
added into the equation according to the desired rating.  Stress scenarios are also 
called worst case scenarios (Standard and Poor’s, 1993a: 25).  In short they are 
equations which form part of a computer based simulation designed to calculate loss 
and the predicted performance of the pool of receivables.  Worst case scenarios are 
highly confidential materials which, as stated by Christopher Such, Ratings Analyst, 
Standard and Poor’s, New York, during an interview on 20 March, 2003, ‘are never 
made public by any rating agency’.  However, there are materials which a rating 
agency will release which demonstrate worst case scenarios but lack significant 
detail.   
The credit loss of a pool of mortgages is calculated using the formula 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993a: 25):  
 
foreclosure frequency X loss severity  
 
Foreclosure frequency is the percentage of loans in the pool assumed to go 
into foreclosure (default) over the life of the issue.  Loss severity is the assumed 
average loss realised on each defaulted loan.  The foreclosure frequency is dictated 
by historical data showing percentages of predictable loan defaults over a period of 
time.  Whereas loss severity is calculated using the cost of converting a defaulted 
mortgage into a repossession of the property and then adding to that amount the 
loss sustained due to declining property values or an auction sale, all in a worst 
case scenario. 
  37 
1.3 ENHANCING 
Credit enhancement facilities protect the principal repayments on the bonds 
that could easily be affected by losses made on the resale of any repossessed 
properties.  A liquidity enhancement facility, conversely, ensures the timely payment 
of interest to investors when non-performing mortgages cause cashflow disruptions.  
Other than overcollaterisation, a pool of mortgages is, in practice, enhanced using 
two facilities (Standard and Poor’s, 1993x: 4-6).  Firstly, an insurance policy is 
arranged to cover a predetermined amount of potential defaults and associated 
losses.  This policy provides credit loss protection and an appropriate bank facility 
will often provide the liquidity enhancement  
Alternatively, a senior/junior structure is used (Standard and Poor’s, 1993s: 
2-4).  Here, at least, two classes of securities are issued by the SPV – class A and 
class B.  Class A securities have the right to claim first from the cashflows whereas, 
class B's claim to cashflows is subordinate.  If there is a shortfall in cashflows then 
class A securities are satisfied first and any remaining cashflows are allocated to 
class B securities.  However, a hybrid of senior/junior and overcollateralisation is 
commonly used to enhance the pool's creditworthiness.  Repayment of class B 
principal is delayed until class A has been fully paid and matured.  To do this all 
scheduled amortisation payments and unscheduled prepayments are used to pay 
class A while class B acquires the residual of the asset pool.  The deferral of 
payment to class B securities functions like an insurance policy for class A security 
holders. However, the protection afforded by deferral is not as effective as the 
protection offered by an insurance policy.  An insurance policy is liquid up to its 
coverage whereas the right to receive cashflows is illiquid.  An insurance policy can 
pay for losses as soon as they are realised, whereas in a senior/junior structure 
cashflows may not be available to cover the loss immediately (Standard and Poor’s, 
1993s: 5).  Additional enhancement for liquidity can be achieved by using any 
surplus from interest received and interest paid.  
Any loss sustained by the pool is, as stated by Christopher Such, Ratings 
Analyst, Standard and Poor’s, New York, during an interview on 20 March, 2003, 
absorbed using a three-tier cushion.  Tier- one absorbs first loss deductibles by 
using a fund set aside by the SPV to absorb any initial credit loss.  Tier-two will 
absorb further loss using mortgage indemnity policies.  And finally, tier-three will 
absorb any remaining loss using a pool insurance policy. 
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1.4 CASHFLOW RISK 
The quality of the securities issued by the SPV does not merely depend 
upon the riskiness of the receivables.  It also depends on the structure itself used to 
channel the payments from the receivables through to the investors.   
Cashflow models are used to test the cashflow streams under a variety of 
worst case scenarios.  The higher the desired rating the more severe the model's 
assumptions.  As a result, cashflow projections are produced which include the 
reduced cashflows together with all credit and liquidity supports.  Cashflow 
projections are produced using differing worst case scenarios.  Each projection is 
then analysed to calculate the need and extent of credit and liquidity support.  This 
way a range of projections are produced and one is ultimately chosen which 
appropriately mirrors the intentions of the investment banker (Christopher Such, 
Ratings Analyst, Standard and Poor’s, New York, during an interview on 20 March, 
2003).  
The cashflow must be sufficient to withstand loan delinquencies which, 
according to historical data, may continue for a period of up to six months before 
curing.  Furthermore, the cashflows must withstand the impact of loans remaining in 
default for a period of up to 18 months before repossession realises any return. 
Cashflow simulations are drawn up to represent cashflow allocation for 
structures primarily (but necessarily) incorporating a senior/junior structure.  Credit 
loss and liquidity shortfalls are covered by junior notes.  Cashflow simulations must 
prove that even under worst case scenario’s junior notes and reserve funds will 
provide the necessary protection for the senior notes (Standard and Poor’s, 1993s: 
6-7).  A typical simulation, as stated by Christopher Such, Ratings Analyst, Standard 
and Poor’s, New York, during an interview on 20 March, 2003, shows credit risk, 
liquidity risk, reinvestment risk (resulting from prepayment) and payments of all fees 
and expenses.  The cashflow simulations simulate a three year depression scenario 
with defaults occurring in the beginning of the first, second and third years of the 
depression. 
The three year depression is assumed to occur at anytime during the life of 
the issue.  The amount of defaults occurring during the three year depression is 
assumed to be 1/3 of the assumed default frequency (foreclosure frequency).  
Recoveries from repossession are assumed to be realised after the 19th month from 
when the default occurs.  The amount recovered is assumed to equal the 
outstanding mortgage amount less the loss severity (the average loss realised on 
each loan converted to repossession).  It is further assumed that short-term arrears 
(lasting up to two months) will occur during the three year depression period.   
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In the absence of a AAA rated guaranteed investment contract cashflows are 
assumed to be reinvested at a rate of LIBOR minus 5% (Standard and Poor’s, 
1993x: 6). 
 
1.5 COVERAGE STEP DOWN 
A pool contains loans with differing amortisation schedules.  Any credit and 
liquidity cover provided will, over time, increase due to the pool reducing in size.  
Thus, a gradual reduction is needed for the credit and liquidity cover.  An immediate 
pro-rata reduction is not allowed as this can result in a loss because prepayment 
can occur at anytime during the life of the issue.  Therefore, based on historical data 
a gradual reduction is permitted only if two conditions are met, namely (Standard 
and Poor’s, 1993x: 9-12): 
 
1. the step-down can occur in the 6th year onwards provided no                                
mortgage substitutions or conversions have been permitted. 
 
2. if no greater than 25% of the available credit loss cover has been used. 
 
If these two conditions are met then a gradual step-down occurs as follows: 
 
year 6: 1/4 of the difference between the percentage coverage required on 
the initial pool and the percentage of the outstanding pool. 
year 7:   1/3 of the difference between the current cover and the initial 
percentage cover required on the outstanding pool. 
year 8:   1/2 of the difference between the current cover and the initial 
percentage cover required on the outstanding pool. 
year 9:   full step-down may occur so that the required coverage is the initial 
coverage percentage but is based on the outstanding pool amount. 
 
For example, in year six: 
 
Initial cover: 7%    
Outstanding pool: 60% 
  
60-7=53 
1/4 of 53%= 12% 
Therefore, 12% of the initial cover can be taken off 
 
Issue size: £1,000,000 
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initial cover: £70,000 
12% of £70,000 can be taken off 
 
If substitutions are permitted then step-down cannot occur until 5 years after the full 
substitutions period.  The minimum floor of the credit and liquidity cover should be 
the greater of £500,000 or two times the largest remaining loan in the pool. 
 
2. TRADE RECEIVABLES 
The securitisation of trade receivables was, it seems, inspired by the concept 
that any stream of cashflow can be used to support an issue of securities (Standard 
and Poor’s, 1996: 2).  The concept of securitising trade receivables may have taken 
birth following the workability and early success of securitisations involving pools of 
mortgages, a view taken by Standard and Poor’s (1993k: 4).  From a rating 
perspective each type of cashflow contains two significant risks, namely, credit and 
structural risk.  A rating agency will view trade receivables as short-term assets with 
a life expectancy of 30-90 days (Standard and Poor’s, 2000a: 5-7).  The other 
significant disparity, when compared to mortgages, is that trade receivables lack the 
security element inherent in mortgages.  If a buyer defaults the seller has no inbuilt 
recourse other than taking title to the underlying goods or pursuing legal proceeding 
to claim the outstanding amount. 
Therefore, trade receivables are comparatively more risky assets than 
mortgages.  Because of this added risk the rating agency utilises an analysis which 
best reflects the risks involved.  The analysis of trade receivables commences with 
analysing the credit risk.  Because of the unique characteristics of trade receivables, 
credit risk is composed of two sub-risks, namely, obligor default risk and dilution risk 
Standard and Poor’s, 2000a: 5-7).  The analysis then moves on to consider the 
extent of structural problems which, if not rectified, can affected cashflows reaching 
investors. 
 
2.1 CREDIT RISK 
This is the primary risk associated with all asset types and trade receivables 
are no exception.  Because trade receivables contain unique characteristics credit 
risk is subdivided into two risks, namely obligor default risk and dilution risk. 
 
2.2 OBLIGOR DEFAULT RISK 
This risk addresses the likelihood of any debtor/customer defaulting on their 
obligation to pay for goods or services rendered by the originator, as seller/provider.  
Standard and Poor’s acknowledges that it is difficult to ascertain the degree of risk 
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because of the different industries in which trade receivables are generated 
(Standard and Poor’s, 2000a: 5-7).  Each industry produces receivables in different 
ways.  Therefore, there is no standard analysis for calculating this risk across all 
industries.  The rating agency views each transaction as unique regardless of asset 
type.  The agency has, over time and with experience, produced a guideline 
analysis which it uses to analyse and assess credit risk – but modification is 
necessary where the asset type contains clear differing characteristics. 
Obligor default risk is measured using historical data of the originator's 
business and industry.  The analysis will focus on a number of considerations, 
amongst which include: 
 
1. The originator's delinquency and write-off performance over a particular time, 
i.e. 5-10 years. 
2. The originator's write-off/bad debts policy to see how long the originator 
holds on to debts before writing them off.  The longer the holding period the 
more positive effect this has as this indicates the originator's willingness to 
work out accounts until all collection opportunities are exhausted. 
3. The originator's charge-off policies are examined to find any discretionary 
favouritism which can invoke manipulation. Charge-off in this context means 
the writing-off of an account by the originator/seller as uncollectible.  This is 
necessary as it determines the value of delinquent receivables.  For 
example, longstanding customers can be forgiven for failing to clear 
accounts because of a special relationship whereas, other customers would 
be pursued until the relevant account is cleared. 
4. Underwriting and collection policies are examined to determine the likelihood 
of delinquent receivables remaining delinquent. 
5. Marketing and terms offered to customers are examined to calculate 
cashflow predictions. 
 
An important threat which can severely affect credit risk is the bankruptcy or 
insolvency of the originator or seller of the receivables.  If the originator/seller faces 
financial difficulty this can lead to a number of consequences: 
 
1. Product/service quality is diminished because of the lack of funds to produce 
goods or services.  This in turn affects the credit quality of that receivable.  
Customers may not pay for the goods/services, resulting in delinquent 
receivables or customers may ask for a reduction in the price or even a 
refund which increases dilution. 
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2. In order to attract customers and prevent competitors taking business the 
originator may modify its terms of business. This can affect cashflow 
because, for example, if extended credit is offered, there is an inevitable 
delay before receivables are materialised into cash. 
 3. If the securities issued are solely dependent on the cashflows (without                                
dependency or with limited dependency on credit enhancement) then the 
originator's/seller's credit quality and its potential to generate receivables is 
analysed.  Where the securities partly rely on the cashflow and partly on 
credit enhancement facilities then the credit quality of the seller is just as 
important as the credit quality of the credit enhancement facilities. 
 
2.3. DILUTION RISK 
Dilution means any non-cash reduction in the pool of receivables that is not 
caused by defaults or write-offs (Standard and Poor’s, 2000a: 7).  Typical examples 
include, refunding a customer, discounts (for example, 2% discount if account is 
settled within 7 days) and rebates.  Rebates are goods given at a discount in order 
to market or promote them – for example, the sales staff of a shampoo manufacturer 
will sell its new shampoo at a substantial discount so the public will sample it and 
become potential users.  This discount needs to be accounted for.  
Companies use diluting methods in order to establish good customer 
relations and remain competitive.  The degree of dilution will depend on products 
and industry practices. For example, clothing purchased from a reputable outlet 
should be of good quality.  Failure to refund where clothing is not of expected quality 
will inevitably affect customer confidence and in turn affect cashflows. 
Dilution is categorised as follows: 
 
1. Contractual - Terms which are in the contract that can provide dilution, e.g. 
discounts and rebates. 
 
 2. Variable - Dilution invoked by non-contractual terms or factors. This is 
difficult to quantify but historical data is helpful. 
 
2.4 OTHER RELATED CONSIDERATIONS 
Trade receivables are different to other receivables used for securitisation.  
The difference is that trade receivables are non-interest bearing assets.  Therefore, 
they only produce an amount of money which does not include any profit such as 
interest.  Because of dilution risk expected cashflows can be reduced if discounts or 
rebates are given.  This can leave the SPV with a purchased portfolio of receivables 
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producing insufficient cashflows to pay for servicing fees, expenses and the 
purchase of further receivables.  If servicing costs and other expenses are not 
settled timely the terms of their contracts may invoke a breach which can cause an 
early amortisation of the operation. 
Reserve accounts are incorporated into the operation on the advice of the 
rating agency.  A small portion of receivables can also be kept in reserve to meet 
expenses – cash may also be held in reserve.  The amount of receivables held in 
reserve depends on the liquidity of the receivables.  If the receivables generate 
cashflows rapidly then cash held in reserve is kept to a minimum.  This is because 
the receivables can be converted into cash as and when expenses arise.  
Conversely, if the receivables do not generate cash rapidly then the reserve ratio is 
more cash than receivables. 
Trade receivables have a tendency of displaying a high turnover and higher 
payment rates, that is, the rate at which each receivable converts into cash.  
Because of the rapid and large inflow of cash there is an inevitable risk, if not 
rectified, that this cash can easily be commingled with cash belonging to the 
originator.  This can, of course, have serious effects on investors’ demand for timely 
payments of interest and principal in the event of the seller/originator becoming 
bankrupt.  Depending on the bankruptcy laws of each jurisdiction, at least, 2/30 of 
the portfolio, that is 6.6%, can be lost or held in the bankruptcy estate of the 
originator (Standard and Poor’s, 2000a: 10-13). 
A cost effective method of reducing or eliminating any risk of commingling is 
to set up a “lockbox” account in which the debtors of the underlying receivables 
deposit their obligations (Standard and Poor’s, 2000a: 13).  The lockbox account is 
set up to receive these payments and convey them on a daily basis to the 
designated account of the SPV.  Where a trust is incorporated into the structure then 
the lockbox proceeds are passed on to the trust account. 
The servicer, typically the originator, plays an important role once the 
receivables have been assigned to the SPV.  Two issues arise with regard to the 
servicing agreement.  The first issue relates specifically to the inability of the 
servicer to continue its servicing obligation.  This can be for various reasons, but 
commonly, if the servicer does not timely convey the proceeds of the receivables to 
the lockbox account.  To safeguard against this the original servicing agreement 
must include a contractual clause which provides for a backup servicer should the 
original servicer default or breach its obligation(s).  The second issue is the fee for 
any substitute servicer.  This should be stipulated in the original servicing
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agreement, thus allowing the original servicer to find a substitute for the same fee 
without renegotiation (Standard and Poor’s, 2000f: 4-5). 
 
2.5 STRUCTURAL RISKS 
 
1. Revolving period 
Typically, and assuming that the pool's performance pattern is constant and 
all collections received are used to repay investors, a typical pool of trade 
receivables will cease to exist in 60-90 days.  However, to match the maturity of the 
repayment to investors with the intended funding strategy (which may be for a 
longer period of time, e.g. 12 months) it is necessary to extend the life of the 
receivable pool and the securities issued.  Commonly, to do this, investors are paid 
only interest during the 'interest-only' period of the securities.  During this period 
collections from the receivables which would otherwise be paid to investors as 
principal are reinvested in additional receivables of equal quality.   
In this way the pool will maintain a level of receivables which would be 
sufficient to pay principal when the securities mature.  Furthermore, this allows the 
originator and the SPV the opportunity to implement the intended funding strategy 
which, if extended, allows the SPV to issue a further class of securities and reinvest 
the proceeds to maximise the yield of the overall operation (Standard and Poor’s, 
2000a: 5-7). 
 
2. Early amortisation events 
From an investor's perspective terms included in the documents which 
provide for early amortisation are considered as enhancing a portfolio's credit 
quality.  Early amortisation events are included to safeguard the investors against 
unexpected scenarios in which the investors may not receive the expected yield and 
principal from their securities.  Typical events include the originator's bankruptcy; a 
material breach of representations, warranties or covenants which adversely affect 
the success of the transaction; servicing default; credit quality of the portfolio 
eroding; and a reduction of credit enhancement below the required level (Standard 
and Poor’s, 2000a: 8). 
The rating agency does not focus on the existence of such events 
incorporated into the transaction because the rating does not reflect the existence or 
importance of these events.  The reason for this is that these events are 
contingency events – their likelihood of occurring has been forecasted by the rating 
agency through meticulous examination of the originator, its business, the 
receivables and all third parties included for monetary support.  However, there 
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existence may be disadvantageous as they invoke an early unexpected return of 
principal to investors.  This can also prevent a long-term funding strategy of 
reinvesting principal to prolong the life of the pool (Standard and Poor’s, 2000a: 8). 
The structure needs to be structured correctly as an early amortisation can 
automatically occur if the amount of receivables in the pool falls below the required 
amount.  This automatic trigger also triggers the prohibition of any release of 
cashflow to all parties until the pool is restored to its correct and required level. 
 
3. SYNTHETIC SECURITIES 
Synthetic securities are supported by a modified cashflow pattern of a pool of 
issued securities.  The modification is brought about by incorporating a swap 
agreement, typically either the 1992 ISDA Multicurrency-Cross Border Master 
Agreement or the 1987 ISDA Interest Rate and Currency Exchange Agreement, 
which changes the cashflow support to match the yield and currency demand of a 
specific investor base.  A swap agreement is an indispensable tool which allows the 
SPV to customise the cashflows so that the securities it issues are attractive to a 
certain market.  For example, a UK investor with a need for Italian government credit 
risk, but not Italian lira exchange rate risk, can purchase an Italian government debt 
security modified to pay in UK sterling.  A swap counterparty can provide the UK 
sterling payments in exchange for Italian Euro (Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 2). 
Synthetic securities allow an investor to indirectly hold collateral which would 
otherwise be difficult or uneconomical to hold.  Mexican government debt, for 
example, can only be held by qualified institutions resident in Mexico.  By 
incorporating a swap international investors can reap the rewards of this debt by 
arranging a swap counterparty in Mexico (Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 2).  Another 
significant advantage of synthetic securities is that they allow investors to 
circumvent withholding taxes by placing such liability risk on the counterparty. 
The underlying collateral is, in essence, the centrepiece of the synthetic 
security.  The swap that is added merely enhances or customises the cashflow 
pattern to meet specific yields or currency demands of investors. 
 
3.1 STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The rating analysis of synthetic securities is comparatively simpler than other 
asset-backed securities.  The analysis does not incorporate a credit risk examination 
because the underlying assets or collateral are usually rated.  Where the assets are 
unrated then an examination of the credit risk is undertaken.  But to date, 
transactions have tended to include pools of assets which are rated because a rated 
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underlying asset is comparatively safer and more attractive than an unrated 
underlying asset.  Ultimately, the SPV will want to make the synthetic securities as 
attractive and safe as possible. 
The rating of the synthetic security is limited by the lowest supporting rating 
of any entity participating in the structure (Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 4).  The 
supporting rating is a rating assigned to any party or instrument used within the 
structure for monetary support.  The lowest rating is the ceiling for the issue's rating.  
A rating assigned can be affected by the downgrading of any rating in the structure. 
The issue's rating cannot be higher than the underlying collateral used to 
support the synthetic securities.  However, it is possible to have the synthetic 
security rated higher than the underlying collateral by incorporating a swap 
agreement and emphasising it as the sole support (Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 5).  
If the swap is terminated the swap party must pay the issuer a termination payment 
which equals the principal and accrued interest payable on the rated securities. 
Another important rating consideration is the currency of the proposed issue.  
An issue cannot be assigned a rating that is higher than the local currency sovereign 
rating.  The reason is that the issuer's access to local currency is dependent on the 
sovereign's policies related to currency control.  For example, a structure that 
'swaps' UK sterling debt into a Hong Kong dollar security, with collateral and the 
swap counterparty rated AAA can only be assigned a AA rating if Hong Kong's local 
currency sovereign ceiling is rated AA (Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 6). 
In cross border commercial paper transactions timing of payments is crucial 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 8-9).  Therefore, the swap agreement needs to be 
flexible to allow commercial paper investors to receive timely principal and interest 
payments.  Because of globalisation, time zones are an essential consideration.  
The swap agreement needs to be flexible so as to accommodate time differences 
thus, allowing parties to perform their obligations without causing a default in the 
chain of events.  For example, assume that, 
 
1. the collateral pays at 9am Mexico City time 
2. payments by the issuer to the counterparty are due at 3pm GMT 
3. payments by the counterparty to the paying agent are due by 4pm GMT 
4. payments by the paying agent to security holders are due at 5pm GMT 
 
In this example, by the time the collateral pays, the issuer is already in 
default on its payments to the counterparty because its payments were due to the 
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counterparty at 3pm GMT which is 8am Mexico City time - assuming a 7 hour time 
difference.   
The SPV's legal title to the securities supporting the synthetic securities is 
evidenced merely by a book entry in a clearing system – an organisation with which 
securities are deposited for safekeeping and through which purchase/sale 
transactions are handled.  The two foremost systems are Euroclear and Cedel 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 9).  The SPV cannot, due to market practice, 
participate in the clearing system directly.  Therefore, a custodian is appointed who 
acts as a link between the SPV and the clearing system.  The custodian holds the 
collateral for the SPV’s benefit.  When the issuer grants a security interest in the 
collateral to the trustee for the investors of the synthetic securities, the trustee 
cannot take possession of the certificated securities that represent the collateral for 
its security interest to attach and perfect.  Instead the trustee will hold its interest 
through the SPV's custodian.  Therefore, there exists a risk which can disturb the 
cashflows.  This risk is if the custodian goes insolvent or bankrupt will the investors 
receive timely payments (Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 10-11). 
Synthetic securities involve custodians at two levels.  At the first level the 
custodian holds the collateral as a direct participant in a book entry system on behalf  
of the SPV.  The custodian is usually an agent bank resident in the jurisdiction 
where the underlying collateral was issued.  The second level is where the beneficial 
interest in the collateral is held in a “sub-custodian account” with a participant at a 
recognised clearing system. 
The SPV instructs the custodian to perform certain administrative duties in 
relation to the collateral for the benefit of the trustee throughout the life of the 
synthetic securities.  The custodian will usually open two accounts, namely, “a 
securities account” in which the collateral is deposited and, a “cash account” in 
which collections deriving from the collateral are deposited.  A third account can be 
opened in which withholding tax recoveries are deposited.  The amounts deposited 
in the cash account are immediately transferred to the swap counterparty's account. 
There are two requirements which the custodian must comply with: 
 
1. the “securities account” must be inaccessible to all parties. 
2. the custodian must not commingle the collateral or any collections with other 
assets it holds for clients, or deal freely with them.  
 
Once the custodian agreement is in place the SPV will give a security 
interest in the collateral to a trustee if a trust is used to issues certificates.  The 
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security interest must give first priority perfected interest to the trustee in the 
collateral.  The security interest must also be legal, valid and binding under the 
chosen law of the jurisdiction. 
 The custodian agreement usually states that if the custodian's or its parent's 
rating is downgraded below A-1 or A then the accounts held by the custodian for the 
SPV should be moved to another appropriately rated institution within a 30 day 
period. 
 Other typical third parties involved in the structure are: 
 
1. Trustee 
2. Agents 
3. Management company 
4. Bank account providers 
 
Third parties do not need a rating as long as they are not relied upon to 
provide the SPV with any monetary support (Standard and Poor’s, 1993c: 15).  If a 
rating is required the general rule is that the long-term unsecured debt rating must 
be at least equal to the rating of the issue.  Replacements for third parties must be 
provided for in the documents should a third party fail to perform due to insolvency, 
bankruptcy, downgrading of its rating, resignation or removal by the issuer. 
The trustee's role is to safeguard the investor's interest in the collateral.  The 
trustees do not involve themselves with the day-to-day administration of the 
underlying collateral and payments.  Therefore, they will subcontract these duties 
out to professionals who undertake these duties.  These professionals include the 
custodian, paying agent and a management company. 
There are four different agents involved in the operation (Standard and 
Poor’s, 1993c: 17-19).  Each agent undertakes distinct duties.  The paying agent 
makes all payments of principal and interest related to the securities.  It also 
prepares financial reports for the trustee's benefit and notifies if the swap 
counterparty has defaulted.  A calculation agent makes all the necessary 
calculations regarding principal and interest payments.  The registration agent will 
register the notes with the appropriate authority and holds the documentation while 
the notes are in bearer form.  An authentication agent will authenticate the notes 
according to the documentation. 
The issuer will pay the collections to the paying agent and this payment 
constitutes payment to the investors.  After this the agent is responsible for 
conveying the correct amount to the investors.  Agents do not need a rating because 
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they have no set-off rights against, or security interest over the payments received 
from the issuer. 
The management company will handle all the administrative operations of 
the SPV such as it will prepare and audit reports for the benefit of all third parties 
involved; handle all matters relating to the SPV's tax liability; ensure the SPV does 
not breach any obligations; and manage the SPV's bank accounts and any surplus 
income.  A bank will provide accounts for any surplus income.  The bank should be 
rated as it provides monetary support to the SPV. 
 
3.2 TYPE OF STRUCTURES 
There are two type of structures which create synthetic securities, namely, 
swap dependent and swap independent (Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 13-19).  
 
3.3 SWAP DEPENDENT STRUCTURE 
In this structure the cashflows forwarded to the investors derive from the 
swap.  Thus, the swap is a major component in the structure.  Because the swap 
plays a significant role in generating the end cashflow it is important to analyse the 
source of this cashflow.  The source is the swap counterparty.  The swap 
counterparty is rated so as to determine whether it has a good credit standing and 
can be relied upon to forward cashflows to the swap mechanism.  The swap 
counterparty is called a “supporting rating” because the SPV relies on it for 
monetary support. 
In a swap dependent structure the supporting rating is important as it 
indicates the overall rating of the whole operation and more importantly, indicates 
the rating of the synthetic security.  The rating assigned to the synthetic security is 
the lowest rating of all those assigned to the supporting ratings (if there are multiple 
counterparties) and the underlying collateral. 
 
Swap dependent transactions fall into two categories (Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 
13):  
 • Structures that analyse the credit risk of the underlying collateral 
 • Structures that do not 
 
1. Structures that analyse the credit risk of the underlying collateral 
 
When the structure includes a supporting rating, the credit risk of the swap 
counterparty, the underlying collateral and the transaction's structure are important 
considerations as all these affect the customised cashflow going on to the investors. 
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The counterparty performs only its expected obligation which is to modify 
receipts into payments as stipulated in the ISDA agreement.  The ISDA agreement 
is modified so that it is only slightly deviated from the market standard.  This 
deviation is necessary to accommodate the nature and desires of the parties 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993d: 5).  Investors need assurance that the swap 
agreement will not be breached or terminated by the counterparty.  Therefore, the 
rating agency reviews the default and termination events in the ISDA agreement as 
chosen by the parties. 
The ISDA agreement is a lengthy agreement which contains numerous 
clauses that collectively give the effect of a swap.  To mention all the clauses would 
be irrelevant to this thesis.  However, what follows are the clauses that are modified 
to get the desired effect (Standard and Poor’s, 1993d: 6-10).  The provisions that 
are not mentioned should be taken as they are in the ISDA agreement. 
 
1. Section 2 – Netting: 
The party that owes a higher swap payment to the other can make a                                     
net payment.  That is, a payment which is equal to the difference of payment 
made and payment received from the other party.  Netting should not apply 
to currency payments or different series of securities issued by a vehicle. 
2. Withholding Tax: 
It is standard practice under the ISDA agreement for parties to gross                                 
up swap payments if an indemnifiable tax is imposed on the payments.  
Withholding tax is an example of an indemnifiable tax.  If there are provisions 
stipulating the imposition of a withholding tax then the swap counterparty 
must pay payments that are grossed up, to take into account the withholding 
tax, to the SPV and accept payments from the SPV that are net of tax.  The 
reason why the SPV pays net of tax is that it has insufficient funds from 
which to pay the grossed up amount.  If a third party is involved which 
guarantees the counterparty's obligation then the payments should be made 
and received as though the third party is the counterparty.  Where there are 
no provisions stipulating the imposition of a withholding tax then legal 
opinions should express this. 
3. Section 3 – Representations: 
Representations are allowed into the agreement only after due diligence.             
After modification any breach of these representations by the SPV shall 
constitute an event of default or allow the counterparty to terminate the 
swap.  Unfair it may seem but it puts the burden on the counterparty to 
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ascertain the credibility of the SPV's representations so that the investors are 
protected from termination events which result from facts that could have 
been discovered had the counterparty exercised due diligence before 
entering into the swap transaction.  Part (a) of Section 3 sets out the basic 
representations that are made by the parties. These relate to status, 
consents, powers, no conflict and binding obligations.  Because the SPV is a 
bankruptcy remote vehicle as opposed to an operation vehicle, it is 
continuously dependent upon third parties to perform its duties.  Failure by 
any third party to perform will have a direct effect on the SPV's 
representations made in s.3.  Therefore, it is important that the rating agency 
is assured that the structure is put together in such a manner which provides 
maximum protection to the structure. 
 
2. Structures that do not rely on collateral analysis 
Synthetic securities can be structured so that they do not rely primarily on 
the collateral as a source of repayment. To accomplish this the structure will 
incorporate a swap which has been structured flexibly so that it deviates greatly from 
the market standard.  It is possible to view the swap as the primary source of the 
repayment for the securities (Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 16). 
Because the swap is the significant source the swap counterparty is a 
supporting rating.  The terms of the ISDA agreement are modified to the extent that 
a termination of the swap results in the swap counterparty paying a termination fee 
to the SPV.  This fee is equal to the principal and accrued interest payments for the 
life of the security minus proceeds from the sale of the collateral.  In practice the 
formula for calculating a termination fee under section 6 (e) is modified to allow such 
a fee calculation to deviate from the market standard (Standard and Poor’s, 1993d: 
5). 
 
3.4 SWAP INDEPENDENT STRUCTURE 
In this structure a swap is used to transform collateral payments into specific 
payments.  The rating agency is not too concerned with the swapped cashflows as 
much as they are with the unswapped cashflows (Standard and Poor’s, 1993h: 17). 
The collateral is the significant and primary source of payments.  The swap 
is incorporated merely to shape the cashflows according to market demands.  
Therefore, if the counterparty defaults the whole transaction terminates and the 
collateral is liquidated to give investors a pro rata share or the swap terminates and 
passes any unswapped payments on to the investors.  In both cases the investors 
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are warned about the consequences of the counterparty defaulting.  Because the 
underlying cashflows are the source of monetary support, the counterparty is not 
viewed as a supporting rating (Standard and Poor’s, 1993c: 15). 
In the case of a swap dependent structure the collateral is analysed because 
it is composed of quality bonds which have a high investment rating.  If these bonds 
default then the counterparty can not really do much to pay the investors.  The 
counterpart pays transformed payments to the investors as long as the collateral 
pays.  The counterparty will need to exercise due diligence with regard to the 
likelihood of the collateral paying.  If the collateral defaults then the counterparty 
loses out because it will have to pay a termination fee (Standard and Poor’s, 1993d: 
14).  However, if all goes well then the counterparty can profit because junk bonds 
pay a high yield from which the counterparty can profit. 
In the case of a swap independent structure the collateral is usually of good 
quality and the counterparty merely transforms cashflows so that they meet investor 
preferences.  If the counterparty defaults then the collateral will still be sufficient to 
continue payments to the investors.  The investors in this case can either accept 
unswapped income or their pro rata share of the collateral. 
The effect of the swap terminating leaves the investor in no worse position 
than if it had invested in the underlying collateral.  However, the economic impact of 
the termination depends on the market environment at the time of the termination 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993d: 16).  For example, if interest rates are rising then the 
investor will lose out because instead of receiving the enhanced rate it will only 
receive the fixed rate of the underlying collateral. 
 
4. CREDIT CARD RECEIVABLES 
 
4.1 CREDIT RISK 
The rating agency will first examine the originator's operations to calculate 
the initial quality of the receivables and the possibility of generating further 
receivables.  The actual calculation of credit risk is done by running cashflow 
simulations of the receivables using five variables.  Implicit in the cashflow 
simulations is an assumption that a base rate pay out event will cause the 
transaction to amortise.  A base rate is the annual rate equal to the rate of interest 
paid on the bonds plus servicing costs.  The pay out will occur when the 3 months 
average portfolio yield, less all losses, becomes insufficient to cover interest 
payments and servicing fees for the same 3 months period (Standard & Poor’s, 
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1997: 5).  The five variables are the payment rate, charge offs (losses), purchase 
rate, portfolio yield and certificate rate.  
 
1. Payment rate 
This is the rate at which monthly principal is repaid by the cardholders 
expressed as a percentage of their outstanding balance.  The payment rate is an 
important indicator of how an issue will behave during the amortisation.  During the 
amortisation period principal is collected and used to pay the investors.  
Simultaneously, credit enhancement levels are reduced at a pace that equals the 
amortisation. 
If the payment rate is low then more losses are realised because there is 
insufficient principal to pay over to the investors and thus credit enhancement needs 
to be high.  However, if the payment rate is high all principal that is collected can be 
passed to investors and simultaneously credit enhancement levels can be reduced 
to reflect the pace of the inflow of the principal (Standard & Poor’s, 1997: 7).   
 
2. Purchase rate 
The pooling and servicing agreement in a securitisation transaction governs 
partly the continuous acquisition of new receivables.  This is because as collections 
are received the amount of receivables in the pool are decreased.  If no receivables 
are purchased then the pool may eventually consist of insufficient funds to pay 
principal and interest.  Therefore, it is necessary to purchase new receivables.  This 
method of maintaining a sufficient pot of funds is also viewed as a form of credit 
support for the SPV called reinvestment (Standard & Poor’s, 1997: 7-8).  The 
acquisition of new receivables and the rate at which they are purchased depends 
upon, firstly, the payment rate and secondly, the seller's business and performance 
characteristics. 
If the payment rate is high then the purchase rate should, at least, equal this 
rate.  For example, assume that the payment rate of a pool is 10% monthly.  The 
purchase rate should be 10% to maintain the pool at its initial level.  If the purchase 
rate was less than 10% then other forms of credit support are necessary so that 
investors can receive principal and interest payments timely.  If the purchase rate is 
higher than 10% then this will accelerate the whole process of receiving payments 
and passing on those payments.  Therefore, the general rule is that the purchase 
rate must be at least equal to the payment rate otherwise other forms of credit 
support are vital. 
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The seller of the receivables is also important because the seller needs to 
produce new receivables which it can sell to the SPV.  If the seller becomes 
insolvent then this affects the SPV's ability to purchase new receivables.  The SPV 
has rights over receivables which have been generated but not yet passed over to 
the SPV because such rights exist in the pooling and servicing agreement.  
Furthermore, this right to new receivables may be a secured interest in the new 
receivables so that the SPV becomes a creditor to the seller.  Post-insolvency 
receivables may be difficult for the SPV to claim a right over (Standard & Poor’s, 
1997i: 9).   
In the servicing agreement there are clauses which require the servicer to 
allocate collections from the receivables to the trust as though the trust owns all the 
receivables.  If this is contrary to law then the agreement calls for an allocation of all  
collections from each account (cardholder) to be used to pay off the oldest balances. 
Because the trust has ownership in the receivables it holds, this form of allocation is 
advantageous than a pro rate distribution. 
 
3. Charge offs 
Charge off is jargon that means to “write off” a debt as uncollectible 
(Standard & Poor’s, 1997: 9).  The rating agency will examine historical portfolio 
statistics together with the underwriting and servicing quality in order to calculate the 
steady-state level of charge offs.  The steady-state tells the SPV the rate of charge 
offs to expect in a given transaction.  These charge off rates are stressed according 
to the desired rating sought by the SPV.  For example, for a single 'A' rating charge 
offs are stressed ultimately to reach 2-3 times the steady-state level of charge offs.  
For a 'AAA' rating the steady-state levels are stressed so that ultimately it is 3-5 
times the steady-state level (Standard & Poor’s, 1997: 10). 
 
4. Portfolio yield 
 The is the sum of finance charges, fees and interchange expressed as a 
percentage of the outstanding receivables balance and multiplied by 12 (Standard & 
Poor’s, 1997: 10-14).  Portfolio yield consists of three types of payments: 
 
1. periodic finance charges 
2. fees 
3. interchange 
 
Periodic finance charges are the interest cost associated with an unpaid 
balance at the end of a grace period.  Fees include annual membership fees, late 
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payment fees and over limit fees.  Interchange is the fee paid to originators by VISA 
or MasterCard for absorbing risk and funding receivables during the grace period.  
Since there is no set rate for interest charges and originators can offer differing rates 
it is difficult to ascertain exactly what the portfolio yield will be for any given 
transaction.  Therefore, the rating agency will assume that the yield will be between 
11-12% in a AAA scenario. 
Interchange fee is paid to the card-issuing bank (originator) by VISA or 
MasterCard as compensation for assuming credit risk and offering a grace period.  
The interchange income is created when a merchant's bank discounts the amount it 
pays to merchants for credit card charges.  This amount of discount is shared 
between the merchant's bank, the originator and VISA/MasterCard as compensation 
for utilising their clearing house function.  The originator's share of interchange 
income is actually generated during its settlement with VISA/MasterCard. 
The originator's share of interchange income has an impact on the 
performance of the SPV's portfolio.  Typically, the originator will agree in the 
servicing agreement to pass on to the SPV a pro rata share of the interchange 
income.  This resulting in the SPV receiving supplemental cashflow which is 
recharacterised as finance charges and used to pay for transaction expenses.  If 
structured this way this income can provide the SPV with extra loss coverage by 
creating a greater level of excess spread.  However, the rating agency will not give 
any recognition to this extra income because the income can be stopped upon the 
originator's insolvency.  Two issues elucidate the problem with interchange income: 
 
1. The property rights of the originator in an interchange arrangement is not 
clearly defined in the membership agreement with VISA/MasterCard; and 
2. Interchange fees are subject to set-off by VISA/MasterCard. 
 
Because VISA/MasterCard are not parties to the transaction they provide no 
representation, warranties or covenants relating to interchange fees.  Furthermore, 
VISA/MasterCard revise their interchange rates annually. 
A servicer may offer to have a portion of their servicing fees paid from 
interchange income so as to reduce the required level of credit enhancement.  In 
practice, the servicer and the SPV contractually agree in the servicing agreement to 
have, for example, 1% of the servicing fee paid from interchange income, if it is 
available.  If the servicing fee rate is 2% annually then, if the interchange income is 
not available, the servicer is only allowed to collect 1% from the cashflows as 
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servicing fees.  This way the SPV can reduce its expenditure only if interchange 
income is not available and the following conditions are met: 
 
1. For investment grade rating the SPV must have a servicer and a trustee (and 
successor servicer) willing to be paid a portion of its servicing fee from 
servicer interchange.  Both must have high long-term senior unsecured debt 
rating and both must accept a reduced servicing fee if interchange is not 
available in the future.  The rationale is that one of the highly rated entities 
should be available to service the portfolio at the lower servicing fee. 
2. The trustee must have credit card servicing capabilities. 
 
The trustee must find a suitable replacement for the servicing obligations 
should a replacement be needed.  The rating agency will assume that the trustee 
will not find a replacement at the contracted fee and therefore will need to undertake 
the role itself.  For this reason the trustee must have experience in servicing a credit 
card portfolio.  In practice, the servicing obligations are done by the originator and 
the trustee is most commonly a trust company.  If the trustee does need to take the 
role of a servicer then the originator will assume the role.  If these conditions are 
satisfied then the rating agency will assign value to the interchange income which 
otherwise would be viewed as contingent upon the seller solvency. The rating will 
depend on the servicer's and trustee's rating and can be downgraded if either 
party's rating is downgraded. 
 
4.2 STRUCTURAL RISKS 
The originator conveys receivables to the SPV for the benefit of the 
investors.  The account from which the receivables are conveyed remain the 
property of the originator and the SPV has property rights on the receivables only 
(Standard & Poor’s, 1997: 16).  The conveyance of the receivables include the 
amount of receivables in the account on a specific cut off date.  Further, in the 
documentation, the originator agrees to convey any receivables that arise in those 
accounts subsequent to the cut off date.  The accounts and the receivables are 
subject to an eligibility criteria and specific representations and warranties of the 
seller.  Under an “account additions” clause in the servicing agreement the originator 
is obliged to add accounts when receivables fall below the minimum level allowed by 
the pooling and servicing agreement.  If this does transpire then all collections 
received are placed into an excess or spread account until further accounts are 
added.  This clause allows the “purchase rate” to be calculated and implemented. 
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4.3 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A SELLER'S INTEREST 
Typically, the SPV will issue two or more series of securities when using 
credit card receivables as support.  Each series of securities issued may have two 
undivided interests.  Firstly, the SPV has an undivided interest in the pool of 
receivables.  Secondly, the SPV has an undivided interest in the collections of the 
receivables.  These interests are based on the invested amounts of each series in 
the pool of receivables.  For example, assume series A securities are issued and 
proceeds amount to 60% of the pool’s interest.  Series B securities are issued at a 
higher rate and proceeds amount to 40% of the pool’s interest.  Series A securities 
have been issued in a larger number than series B therefore, series A holders have 
the right to demand more money from the pool.  Both series have an undivided 
interest in the pool, that is, they both have rights to the receivables and collections 
without priority. 
There is also another interest which is not allocated to any series.  This 
interest is allocated to the seller of the receivables (Standard & Poor’s, 1997: 18-21).  
The interest held by the seller will fluctuate according to the liabilities of the SPV and 
the balance of the principal receivables in the pool.  The seller's interest increases 
when the seller sells additional receivables to the SPV which are more than the 
necessary to meet payment demands, that is, when receivables are sold in excess 
of the purchase rate.  The seller's interest decreases when account payments 
exceed account purchases.  The seller has only an interest in the pool whenever the 
account purchase rate (the calculated amount reinvested in new receivables) 
exceeds the account payment rate (that is, the amount of receivables sufficient to 
allow investors timely payments and allow all expenses to be met timely). 
The seller's interest exists because the SPV will need additional receivables 
and as part of the consideration provided for additional receivables the SPV allows 
the seller to have an interest in the trust.  The purpose of this interest is firstly, to 
provide overcollateralisation when account payments exceed account purchases 
and secondly, to absorb reductions in the receivables balance that result from 
receivable dilution and non-complying receivables (Standard & Poor’s, 1997: 23).  
Examples of dilution include merchandise returned and credit amount owed by the 
cardholder, eliminated reductions of amounts caused by rebates, refunds, 
adjustments for service errors or reductions resulting from fraudulent use or 
counterfeit charges. Non-complying receivables are those that were in breach of the 
representations made by the seller when sold to the SPV.  In typical transactions the 
seller of the receivables absorbs the risk of dilution and all subsequent adjustments.  
During an amortisation any reduction in the receivables balance resulting from 
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dilution would certainly hinder the payment of principal and interest to the investors.  
Because credit support is available to cover loss there is a tendency to keep this 
support to a minimum, that is, sufficient to cover the loss predicted.  Dilution is not 
covered for by credit support so therefore the securitisation of credit card 
receivables needs to be structured so that a seller's interest, although kept at its 
minimum, is available to absorb the risk of dilution should the seller default on its 
obligation to absorb the dilution risk. 
Most transactions incorporate a minimum seller's interest of 7% (Standard & 
Poor’s, 1997: 23).  Any deviation from 7% norm is based on an analysis of the 
historical performance of dilutions and the in place of a mechanism which will trap 
principal payments into an account at any time if the seller's interest falls below the 
specified minimum.   
The rating agency will also analyse what is increasingly becoming popular in 
the competitive credit card market (Standard & Poor’s, 1997: 25).  This is rebate 
programmes.  These programmes are setup to allow cardholders to earn points 
every time a credit card is used to purchase goods or services.  They also allow the 
cardholder to earn points if he/she maintains a specified account balance.  Once 
points have been collected the cardholder can redeem them for a variety of items 
including cash or airline tickets. 
Because the card-issuing bank can become insolvent a rating agency views 
rebate programmes as imposing an additional risk to the structure.  If the card-
issuing bank does become insolvent it cannot continue with its obligations under the 
rebate programme, i.e. redeem points for items.  In this situation the cardholder who 
has collected points may set-off the points with his current card balance.  For 
example, assume Mr Smith has a card balance of £1000 and has collected £100 
worth of points under the rebate programme.  If the card-issuing bank then becomes 
insolvent and defaults on its obligation under the rebate programme, Mr Smith can 
set-off his £100 cash rebate against his card balance of £1000, thus allowing Mr 
Smith to settle his balance by paying £900. 
The set-off in the scenario comes under dilution because there is a reduction 
in the receivables balance for a reason other than charge-off or cash payment, that 
is, the cardholder settling his balance by making the required payment.  The rating 
agency examines meticulously each rebate programme incorporated into the 
receivable pool to calculate the likelihood of set-off occurring.  Further, it will also 
examine whether any rebate programmes are prohibited by the credit card 
agreement, that is, whether set-off is allowed by the agreement. 
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Receivables derive from a range of sources including merchandise bought, 
services rendered, cash advances and balance transfers.  Receivables from 
merchandise purchases can be subject to dilution because the merchandise can be 
returned.  However, receivables from services rendered can not be subjected to 
dilution risk because there is no return of service offered.  This is also similar for 
cash advances as money advanced cannot be returned if not needed.  Balance 
transfers have become a fashionable method of enticing cardholders to transfer their 
credit acquiring activity from bank to bank.  Low introductory APR's are offered to 
entice transfer.  The popularity of balance transfers has an impact on the structure 
to varying degrees.  Generally, portfolios which include a high rate of balance 
transfers will demonstrate a lower dilution risk rate because balance transfers are 
viewed like cash advances - they cannot be returned (Standard & Poor’s, 1997: 26). 
The rating agency will analyse 3-5 years of monthly return and fraud data 
with a particular emphasis on both the amount and timing of dilution.  The required 
seller's interest is the amount necessary to protect investors from the loss resulting 
from dilutions during a rapid amortisation.  It is assumed by the rating agency that a 
majority of the dilutions will occur within 1-3 months of the sale date of goods 
(Standard & Poor’s, 1997: 28). 
 
4.4 PAY OUT EVENT 
The credit rating agency will also examine pay out events that are included in 
the receivable purchase agreement (Standard & Poor’s, 1997: 29-36).  A pay out 
event is called a termination event which, if occurs, results in the early redemption of 
the issued securities.  The most common events are as follows:  
 
1. Base rate trigger: 
This is a pay out event when the excess spread, that is, the difference between the 
interest on the receivables and the interest on the securities, has eroded 
significantly.  The base rate trigger usually comprises of two components (a) the net 
portfolio yield (finance charges minus charge offs that is expressed as a percentage 
of the investor's interest) and (b) the base rate (an amount of monthly interest, 
servicing fees that is expressed as percentage of the investor's interest).  If the base 
rate exceeds the net portfolio yield for a 3 month period, the principal will be 
returned to the investors as quickly as possible beginning on the next distribution 
date, that is, the date when an interest payment would have been made in absence 
of a base rate trigger. Base rate triggers can be structured so that they cause a pay 
out event to occur before the excess spread declines to zero.  For example, a trigger 
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may require a pay out event if the net portfolio yield declines below the base rate 
plus 1% which would result in the transaction going into rapid amortisation sooner.  
With this type of structure mechanism credit enhancement can be kept to a 
minimum.  The base rate trigger is an automatic pay out event which does not     
require the investors to vote. 
 
2. If the seller's interest falls: 
If the seller's interest falls below the required amount and not rectified within 10 days 
then this causes a pay out event.  It can be rectified by adding additional 
receivables.  The seller's interest is measured as a fixed percentage of current 
principal receivables or current investor interest.  As a series of securities amortise 
the invested interest and seller's interest begin to decline.  This type of pay out 
event also does not require the investors to vote. 
 
3. Failure of the seller's obligation: 
If the seller fails to make or deposit payments as required under the                                   
pooling and servicing agreement for a period of more than 5 days this causes a pay 
out event.  Further, if the seller breaches a covenant which has material adverse 
effect on the investors and left unremedied for 60 days this also causes a pay out 
event.  This requires investors representing 50% of the invested amount of a series 
of securities to vote in favour of a pay out event before it can become effective. 
 
4. Representation & Warranties: 
A pay out event will occur if there is a material breach a representation                    
or warranty by the seller which remains unremedied for 60 days.  This also requires 
50% of the investors in a series to vote in favour. 
 
5. Servicer default: 
If the servicer of the receivables defaults causing a material adverse                                   
effect on the investors then this is a pay out event requiring 50% of the investor to 
vote in favour. 
 
6. Investors are not paid in full and timely: 
If any class of security holders is not paid in full and timely then this                                 
inevitably triggers a pay out event for other class of security holders.  This event is 
triggered automatically thus not requiring investor vote. 
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Other pay out events are triggered if the seller or the SPV becomes 
insolvent, or the seller is unable to transfer receivables to the SPV. 
 
5. FUTURE RECEIVABLES 
Securities issued that are backed by future receivables are not called asset-
backed securities because the SPV will receive the issue proceeds before any 
receivables are generated.  Future receivable financing is an ingenious deviation 
from the longstanding concept that all cashflows can be securitised (Standard & 
Poor’s, 1993b:6).  Here the SPV issues bonds supported by the hope or likelihood 
that receivables will be generated by the originator which will immediately be 
assigned to it.   
Conventional asset-backed securities are supported by receivables that 
actually exist or will be generated on a predetermined date.  All parties to the 
transaction can calculate the value of the receivables because they have or will in 
the imminent future materialise into cashflows.  Future receivables are, however, 
distinct because the parties have no idea of the receivables, their value and when 
they will eventually materialise into cashflows. 
The first reported future receivable securitisation was carried out on behalf of 
Mr David Bowie who securitised his future royalty payments – this transaction 
created a new mould for securitisation transactions (Standard & Poor’s, 1993b: 8).  
The performance of a future receivables transaction depends on the risk of 
generating future receivables, the business risk of the entity originating the 
receivables and finally, the structure and legal risks of the whole operation. 
 
How a future receivable transaction works: 
 
1. Originator and the banker will setup a SPV. 
2. Directors/trustees of the SPV and the originator sign a contract in which the 
originator promises to generate receivables and assign them immediately to 
the SPV. 
3. SPV issues securities backed by this contract and passes on the proceeds to 
the originator. 
4. Originator will generate and convey receivables to the SPV.  
 
The originator must produce goods or services which will be bought in a 
demanding market.  In other words, the goods or services should be essentials and 
essential to the economy and paid for in a manner which does not cause cashflow 
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disruptions.  The originator should be financially stable and possess the ability to 
generate receivables during a financially unfit period. 
The rating agency will examine various collected data including industry 
trends, asset quality, sources of liquidity, company structure, capital adequacy and 
special risks such as mergers and potential acquisitions (Standard & Poor’s, 1993b: 
11-13).  An assessment of cross-border risks are essential in a transaction involving 
the originator based in a foreign country.  Cross-border risks are classified into 
general types, namely, currency transfer risk and political risk. 
Currency transfer risk addresses the ability and willingness of a nation's 
central bank to make available foreign currency to its nation's borrowers so that they 
can repay their debt in the appropriate currency.  It is essential that a nation can 
generate foreign exchange to allow borrowers to comply with their obligations.  To 
minimise currency transfer risk financiers are now making increasing use of offshore 
vehicles.  Where the SPV is setup in the originator's own country then currency 
transfer risk is at its extreme if the central bank cannot allow the foreign currency 
needed by the SPV to repay investors available.  However, these structures may not 
be exchange control proof.  Some exchange control regulations may require that 
exporters bring in their foreign currency earnings from export sales back into the 
country.  Therefore, it is essential that currency transfer regulation or guidelines and 
exchange control regulations are inspected closely in order to estimate the risks and 
determine effective methods of minimising or eliminating the risks. 
Political risk addresses government actions or specific events which impair 
the flow of goods or services or the cashflows of the contracts.  Thus, it is important 
to closely examine a nation's foreign trade policy and economy to estimate the scale  
of risk or potential risk, even if the cashflows do not pass through the country.  Other 
harmful actions that can impact on the transaction are export restrictions, 
environmental regulations and trade quotas.   
As said earlier, future receivables are those which will materialise from 
contracts between the originator and the SPV.  Therefore, the rating agency will 
analyse the contract before using the appropriate criteria to address the risks of the 
assets behind the future receivables.  
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CHAPTER 4 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ORIGINATOR 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter of the work will unfold the law and regulation applicable to the 
actions of the originator in a typical securitisation.  To date, the majority of 
originators who have participated in a securitisation structure have done so because 
they needed to remove, for various reasons, risk-embedded assets from their 
balance sheets.  To effectively achieve removal, a transfer structured as a true sale 
was imperative (Kothari, 1999: 22).  True sale is jargon created by practitioners to 
describe ‘a sale at arm’s length in which the transferor transfers either a legal or an 
equitable title to the assets to the transferee’ (Kravitt, 1996: 91). 
As stated earlier, a receivable is a contractual right to a sum of money that 
derives from a contractual arrangement.  In practice, there exist three types of 
receivables, that is, three types of contractual rights to a sum of money.  The first 
type of receivable is one that presently exists.  Here the originator has performed its 
obligation under the contractual arrangement and anticipates the co-party (the 
obligor) to perform its obligation.  The originator can assign this existing ascertained 
contractual right without difficulty and uncertainty.  The second type of receivable 
derives from a revolving borrowing facility in which the co-party borrows, repays and 
reborrows.  This type of receivable mirrors a credit card receivable, in that, the card 
user will use the credit facility, repay the debt and re-use the credit facility.  The 
originator can assign the contractual rights of these receivables if and when they 
arise.  The third type of receivable is that which will come into existence and 
ascertainment at a future date. 
Thankfully, the method for transferring pools of receivables with changing 
natures has remained the same.  There are three methods established by English 
law which have traditionally been used to transfer contractual rights between seller 
and buyer, namely, assignment, sub-participation and novation. 
 
2. TRANSFER OF RECEIVABLES 
For purposes of securitisation transferring receivables by assignment is by 
far the most popular and effective method used by originators to achieve a true sale 
transaction.  An originator can sell and assign its contractual rights to cashflows 
under a legal assignment that is effected under the provisions of s.136 (1) Law of 
Property Act 1925.  Section 136(1) provides three conditions, which upon 
satisfaction, creates a legal assignment.  The parties effecting a legal assignment 
must ensure that,  
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i.   the assignment is "...in writing under the hand of the assignor..."  This 
 condition merely imposes on the parties a procedural formality that 
 evidences their intention and obligations under the contractual arrangement. 
 
ii.  the assignment is "...absolute...”  This condition provides that the seller must 
 assign the complete contractual right to the cashflow and not just a part of it 
 to the purchaser or limit the right to the cashflow with restrictions. 
 
iii.  express notice is given to the underlying debtors.  This is another procedural 
 formality created by the law of security, which enables the underlying debtors 
 to achieve a good discharge of their debt following the assignment.  
 However, the notice requirement is not essential since it is now become a 
 term in a contract that parties assigning their right under an agreement do 
 not need to give notice.  This usually applies to the creditor and not the 
 debtor. 
 
A legal assignment is, therefore, one, which in writing absolutely transfers 
the whole contractual right to a cashflow, and the parties give express notice 
reflecting this transfer to the underlying debtors affected.  In practice, some 
originators do not provide the underlying debtors with notice of the transfer.  An 
assignment, which falls short of this, has validity and enforceability deriving from the 
principles of equity.  An equitable assignment is one where the originator purposely 
fails to give notice of the transfer to the underlying debtors.  This is usually done 
because the originator would not want such debtors to know about the securitisation 
since it wants to maintain the contractual relationship it has with its borrowers 
without exposing them to complicated arrangements which the originator seeks to 
benefit from. 
Notwithstanding this motive, failing to give notice of the transfer is 
disadvantageous from a litigation perspective in that should the SPV wish to bring 
an action against the underlying borrowers it would need to join the originator as 
party against the borrowers.  In essence, the SPV has no locus standi against the 
borrowers because there is no contract between the underlying borrowers and the 
SPV (Standard and Poor’s, 1993i). 
The term sub-participation does not have a legal meaning yet is used widely 
in practice.  Nor does it, in law, constitute a transfer of any contractual rights to a 
cashflow or obligations.  Sub-participation is merely transferring credit risk of a sum 
of money.  It is an arrangement set up by the seller to raise non-recourse finance.  
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The seller (usually a bank) will agree with a buyer (also usually a bank) to create a 
contractual relationship based upon an arrangement in which the buyer deposits a 
sum of money equal to the value of the sought participation.  In return, the seller 
agrees to convey an agreed proportion of funds as and when they are received from 
the underlying debtors of the participated credit.  The arrangement creates what is 
called non-recourse finance, that is, the buyer has no recourse to the other assets of 
the seller, and can only be paid if the underlying debtors pay the seller.  If the 
underlying debtor defaults, the financial impact of the default is greater on the buyer 
than the seller.  Thus, the buyer takes a double credit risk, namely, the risk of the 
underlying debtor defaulting and the risk of the seller defaulting or going into 
insolvency or bankruptcy (Penn, Shaw and Arora, 1987).  
However, for securitisation purposes sub-participation is not a useful method 
to transfer the receivables because the documents do not transfer any title to the 
receivables, which is imperative for securitisation purposes to grant a security 
interest to investors.  Sub-participation merely transfers the credit risk in receivables.   
Novation is an arrangement in which the seller, under a legally binding 
contract, disposes its contractual rights and obligations under its loan documentation 
to the buyer.  The consideration passed between the buyer and seller for the sale of 
the contractual rights and obligations reflects the value of the outstanding debt 
repayable by the underlying debtor(s) and any value of the customer relationship the 
seller holds with those underlying debtor(s).  Novation, therefore, creates an entirely 
new contractual relationship between the buyer and the underlying debtor.  Because 
the seller's obligations and rights are relinquished and discharged under novation, 
the wording of the documents causes the buyer to replace the seller.  The buyer, as 
a result, becomes the lender on record and enjoys the rights and remedies, which 
the original lender enjoyed (Penn, Shaw and Arora, 1987: 146; Kravitt, 1996: 87). 
Novation is an ideal arrangement where the seller wishes to dispose off 
commitments to lend (particularly under a revolving credit facility) as this is not 
achieved under assignment or by granting a sub-participation.  Conversely, the 
buyer also benefits from expanding its client/debtor base.   
However, the practical difficulty with creating a novation is that the 
documentation requires the consent of all parties involved in the original credit 
facility.  The size of the difficulty will no doubt reflect the size and complexity of the 
original credit facility.  Further, it creates more work, expense and complication for 
the originator who would need to relinquish any security interest it holds in any 
collateral and assign this interest to the buyer.   
Although novation creates the cleanest form of transfer it also presents a 
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further complication.  The seller sells all rights and obligations in relation to the 
underlying debtors to the SPV.  Thus, this places strict obligations on the SPV to 
undertake contractual obligations which were provided by the seller.  The SPV, as 
its name suggests, is set up to undertake minimum duties, and burdening it with 
additional obligations would be contrary to its purpose and more likely to affect its 
ability to concede bankruptcy (Standard and Poor’s, 1993i: 39-41) 
3. WHAT IS TRUE SALE? 
The transfer of assets incorporates the need to satisfy the true sale test.  
Under the test, the transfer must be structured so that the originator relinquishes all 
ownership and control over the transferred assets.  The relinquishment must be 
recognised in accordance with the governing law of the contract (subject to local 
law) and the applicable accounting treatment.  “True sale” means ‘a transfer of 
financial assets in which the parties state that they intend a sale and in which all of 
the benefits and risks commonly associated with ownership are transferred for fair 
value in an arm’s length transaction’ (Kravitt, 1996: 92).  The key ingredients here 
are firstly, that the intentions of the parties must be clearly expressed without 
ambiguity.  Secondly, the transaction must be for fair value and at arm’s length.  And 
finally, it must transfer only the benefits and risks which the originator carries in 
relation to the receivables. 
Obviously, a true sale transfer can only be challenged as invalid by a court if 
a dispute arises.  The court can make such a challenge regardless of what the 
lawyers, the credit rating agency or the bankers conceived or opined when 
constructing the transaction.  The English courts, to date, have been fortunate in not 
witnessing litigation where a complicated securitisation transaction is dissected and 
examined in order to rule whether a true sale has occurred.  However, Welsh 
Development Agency v. Export Finance Co. Ltd. [1992] BCC 270, CA, deals with a 
sale of receivables and the method of transferring those receivables.  Although it is 
not directly related to securitisation, it demonstrates to a certain extent how an 
English court views sophisticated financial transactions.  In the US, however, this is 
not the case - even a seemingly non-contentious subject like securitisation can 
generate litigation in a litigious society.   
 Although English law lacks any rulings regarding true sale transfers in 
securitisation we can, however, look to the US ruling in order to gain some familiarity 
with how the courts view true sale under securitisation.  The case law involving true 
sale point to three issues which have become determinative of true sale.  These are 
intention of the parties; ownership and risk; and recourse (Kravitt, 1996: 94-99).   
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3.1 PARTIES’ INTENTIONS 
 The English law position regarding securitisation and the parties’ intentions 
still undeveloped territory.  However, what can be construed from Millett LJ’s 
language in Orion Finance Ltd v Crown Financial Management [1996] BCC 621 
provides, to some extent, an English court’s approach to the question of the parties’ 
intentions.  In Orion the question was: what were the parties thinking at the time 
when they entered into a complicated sale and leaseback transaction?  The learned 
judge looked at the language of the contract to determine its underlying intention 
and purpose and ruled, ‘the question is not what the transaction is but whether it is 
in truth what it purports to be’.  Meaning, that if the contract claims to be a sale it 
should clearly create rights and obligations consistent with a sale – ‘whether it in 
truth what it purports to be’.  This short sentence implies that the approach taken by 
an English court is that it will look at the substance of a transaction rather than just 
the label given to it by the parties.  Further, substance should be examined to the 
extent of determining whether the actual rights and obligations of the parties created 
by the contract are consistent with their description in the contract. 
Thus, an English court, it seems, will look behind the wording used by the 
parties and recognise substance over form which means that it will give recognition 
and deference to the substance of the transaction rather than its form.  The US 
position construed from the case law is very similar (Kravitt, 1996: 98).  It appears 
that in the US a court wants to be convinced that if the parties intended a sale 
transaction, their acts and obligations must be consistent with those found under a 
sale.  Such view is depicted in Major Furniture Mart Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp. 602 
F.2d 538 26 UCC Rep. Serv. 1319 (3rd Cr. 1979).  The primary question in Major 
was: when is a sale not a sale but rather a secured loan? 
There facts were – Major was a furniture retailer and sold items by way of a 
no-deposit credit facility to customers, and consequently built up a pot of 
receivables.  In order to acquire further finance it entered into a financing agreement 
with Castle Credit whereby Major “sold” receivables in exchange for funds.  The 
transfer agreement was ambiguously drafted and contained terms which caused the 
court to look closely at the transfer.  These terms stipulated that all accounts sold 
shall be with full recourse against Major, and Major was required to warrant the full 
performance of each account sold to Castle.  Further the accounts were sold at a 
discounted rate.  Major decided to sue for the excess held by Castle claiming that 
the transfer was not a sale but a loan and by virtue of §.9-502 Pennsylvania Uniform 
Commercial Code – ‘a secured party must account to the debtor for any surplus, the 
debtor is not entitled to any surplus where there was a sale of accounts unless 
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otherwise stated in the agreement’.  In order for Major to succeed it needed to show 
that the transfer was in fact a loan and not a sale.    
The court looked closely at the transaction and the business activities of the 
parties.  It held, without much elaboration, ‘courts will not be controlled by the 
nomenclature that parties apply to their relationship’.  Some commentators have 
interpreted this to mean that a court will look beyond the wording used in the 
transfer contract by examining the business activities, objections and the 
relationship between the parties (Kothari, 1999; Kravitt, 1996).  It is true, argues 
Kravitt, that ambiguous wording can be used to disguise the true intentions of 
parties but in the US it seems a court will reject the use of simple language like ‘sale 
and purchase’ to indicate the intention of true sale (Kravitt, 1996: 97).  Lawyers 
drafting transfer contracts are now expected, following the decision in Major, to 
incorporate elaborate wording which clearly demonstrates the parties’ intentions.  
Wording such as ‘sale and purchase’ is now replaced with ‘assigns, sets over and 
transfers all rights, title and interest’ – language that was suggested in Re. Golden 
Plan of California Inc. 829 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986), another case that briefly 
touched upon the issue of parties’ intentions.  It seems that such wording defines 
and describes the parties’ rights and obligations in respect of true sale.  This way 
the sale of the assets is effective against the originator, its creditors, its regulator, 
and its liquidator/receiver and enforceable against the underlying obligors, if worded 
correctly.  
 
3.2 OWNERSHIP AND RISK 
The clear passing of ownership and risk is another determinative factor of 
true sale.  Under English law, both ownership and risk passes if a transfer complies 
with s.136 Law of Property Act 1925 which passes all legal rights, risks and 
remedies respecting the receivables to the transferee.  It further, gives the 
transferee authority to discharge the debt without the aid of the transferor.  Once 
such receivables have been assigned pursuant to s. 136, the purchaser then 
registers its interest by filing a registration statement and/or a registration with HM 
Land Registry (in the case of mortgages).   
Typically, the originator does not give the required notice under s. 136 to the 
underlying debtors since such a requirement involves additional administration and 
costs.  Thus, the transfer of the receivables does not strictly comply with s. 136 and 
as such the transfer is accomplished by an equitable assignment.  In such a case, 
the SPV generally takes actual or constructive possession of the documents 
evidencing title for each receivable and an irrevocable power of attorney from the 
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originator enabling it to perfect legal transfers if necessary.   
The weakness of transferring receivables by an equitable assignment is that 
it presents priority problems between competing assignments.  Priority between 
competing assignment is determined by the order in which notice of the assignment 
is given to the underlying debtor, not the order of the assignments themselves, save 
for where the later assignee is aware of the earlier assignment at the time that it 
entered into the later assignment (Goode, 2003).  Thus, until notice is given, an 
assignment is vulnerable in terms of priority.  However, in practice, language is built 
into the transfer agreement in form of representations and warranties given by the 
originator with the effect that the receivables being transferred are owned by it on 
the date of the assignment, and that it has not granted to any other party a security 
interest in such receivables.  In his way, the SPV is protected against any third party 
claiming an interest in the receivables, and more importantly, any security interest 
that ranks ahead of the SPV’s interest.   
Conversely, in the US determining the effective transfer of ownership and 
risk in receivables is a state law question, and in the US assignments can be either 
legal or equitable depending on whether notice has been given to the underlying 
debtors. For the same reason as that in the UK, originators do not give such notice, 
and passing of ownership and risk in the receivables is evidenced by filing a 
registration statement pursuant to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.  
Further, priority problems are avoided through the giving of representations and 
warranties.   
 Without an effective transfer of ownership and risk significant effects can 
surface which can affect the SPV and consequently the investors.  Note, however, 
that the SPV and the investors can only be affected should the originator face 
financial difficulty.  Where there is no evidence of an effective transfer of ownership 
and risk in the transfer agreement, it is possible that such transaction (should a 
dispute arise) can be interpreted as a granting of finance secured on the 
receivables, in other words, ‘recharacterised as security for the purposes of security 
and bankruptcy law’ (Wood, 5-3).  Accordingly, the originator and the issuer 
establish a debtor and creditor relationship, respectively.    
Because a mortgage or a charge of the receivables confers no ownership to 
the SPV, the originator remains the owner of the receivables, and such receivables 
form part of its bankruptcy estate.  Furthermore, if the originator becomes bankrupt, 
assuming that the SPV has registered and perfected its security interest, it will only 
suffer a delay in the conveying of cashflows received by the originator from the 
underlying debtors.  If the SPV holds mortgaged receivables then the security 
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interest will convert into ownership after following the security enforcement 
procedures.  However, if it holds charged receivables that are unregistered then the 
SPV is classed as an unsecured creditor and will be paid according to the 
liquidator’s asset distribution percentage. 
 Thus, it is important that the language of the transfer agreement clearly sets 
out the intentions of the parties.  If the transfer is a sale then the wording should be 
redolent of a sale.  Although the courts, generally, will not interfere with or rewrite 
the transaction, they will, however, intervene if the wording of the transfer appears 
inconsistent with the actions of the parties (Kravitt, 1996: 98).  For example, if the 
wording suggests a sale but the originator retains a right to repurchase the 
receivables, under mortgage law this arrangement constitutes an equity of 
redemption of mortgaged property.  Having said that, it is common for the originator 
to repurchase any remaining receivables after the life of the securities but the 
repurchase amount must be limited to a minimum. 
 Another example where parties claim to have documented a sale but the 
arrangement suggests a mortgage occurs where the originator extracts excess profit 
from the transaction.  It is common for the originator to extract the profit made by the 
SPV in a manner disguised as servicing fees.  However, this arrangement also 
suggests, in the absence of true sale language, that the originator is taking back the 
excess of the mortgaged property over the loan.  If the transaction is, in fact, a true 
sale then the SPV can rightly keep the profit derived from the purchased property.  
Further, the originator can effectively transfer the credit risk to the SPV under true 
sale language.  This is not the case if the arrangement is or is later recharacterised 
as a mortgage or a charge granted in exchange for a loan. 
 Case law determining the passing of ownership and risk in receivables is, 
regrettably, thin.  As stated earlier, English courts have not ruled on any transactions 
where the subject matter is the transfer or purported transfer of a pool of receivables 
under a securitisation.  The US has a very short list of such cases which have 
indirectly touched upon the effective transfer of ownership and risk when examining 
the issue of the parties’ intentions.  For example, the case of Octagon Gas Systems 
Inc. v. Rimmer 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993) highlighted that ownership and risk 
passes if the parties intended such act (Elmgren, 1995; Kravitt, 1996: 111).   
  
3.3 RECOURSE 
 The essence of transferring under a true sale contract is to assign 
ownership, risks and benefits to the SPV.  It can be the case that a pool is 
transferred using true sale language but the originator agrees, directly or indirectly, 
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to compensate the SPV should any receivables fail to materialise.  This agreement 
to compensate may either be in the transfer contract or be disguised by action.  The 
rating agency is aware of such compensatory provisions existing in a typical 
securitisation.  However, it views such provisions as beneficial since they protect the 
SPV against non paying receivables (Standard and Poor’s, 1993i).  But from a legal 
prospective, particularly in the US, such recourse provisions are viewed as contrary 
to what true sale should achieve (Kravitt, 1996: 114).   
 The English law position with regards to recourse and true sale is still 
unexplored territory, although in Metropolitan Toronto Police Widows and Orphans 
Fund v. Telus Communications Inc. [2003] O.J. No. 128, the first Canadian case that 
dealt with true sale in Canada, the court observed that ‘in both British and Canadian 
authorities it has been held that even full recourse is not incompatible with the 
concept of legal sale’ without mentioning which English case it replied on to make 
such statement.    
The English approach to recourse provisions, generally, stems from the 
doctrine of substantial performance.  Assume the originator transfers a pool of 
receivables to the SPV.  At the time of transfer the originator reasonably believes 
such receivables would materialise.  Now, assume that a small fraction of those 
receivables fail to materialise because the underlying obligors fail to make 
payments.  The SPV can bring a claim against the originator for breach of contract 
based on failed performance.  However, the SPV would need to show that the small 
amount of non paying receivables is sufficient to rule the transfer a breach of 
contract – in other words does the doctrine of substantial performance apply to the 
breach?  The doctrine is triggered when the breach relates to a breach of warranty 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993i).  The originator when transferring the pool of 
receivables warrants that the receivables will pay thus, a breach of such warranty 
triggers the doctrine.   
 But whether the SPV is allowed to treat the whole transfer as a breach 
depends on the how much loss the breach of warranty has caused.  For example, in 
H. Dakin Co. Ltd. v. Lee, CA (1916), the claimant builder agreed to carry out repair 
work on the defendant’s house, and the completed work departed from the 
specifications in three minor respects which could be remedied at a small cost.  The 
Court of Appeal held that the breach of warranty did not amount to a complete 
breach of the contract and awarded judgement for the plaintiff, subject to a 
deduction equal to the cost of remedying the defects.  In contrast, in Bolton v. 
Mahadeva, CA (1972), the claimant agreed to install a central heating system in the 
defendant’s house for £560.  The system was defective and gave off noxious fumes 
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and the house failed to heat adequately.  The cost to remedy this defect was £174.  
The Court of Appeal held that there had not been substantial performance on part of 
the claimant and thus, was not permitted to recover the cost of the work.  It seems 
that the SPV must show that the breach of warranty affected the originator’s 
performance substantially.  In other words, did the small amount of defaulting 
receivables amount to concluding that the originator failed to perform substantially 
under the contract?   
 The amount to remedy the breach of warranty is an indication as to the 
answer.  Where the cost of remedying is nominal and does not affect the heart of 
the contract then under the doctrine of substantial performance the SPV should be 
compensated for the small loss but the contract will remain effective. 
 However, the position in the US regarding recourse provisions is somewhat 
different.  The US view is depicted in Major’s case (discussed earlier).  We have 
already seen how in Major a court views the language used by parties when 
transferring receivable and how it needs to be convinced that the parties must intend 
a transfer.  The primary question in Major’s was when is a sale not a sale but rather 
a secured loan, but court also dealt with the issue of recourse and the recourse 
provisions in the agreement, and held that such provisions were contrary to those 
found in a sale and purchase contract which aims to transfer risks and benefits.   
Regardless of how the parties dress up the contract such recourse 
provisions are key to determining whether a transfer is nothing more than a loan 
granted in exchange for receivables (Kravitt, 1996).  A close examination of the 
court’s reasoning in Major spells out why it may have recharacterised the purported 
sale transaction as a loan.  True sale is achieved when all risks and benefits are 
actually transferred.  In Major a contractual term clearly provided that there were 
recourse provisions – provisions which the court perhaps thought were excessive in 
order to satisfy true sale.  The court, however, failed to indicate to what extent it saw 
the recourse provisions as being excessive and moreover, failed to indicate or set 
precedent as to what level of recourse amounts to excessive recourse – was the 
court prepared to accept recourse provisions which were not full recourse against 
Major?   
The academic reaction to Major is nicely summed by Kravitt (1996) and 
further explored by Pantaleo et al (1996).  These academics looked at recourse 
provisions found in typical transfer agreements against the ruling in Major.  Kravitt 
argues that a key element to finding that a sale took place, as opposed to a loan, is 
that the purported seller provide no recourse or such recourse is very limited.  
Recourse has been analytically divided into four general categories: recourse 
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provided for uncollectibility; recourse to provide a contracted rate of return; recourse 
for yield protection; and recourse for representations and warranties no relating to 
the credit quality of the receivables.  Recourse that falls within the first two 
categories is called economic recourse.  Economic recourse is explored by Pantaleo 
et al (1996: 170-171), who correctly state that one distinguishing characteristic 
between true sale and secured lending is the level of recourse that is permitted 
against the seller.  Under true sale the buyer may have recourse against the seller 
for collections risk, or put another way, the buyer can seek compensation from the 
seller up to an amount that is the difference between the market value (or purchase 
price) of the receivables and what was actually received by the buyer.  This kind of 
recourse, they state, is compatible with true sale since it stems from first principles 
of contract law and the freedom of the seller to give a warranty to bolster the quality 
of the receivables.  In effect, the seller warrants that the pool of receivables will 
perform in a particular fashion, and if it does not, the seller will compensate the 
buyer to the extent of putting the buyer in the position it would have been in had the 
pool performed as expected.  Put another way, ‘recourse for collectibility merely 
improves the quality of the asset transferred … the purchaser with recourse cannot 
do better economically than the purchaser without recourse if the asset performs in 
accordance with its terms’ (Pantaleo et al, 1996: 171). 
Thus, assume A sells B a pool of 100 mortgages, each having a life of 10 
years and provides a stable yield at 5% p.a.  Now assume that both parties have 
made assumptions that during the first 3 years the pool will lose 2 mortgages each 
year through obligor default.  At the beginning of year 4, the pool will contain 94.  
Collections risk is the 6 mortgages lost through obligor default, that is, the loss 
sustained by the buyer through uncollectibility.  In practice, the seller will replace the 
6 defaulted mortgages with mortgages that provide a stream of cashflow which, 
when injected into the pool, will put the pool in the position it would have been in had 
the default not occurred.  This replacing of defaulted mortgages is defined by 
Pantaleo, et al, as “collectibility recourse”. 
If the level of recourse provided by the seller is in excess of this, then there is 
a risk that such excessive recourse may be interpreted as economic recourse, 
recourse that is said to be incompatible with true sale (Pantaleo et al, 1996: 171).  
Economic recourse, in simple terms, is a payment (or a series of payments) made 
by the seller to the buyer that is in addition to, or outside of, compensating against 
collections risk.  It is important to note that economic recourse will only become an 
issue if the transaction in question contains other characteristics that suggest it is, in 
fact, a loan transaction.  For example, a court is likely to look at the passing of 
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ownership and risk, and will certainly look to whether the intention, words and 
actions of the parties suggest that the buyer has become the owner of the 
transferred assets.  It will also consider the scenario of what happens if the pool of 
mortgages defaults, and who suffers the loss.   
Thus, it seems that in the US recourse provisions which are “excessive” or 
indicative of economic recourse are interpreted as incompatible with true sale, 
meaning that a transfer agreement with such provision would not transfer ownership 
and risk effectively; whereas, in Canada, in Metropolitan Toronto Police Widows and 
Orphans Fund v. Telus Communications Inc. [2003] O.J. No. 128, it has been held 
that full recourse is not incompatible with a concept of a legal sale.  If Canada 
witnesses another case involving true sale it would be interesting to learn exactly 
what is meant by “full recourse” and whether this includes economic recourse.  
Additionally, if an English court is faced with the issue of true sale it would be 
interesting to learn whether it acknowledges and incorporates into its reasoning the 
US concept of economic recourse. 
   
4. TRUE SALE SOLUTIONS 
Judicial analysis of true sale based on black letter law and applying 
discretion in order gain a result (Pantaleo et al, 1996).  The author believes it is this 
discretion that needs to be controlled by drafting certain guidance so that future 
judicial understanding of true sale truly reflects what true sale is in essence and the 
academics’ view.  If discretion is controlled and allowed to be undertaken within 
defined parameters and in accordance with clear guidance this inevitably will have a 
positive effect on eliminating inconsistent judicial evaluations of true sale 
transactions.   
 Two legal commentators, Professors Aicher and Fellerhoff (1991) suggest a 
solution for judges when dealing with the true sale issue which, in the author’s view, 
seems rather limited.  They discuss an analytical approach that focuses on whether 
the purchaser paid the ‘reasonable equivalent of fair market price for the assets’ 
(1991: 3).  They contend that the courts should seek to answer the following 
question: ‘what would an informed and willing buyer pay a willing seller for a transfer 
of the entire bundle of risks and benefits embodied in the cash flow represented by 
the [accounts]?’ (1991: 3).  They correctly add that a proper determination of this 
question will necessarily involve a consideration of recourse, both indirect and 
direct, and the effect recourse has on the purchase price.  Aicher and Fellerhoff 
further add that, ‘[if] the effective price paid (accounting for all recourse…) 
reasonably approximates what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, the court 
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should not decide that such recourse devices require characterization of the 
transaction as a loan (1991: 3).  Kravitt (1996: 117-119) acknowledges that the 
purchase price paid for a pool of receivables needs to be reasonable and of fair 
value but argues that recourse provisions should be considered in isolation of what 
constitutes as fair value.  He is silent as to whether such consideration is to be 
undertaken by a court.  However, recourse provisions are not part of the purchase 
price notwithstanding that the purchase price is somewhat calculated with recourse 
in mind.  Pantaleo et al also discuss recourse provisions and state that recourse 
should be considered by a court where their consideration is necessary to determine 
true sale and whether the purchase price paid is based on economic recourse.  
Where economic recourse exists then the court can rightly recharacterised the 
transaction as a loan (1996: 172).   
Unfortunately, the solution proposed by Aicher and Fellerhoff is questionable 
and is limited to suggesting that dealing with the question of recourse alone will 
eliminate inconsistent judicial evaluations of true sale.  Aicher and Fellerhoff mention 
a "reasonable value" test, suggesting that a court’s determination of what is 
"reasonable" should take into consideration any recourse provisions or guarantees, 
but they fail to mention what type and amount of recourse is permissible in a true 
sale transaction.   
A close analysis of their solution reveals the following – a court should 
characterise a receivable transfer as a “true sale” when a reasonable purchase price 
is paid; "reasonable" they define as what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller 
taking into account all recourse; thus, any price is reasonable.  However, Aicher and 
Fellerhoff fail to define the limits of permissible recourse and this omission may 
invite judges to conduct a balancing test to determine the acceptable amount of 
recourse in a true sale transaction.  Thus, allowing judges to exercise discretion.  
Moreover, their proposed solution requires judges to perform the difficult task of 
assigning value to recourse.  
Furthermore, Aicher and Fellerhoff state, ‘the presence of some direct 
recourse or a retained interest by the seller in excess collections…is still consistent 
with a true sale’ (1991: 3).  This, in the absence of elaboration, is misleading.  It is 
true that a limited amount of recourse may exist so as to still achieve a “true sale”.  
However, the second part ‘a retained interest by the seller in excess of 
collections…is still consistent with true sale’ is wholly inaccurate.  Section 9-502 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code implies that a retained interest in excess collections 
is indicative of a created security interest.  More importantly, §.9-502(2) provides 
that,  
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“… [where] a security agreement secures indebtedness, the secured party 
must account to the debtor for any surplus, and unless otherwise agreed, the 
debtor is liable for any deficiency." 
 
 This provision suggests that a seller’s right to surplus collections accrued on 
transferred receivables is indicative of a security interest and not a “true sale”. 
Furthermore, in Major the court held that holding a retained interest by a 
seller/debtor connotes the creation of a security interest in apposite to an absolute 
assignment.  In Re Evergreen Valley Resort 23 B.R. 659, 661 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) 
the court held that ‘holding a security interest is indicated when the sellers retain a 
right to a deficiency or surplus collection’ (pg. 663).  Unfortunately, Aicher and 
Fellerhoff’s solution of just dealing with the question of recourse alone in order to 
eliminate inconsistent evaluations of recourse does not provide the clarity and 
consistency needed in a solution.  
Another academic Professor Bjork (1997: 122) discusses an alternative 
solution to that proposed by Aicher and Fellerhoff.  Bjork proposes a two step 
analysis which argues would assist courts in accurately characterising a transaction.  
Firstly, he states that mathematical formulas should be used to determine fair value 
of the receivables.  Once a fair price has been established the court should then 
look at the relationship between the originator and the SPV in order to ascertain 
whether there is a ‘separateness of entities’.  If it can be shown that the two entities 
are separate and that receivables have been transferred at market price then this 
indicates sufficient evidence of a true sale.  This is true to a certain extent in that 
showing the separateness of the two entities can assist in showing a legitimate and 
arm’s length sale.  However, Bjork’s solution fails to consider the effect of recourse 
provisions and other factors which can indicate against true sale.   
While solutions like the one proposed by Aicher and Fellerhoff and Bjork 
strive to establish judicial consistency in transactional characterisation they also fail 
to limit the discretion of the courts in characterising such transactions.  
 
4.1 AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION 
The author will now discuss an alternative solution which it believes goes 
further than the solutions of Aicher and Fellerhoff and Bjork.  The author 
acknowledges the solution of Bjork and incorporates it to the extent that a fair value 
of the pool should be established and shown in addition to showing the 
separateness of the originator and the SPV – but now goes further. 
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Under a secured lending the SPV will raise funds from investors by 
representing that it intends to acquire a security interest in a pool of receivables.  
The funds raised are then given as a loan to the originator in exchange for a security 
interest in “risk free” receivables.  The onus is on the originator to ensure that the 
receivables isolated for the SPV produce the intended income and that income is 
passed on to the SPV as repayments.  The loan agreement will govern the amount 
and frequency of repayments.  
Contrast this with a true sale – the SPV raises funds from the investors by 
representing that it intends to purchase a pool of receivables.  The originator 
transfers the pool in exchange for the raising of funds.  The originator retains no 
interest or risk in the pool.  A reliable mechanism is put in place which conveys the 
income from the pool to the SPV.  Note the disparity that under a true sale 
transaction, the onus is not on the originator to ensure that income is passed on to 
the SPV.  This in the author’s view is an indication of true sale – looking at on whom 
is the onus to ensure the SPV receives payments from the underlying debtors.   
Another problem is that the pool stops producing income because the 
underlying debtors default.  The SPV has a limited amount of recourse – <5% – 
usually agreed with the aid of the credit rating agency to deal with defaults.  The 
originator can replace these defaulting receivables.  But what happens if the 
defaulting amount is in excess of the agreed and acceptable amount?  In practice, 
the SPV will have a cushion of receivables (in addition to insurance policies and 
other credit enhancements) which will absorb the loss of the defaulting receivables.   
Now assume that the originator fails to make the repayments under a secured 
lending, or if the transferred receivables under a true sale are not producing the 
intended income resulting in a loss in excess of any cover.  What happens?  This 
essentially is the question in relation to recourse.  Another method of testing a 
transaction for true sale characteristics is to ask who covers the loss of a pool in 
excess of the cover provided by credit enhancement facilities?  If the answer is the 
originator then this suggests that the transaction is not a true sale – the originator 
has not transferred all risks associated with the receivables. 
Another determinative factor is to analyse the whole securitisation structure 
before isolating and studying the transfer contract between the originator and the 
SPV.  Before this is discussed further it is necessary to compare securitisation with 
another method of selling debt – factoring.  Under a factoring arrangement the debt 
is sold to the buyer in exchange for an amount which is less than the market value 
of the debt.  The buyer’s profit is the amount recovered less the price paid.  The 
buyer would have sufficient funds in place in order to purchase the debt.  Contrast 
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this with securitisation – where debt is sold or pledged in exchange for funds which 
firstly, reflect fair value and secondly, are not in the possession of the buyer.  It can 
be safely believed that securitisation evolved from factoring – the idea of selling 
debt.  But securitisation differs in two respects – (i) the assets can be pledged in 
exchange for a loan and (ii) the buyer cannot purchase any right in the receivables 
without borrowing from investors.  In essence, the buyer is not a trading company 
with its own two-sided balance sheet – credit and debit balances.  The SPV is 
created to become a creditor only with a pool of receivables as assets.  Any profit 
made between the assets and liability is used to maintain the whole arrangement 
and purchase additional assets only from the originator.   
When determining true sale the whole structure should be analysed first and 
this should spark an analysis of the SPV – why is the SPV set up?  Who owns and 
operates it?  Is it a trading company?  Does it have the ability to trade?  What is on 
its balance sheet?  Who are its creditors and debtors?  How did it get the funds to 
purchase the rights in the receivables?  Does it have the ability to raise funds from 
investors?  Is it a bank trading to lend funds?  How long is its life as a company?  
Such an investigation will reveal how and why the SPV is in the whole securitisation 
structure.  Once this picture has been formed only then should the transfer contract 
be isolated and analysed to determine true sale.  Thus, a court will understand that 
the SPV is merely a legal and commercial vehicle created to assist the originator to 
raise funds.   
The SPV’s incorporation documents will state if it has the ability to lend 
money – if it does then this hints that the originator created the structure to acquire 
funds as a loan from the SPV in exchange for a security interest.  If the documents 
state that the SPV has no ability to lend – it should not create a debtor – then this 
hints true sale in that the SPV only has the ability to borrow from investors and not 
to acquire debtors which can upset its bankruptcy status.  If the SPV has the ability 
to create debtors then this exposes it to potential financial difficulty in excess of the 
potential financial difficulty it can have in relation to its creditors.  The SPV is not set 
up to increase its chances of getting itself into a financial mess nor create 
complicated accounting by trading and acquiring debtors and creditors.   
The author believes that this alternative solution is more workable and will go 
some way to assist courts in correctly determining the character of a transaction.  To 
recap – 
• analyse the whole structure 
• investigate the separateness of the originator and the SPV 
• investigate the SPV 
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• ascertain the market value of the receivables 
• closely read the transfer contract  
• whose duty is it to ensure income passes to the SPV? 
• who bears the risk in excess of all credit enhancement? 
 
This discussion aimed to show that the courts may be inadequately equipped 
to decide securitisation issues.  The author discussed how the US litigation was 
decided in absence of clear judicial understanding of securitisation – maybe it was 
the fault of lawyers who failed to present securitisation correctly to the court.  
Hopefully with more guidance a court will have a better understanding of 
securitisation and decide its issues correctly and of equal importance such guidance 
can assist in the correct construction of securitisation structures. 
 
5. ARM’S LENGTH 
Another significant consideration for the originator when transferring the 
assets is to ensure that the transaction is not nullified on the grounds that it 
constitutes a sham.  As already mentioned, the contract language needs to be 
consistent with both the intentions and actions of the parties involved.  Further, the 
originator needs to ensure that the contract governing the sale of the assets is made 
in good faith and for valuable consideration.   
 
1. What is market value? 
Market value is the value assigned to a pool of receivables which can assist 
in determining whether the pool has been transferred to the SPV for an amount 
which does not indicate an undervalue.  Calculating market value is usually 
undertaken by specialist accountants with the assistance of the credit rating agency 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993i).  Without complicating the discussion the author will 
now demonstrate such a calculation. 
There are three key components which form the market valuation of a pool of 
receivables – the expected return; risk of default and costs.  The expected return is 
the amount the pool will generate during its life.  This amount is a speculative 
amount based upon past performance data collected by the credit rating agency and 
balancing it as accurately as possible with the quality and quantity of the SPV’s pool.  
The risk of default is expressed as a percentage to reflect an amount that potentially 
will not produce income due to default.  This percentage again is based upon past 
performance data collected by the credit rating agency.  Costs reflect the amount of 
total costs expended in the transaction - legal costs, administrative costs etc. 
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The expected return shall be designated “ER”; risk of default “RD” and costs 
“C”.  Now consider this formula: 
 
  ER – C = DER (discounted expected return) 
 
  DER x RD = QRD (quantified risk of default) 
 
  DER – QRD = market value 
 
Assume the SPV has a pool of receivables with an expected return of 
£15,000,000.  Costs amounted to £250,000 and the credit rating agency stated that 
the risk of default is 10%.  Thus, 
 
  £15,000,000 – £250,000 = £14,750,000 DER 
   
  £14,750,000 x .10 = £1,500,000 QRD 
 
  £14,750,000 – £1,500,000 = £13,250,000 market value 
 
Note that this calculation omits any recourse since recourse in excess of 
what the credit rating agency declares as acceptable is an indication that the 
transaction may be characterised as a loan for security.  However, calculating 
market value can assist in determining excessive recourse.  Assume that the SPV 
has a pool with a market value of £13,250,000.  Then look at what facilities are in 
place to cover loss – how much cushion does the SPV have?  Then look at the 
recourse provisions in the transfer contract to ascertain how much cushion is 
provided by the originator.  If the cushion provided by the originator is unreasonably 
in excess of the quantified risk of default then this can be viewed as excessive 
recourse.  Thus, in the example above, if the recourse provided by the originator is 
unreasonably in excess of £1,500,000 then a court can rightly question the recourse 
provisions – has the originator transferred all risk associated with the pool? 
It is common to find, in practice, a contract made between the originator and 
the SPV involving receivables sold at a discount.  The granting of a discount is 
justified by the quality of the receivables pool.  Some receivables will not materialise 
as expected and a typical pool will contain such receivables.  A discount is offered 
by the originator that reflects the size of the defaulting receivables in excess of the 
expected default rate. 
 The size of the discount granted by the originator needs to be cautiously 
measured against the market value of the pool.  A too large discount can easily be 
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interpreted as a transaction at an undervalue and nullified as a result.  Further, such 
discount should not be disguised as recourse excessive recourse. 
 A transaction at an undervalue can occur in numerous scenarios.  However, 
in the context of securitisation, a transaction which is legally binding at the time of 
making can be nullified if the originator transfers receivables to the SPV for no 
consideration or where the originator sells receivables for consideration that is 
significantly less than the reasonable market price (excluding any discount allocated 
that reflects the overall quality of the pool). 
 
2. Contractual prohibitions 
The originator, unlike the SPV, is trading entity with an established business 
operation.  It will be a party in a number of commercial contracts with either lenders 
or other commercial entities.  Usually the originator will have outstanding borrowing 
on its balance sheet.  Such borrowing will be tied to a lending agreement which 
inevitably will have anti-asset-disposal; asset-stripping or negative pledge clauses to 
protect the lender who has given funds to the originator (Penn, Shea and Arora, 
1987: 111).  This type of clause comes into effect depending on how the originator 
gains funds from the SPV in exchange for the receivables.   
If the originator decides to pledge the receivables as security in exchange for 
a loan then the negative pledge clause takes effect.  In essence, it protects an 
existing lender against an event where the originator isolates assets and pledges 
them as security for a loan.  A typical negative pledge clause will provide (Penn, 
Shea and Arora, 1987: 111): 
 
‘The Borrower will not create or permit to subsist any mortgage, charge, lien, pledge 
or other security interest on or over any of its present or future assets unless all the 
borrower’s obligations under this Agreement either: 
(a) share (to the satisfaction of the lender) the security afforded by such 
mortgage, charge, lien, pledge, or other security interest, equally and 
rateably with the loan, debt, guarantee or other obligation secured thereby, 
or 
(b) receive (to the satisfaction of the lender) the benefit of either a mortgage, 
charge, lien, pledge or other security interest, on other assets or revenues of 
the Borrower which the lender judges to be equivalent to that granted to 
such loan, debt, guarantee or other obligation.’ 
 
Although the clause seems restrictive there are usually exceptions drafted 
which allow the originator to borrow further funds from other lenders.  Commonly, 
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the originator is expected to seek permission from an existing lender if further 
borrowing is intended.  Whether such permission is granted depends on 
negotiations that favour the existing lender’s interests.  Note that there is another 
clause popular in lending agreements called the pari passu clause which seeks to 
protect the security interests of unsecured lenders where the originator borrowers 
unsecured debt.  However, in the context of securitisation this is not appropriate 
since the originator will seek to give a secured interest to the SPV and not a 
unsecured interest.   
Anti-asset-disposal or asset-stripping clauses take effect when the originator 
transfers assets under a “true sale” contract.  As already mentioned, the originator 
will have existing borrowing and thus lenders will aim to protect their interest in the 
originator’s assets.  Transferring receivables can affect the originator’s balance 
sheet even though proceeds are received.  The effect depends on the actual sale – 
the originator may have sold the receivables at a discount in addition acceptable 
recourse provisions.  Thus, there is a disparity on the balance sheet between the 
value of the receivables when held by the originator and the value received upon 
sale.   
How much concern this would cause depends on how a lender would react 
to the change in the balance sheet.  However, originators do securitise receivables 
with the intention of paying existing lenders.  Thus, in such a scenario a lender may 
not object to the transfer of receivables.  In any event the originator is expected to 
read closely any existing borrowing agreements and ascertain any limitations or 
prohibitions on transferring assets.  Commonly, if assets are transferred the 
originator should seek the permission of any lender who has an interest in the 
receivables.   
 
6. FINAL WORDS 
 Though it seems that the originator transfers receivables under a simple yet 
well drafted sale and purchase contract or security for loan contract there are 
important considerations which can destroy the whole contract.  At the outset of the 
securitisation the originator will know whether it wishes to borrow the funds from the 
SPV or sell the receivables for cash.  According to this intention the arrangement is 
constructed and the governing contract is drafted so that the intentions are clearly 
expressed. 
Commonly, securitisation is intended to achieve a true sale so that 
receivables are sold and eliminated from the originator’s balance sheet.  We have 
seen that achieving true sale is not as easy as it seems.  There are a number of 
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important considerations for the originator which assist in determining a true sale.  
There is also the threat that courts may continue to recharacterise a transaction as a 
loan regardless of any true sale intentions and actions.  Without clear guidance for 
judges and lawyers it seems that incorrect evaluations of transactions may continue.  
The author examined solutions to this problem before developing his own solution 
which it is hoped will assist judges and lawyers in future litigation relating to the “true 
sale” issue in securitisation.   
 Aside from true sale the originator needs to bear in mind that the transfer 
contract must be conducted at arm’s length so that it cannot be attacked as being a 
sham.  The receivables should be sold at what they are realistically worth.  A pool 
sold for less than its market value can be attacked as a sale at an undervalue.  
Contractual prohibitions and limitations need to be considered since they have 
priority over the actions of the originator when intending to sell or pledge 
receivables.  In the main detailed legal investigation should be conducted by lawyers 
before offering advice in this rather complicated mechanism of raising funds. 
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CHAPTER 5 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE SPV 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 The special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) undertakes a pivotal role in a 
securitisation.  In fact, it is the entity that actually securitises the purchased or 
pledged receivables to raise finance.  The SPV is simply a thinly capitalised entity, 
structured either as a corporation or as a trust, which issues debt securities in order 
to raise finance.  Observing a traditional securitisation structure, at first sight, gives 
the impression that the SPV is merely added to bridge the originator and investors 
so that the originator can benefit from capital market borrowing even if the 
originator’s own credit standing fails to meet the criteria of capital market borrowing.    
However, from an analytical standpoint it can be seen that the originator is 
not contractually linked with capital market investors but is contractually linked with 
the SPV only.  If the contract for the sale of the receivables complies in word and 
action with a “true sale” criterion then the originator has merely sold receivables at 
their market price.  However, where the agreement falls short of a “true sale” then 
the originator borrows not from the capital market investors but from the SPV at a 
rate that is fractionally higher than the rate the SPV has borrowed from the capital 
market investors.  The difference is used for operating costs. 
 The SPV is created as a separate entity with its own individual legal standing 
and operations.  It can be created as an offshoot subsidiary of the originator or, as is 
often recommended by counsel, as an independent legal entity controlled and 
operated by independent minds. 
 Company and trust laws of leading financial jurisdictions have developed 
well over time to allow the creation of several distinct types of entities (with little 
comparative disparities) which have the capacity of operating effectively as a SPV 
for the purpose of securitising receivables.  But the aim of this chapter is to focus 
solely on the common and statutory laws of the UK and US (with a bias towards 
New York state law). 
 When structuring a securitisation each party is faced with legal 
considerations.  In the previous chapter the legal considerations for the originator 
were discussed.  This chapter aims to unfold the legal considerations faced by the 
SPV.  Because of the complexity involved in securitisation and the pivotal role 
played by the SPV, it is imperative that the SPV is structured, controlled and 
operated correctly since a slight deviation can be disastrous.  The legal 
considerations for the SPV are, in short, 
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• Correct form and location 
• It acquires a bankruptcy remote status 
• Independently controlled and operated 
• Perfection of security interest in the purchased receivables 
 
2. FORM AND LOCATION 
 The form and location of the SPV is the first of the legal considerations.  
Moreover, it lays the foundation and triggers the other legal considerations 
mentioned above.  The investment bank acting as “sponsor” or composer of the 
securitisation structure and the instructed lawyers must achieve the correct form and 
location for the SPV so that it corresponds with the law and content of the contract, 
the type of security the SPV will issue, the investor base it is targeted at and the 
desire to minimise the imposition and amount of taxation.  It would aid 
understanding if a working definition of “form” and “location” is provided at the 
outset.  “Form” is used to mean the legal and physical nature of the SPV.  As history 
depicts, a SPV has been created for the purchase and securitisation of receivables 
as either a corporation or as a trust with specific instructions in the trust deed 
respecting the operation of the trust and the assets.  “Location” is used to mean the 
legal and physical presence of the SPV, which, again, as history depicts can be 
either onshore or offshore.   
 The law and the content of the contract, from an analytical standpoint, is a 
contributing factor which can determine the location of the SPV and to a lesser 
extent its form.  A SPV can be located onshore or offshore and in practice, its 
location is usually perceived to be associated with the desire to minimise the 
imposition and amount of taxation.  Again, to aid understanding, a working definition 
of “onshore” and “offshore” will be provided. 
 “Onshore” jurisdictions can be best defined as independent territories that 
are responsible for their own administration, legislation, forces of coercion and 
financial regulation and in most cases are not answerable to or dependent upon 
other territories.  From an economic viewpoint onshore jurisdictions are classed as 
the developed states.  “Offshore” jurisdictions can be defined as ‘a centre that hosts 
financial activities that are separate from major regulating units (states) by 
geography and/or by legislation’ (Hampton, 1992: 4).  This separation can be a 
physical separation as in the case of the Cayman Islands and the UK or the 
separation can exist within the state, for example, in London. 
It is often believed that offshore jurisdictions are synonymous with tax 
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havens, yet a close study of offshore jurisdictions suggests that there is a blurred 
disparity between the two.  A tax haven can be defined as a territory, which imposes 
no or, at best, low direct and indirect taxation compared to other territories.  The 
disparity that exists is blurred due to the development of offshore jurisdictions in that 
both types of jurisdictions compete for business against each other.  Many offshore 
centres which were once not known to be tax havens have changed legislation to 
appeal for more investment and capital thus, fitting the definition of a tax haven.  
Additionally, many known offshore centres are tax havens yet the authorities dislike 
the term thus, unadvertising the tax benefits.  
Offshore jurisdictions, whether a tax haven or not, are governed by a 
derivative of one of two systems of law, namely, English law or civil law.  The 
legislation enacted is usually rooted in or heavily influenced by the legislation of the 
territory which the offshore jurisdiction is dependent upon.  For example, the 
legislation in Gibraltar is based on English law, with the principal corporate 
legislation being based on the Companies Act 1929 (as amended) and Companies 
Ordinance 1984; Madeira is governed by civil law, its principal corporate legislation 
is the Portuguese Companies Code (Codigo das Sociedades Comerciais); Vanuatu 
is governed by common law and still has in place pre-independence English law; 
and finally, the Cayman Islands is governed by English common law and its 
company legislation, the Cayman Islands’ Companies Law 1960, is based on the 
Companies Act 1948 (Hampton, 1992: 8-12).  
To determine whether the SPV should be located onshore or offshore, the 
sponsor or composer of the structure needs to establish the governing law of the 
contract.   A majority of financial arrangements are governed by either English or 
New York law, therefore, the SPV needs to be located in a jurisdiction that will 
legally accept the financial arrangement to which the SPV is a party.  For example, 
assume that the originator is incorporated under and governed by New York law, the 
contract for the sale of the receivables is written using New York law, now, if the 
SPV was incorporated, say, under German law, can the SPV effectively carry out its 
operations without triggering a conflict of law problem or a perfection of security 
problem?  Possibly not. 
Therefore, to eliminate any potential and unnecessary problems the SPV is 
always located in a jurisdiction which will facilitate its operations.  Additionally, the 
rating agency, before assigning any rating to the securities, will need comfort that 
the receivables have in fact passed to the SPV and that the SPV is the legal and 
beneficial owner of the receivables.  Further, that the security interest in the 
receivables has been perfected and can be called upon should the originator 
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become insolvent or the arrangement runs into difficulty and the assets need to be 
liquidated.  The governing law of the contract in this context relates to the location 
as opposed to the form of the SPV since both onshore and offshore jurisdictions 
allow the formation of trusts and companies.   
 
2.1 SPV AS A CORPORATION  
In the main, the corporation law of popular jurisdictions is rooted in one of the 
following systems of law, English, US or French Civil law.  Each of these systems of 
law facilitate the formation of a trading corporation.  The local law of the jurisdiction 
provides the gloss which reflects the distinctive characteristic of the corporation 
formed under that jurisdiction. 
A company formed and registered under English law can take one of two 
recognisable forms, limited or unlimited.  In short, the disparity is as follows, an 
unlimited company will have members who will be held responsible and accountable 
for all debts of the company without any limit, whereas a limited company will have 
members whose responsibility and accountability is limited either by the size of 
shares they individually hold (s. 1(2)(a) Companies Act 1985) or by the personal 
guarantee afforded by them individually in favour of the company (s. 1(2)(b) 
Companies Act 1985).  Thus, from a commercial standpoint, a limited company is a 
much advantageous entity and prompts praise such as ‘the greatest single 
discovery of modern times.  Even steam and electricity are less important than the 
limited liability company’ (Butler (in Diamond, 1982: 42)). 
 A majority of the companies formed under English law are limited companies 
which further, can take one of two forms, private or public.  A private company can 
only offer its membership or shareholding to a restricted class of investors, whereas 
a public company can canvass for membership or shareholding from a wider class 
of investor, i.e. the general public (s. 81 Companies Act 1985). 
 A SPV created specifically for securitisation, in practice, takes its initial form 
as a private limited company – a special purpose vehicle.  It can be one that has a 
specific object clause in the memorandum or one that has a general “catch-all” 
object clause – also known as an ‘off the shelf’ company.  After registration with the 
registrar it will lie dormant until a public issue of debt securities has been planned.  
Pursuant to s. 43 CA 1985 the private company is re-registered as a public company 
– this change in status is much more common than vice versa.  The company must 
pass a special resolution that is supported by at least 75% of the votes cast.  The 
registrar must be provided with a statutory declaration that the minimum capital 
requirements for public companies have been complied with and that a special 
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resolution favouring the change in status has been passed.  Pursuant to s.47 CA 
1985 the registrar may accept this as sufficient evidence and issue a certificate of 
incorporation.  Such a certificate, under s.47 (5), conclusively states the new status 
of the company.   
 Thus, a UK originator can sell or pledge receivables to a UK created private 
limited company and when a public offering is arranged on paper, the SPV’s legal 
status is changed to a public limited company.  However, where the originator is a 
non-UK entity, it still is required to set up a UK entity which then transforms itself into 
public limited company.  An influencing factor as to the location of the SPV is the 
place where the securities are ultimately issued.  Though securities law respecting 
non-alien and alien entities are similar in spirit, alien entities need to show credibility 
to the foreign investors.  A non-alien entity will have satisfied local corporation rules 
and any investors will gain comfort knowing that the entity is established locally.  In 
contrast, an alien entity issuing securities needs to convince investors that 
regardless of its foreign incorporation, it is a credible entity.  Thus, to overcome any 
difficulty the SPV is established in a credible jurisdiction and can show links with the 
jurisdiction in which the securities are to be issued. 
Both English and civil law have influenced the corporation law of the US.  
Save for the obvious disparities in language, terminology and interpretation, US 
corporation law differs from English law in some significant way (Gusset, 1998: 2-3).  
For example, in the US, corporations have officers as well as directors; bye-laws are 
often created post-incorporation; and directors can be empowered to modify bye-
laws.  Because of the structure of the US legal system, corporation law differs 
slightly from state to state.  But generally, the law of the state in which the 
corporation has been incorporated governs the corporation and its directors and 
officers.  Under the law of the US, a corporation can take one of the following legal 
forms –  
• Close corporation 
• General corporation 
• “S” corporation 
• Limited liability corporation (LLC) 
 
A “close” corporation is created by an individual or a small group of 
individuals who undertake the management of the corporation’s affairs.  
Furthermore, an individual or a small group of individuals hold the equity, that is, its 
stockholding.  It is comparable with the private corporation incorporated in the UK.  
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In practice, a “close” corporation would not be an ideal vehicle which can effectively 
securitise receivables due to its inability to canvass and sell securities to the public.   
A “general” corporation is comparable with the English public limited 
company thus, ideal to securitise receivables.  Under New York State law (s.202 
(a)(7) BCL) an incorporated SPV can issue bonds, notes and other obligations in 
order to raise finance.   Further, the bond proceeds can be passed on to the 
originator as a loan if the agreement falls short of achieving true sale (s. 202 (a)(8) 
BCL).  The “S” corporation was born after the Tax Reform Act 1986 and has since 
become a highly desirable vehicle for tax purposes.  In short, any income received 
secures pass-through treatment if an “S” corporation election is made.  This, in 
practice, is made on IRS form 2553.  Consequently, any income is treated as though 
it is received by a partnership as opposed to being received by directors and 
officers.  In other words, there is no entity level taxation imposed and the holders of 
the securities pay taxation at the personal rate of 28%.  
 The “limited liability” corporation (“LLC”) is the latest advance in the evolution 
of business formation.  Its origins are rooted in Europe and the first statute which 
enacted its formation was modelled on the 1892 German company law known as 
the German GmbH Code 1982.  In 1977 Wyoming was the first state to create this 
type of corporation soon to be followed by all the states.  The LLC combines the 
advantages of its alternatives, for example, a “general” corporation is subjected to 
double taxation, once at corporate level and again at a personal level, whereas the 
LLC is only taxed once at a personal level – investors pay at their personal rate.  
Other advantages include, no citizenship requirement – the “S” corporation restricts 
non-residents becoming shareholders – thus, the originator and/or those who own 
the equity of the SPV must be US residents which can prevent foreigners from 
owning a SPV in the US.  Further, the LLC has no limitations on the size and 
number of its members, no tax penalties upon its liquidation, no limitation on 
ownership of other corporations and allows limited liability to all members including 
those who participate in management (Moody’s, 1999: 3-5).   
Among the reasons for the popularity of the LLC structure is the ability of the 
owners/members of the LLC to participate in its management without exposing 
themselves to the liability for its obligations.  The fiduciary duties of LLC managers 
may be contractually specified, so it may be possible to prevent the independent 
director’s conflict of interest situation by providing in the LLC agreement that the 
managers fiduciary duties are owed primarily to the investors and only secondarily 
to the LLC’s members.   
To reduce the risk of bankruptcy, the LLC agreement typically requires that 
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the filing of a bankruptcy petition must be authorised by a unanimous vote of the 
board of managers of the LLC.  The board of managers can be independent of the 
SPV’s equity owner(s) and, pursuant to the express provisions of the LLC 
agreement, would not owe their fiduciary duties primarily to the owner.  In some 
instances, LLC agreements contain provisions automatically adding one or more 
independent managers as a member, in the event of a ratings downgrade or the 
insolvency of the original member. 
 An interesting question is whether the LLC SPV survives in the bankruptcy of 
any owner or member – it is somewhat clear from Re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, 
LLC, 259 B.R. 289, that LLCs are eligible as debtors under the Bankruptcy Code, 
but it is unclear whether a single member LLC (where one entity owns the equity of 
the SPV) continues to exist after the bankruptcy of its single member (Gusset, 1996: 
4).  
In Re Garrison-Ashburn, L.C., 253 B.R. 700, a bankrupt member of a LLC 
claimed that a real estate transaction which had been authorised by the operating 
manager/member of the LLC was ineffective because his consent had not been 
obtained.  The court concluded that since under ‘the operating agreement a member 
could, without being in breach of the operating agreement, resign from all of his 
offices and committee positions and no longer actively participate in the affairs of the 
company’, the court found that ‘such a member would stand in an analogous 
position to the company as a shareholder to a corporation’ – thus survival of a single 
member LLC exists beyond its sole member’s bankruptcy (pg. 706). 
 However, the court in Re De Luca, 194 B.R. 79, enforced a Virginia LLC 
agreement that expressly provided for the dissolution of the LLC upon the 
bankruptcy of a member. Moreover, the court in Re Daugherty Constr., Inc. 188 B.R. 
607, held that a Nebraska statute which expressly provided that a LLC automatically 
dissolves upon the bankruptcy of one of its members unless the remaining members 
vote to continue the LLC determines the life of the LLC SPV.  Thus, it seems that 
unless the governing statute provides for the continuing existence of the LLC SPV or 
the LLC agreement expressly determines the life of the LLC SPV, the life of the LLC 
SPV ends on the bankruptcy of it single member.  In conclusion, the LLC can make 
a good vehicle for securitising receivables in some states.  The UK does not have 
an entity similar to the US LLC thus, avoids any of the aforementioned difficulties.   
 
2.2 SPV AS A TRUST  
 The trust concerned will be one whose purpose is to purchase the 
receivables and pay the investors.  Furthermore, the trust would be one which is 
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workable in established legal jurisdictions.  In a securitisation structure a trust 
enables the easy satisfaction of the true sale requirement.  In the structure the 
originator transfers receivables to a trust which is specifically manufactured to 
purchase those receivables and carry out duties essential to the maintenance of the 
structure.  Independent trustees are elected to carry out the duties with a trust 
manger who has overall control.  Because the trust lacks capital to fund the 
acquisition of the receivables, it issues equity-like interest in the trust in the form of 
trust certificates to investors.  These certificates represent an undivided fractional 
beneficial ownership in the underlying receivables.   
 In a private offering, one which is accepted by sophisticated purchasers, 
participation certificates are offered giving investors interest in the receivables, 
rather than in the trust as is the case in a public offering.  The reason for eliminating 
the trust from the structure in a private offering is that investors are thought to be 
capable of dealing directly with the parties involved and in the event of a default can 
quite easily enforce their rights.  The important distinction between private and 
public offerings is that in the former, the investor has a direct link with the 
receivables due to the interest he or she acquires in the receivables and can enforce 
rights without an intermediary, whereas in the latter, the investor normally has an 
indirect link with the receivables as he or she owns an interest in the trust only.  This 
is because the link with the receivables is through an intermediary (normally a 
trustee) who is utilised by the issuer to handle the physical administration of the 
issue for reasons of convenience and cost effectiveness.  In the event of a default 
the trustee will enforce rights on behalf of the investor.   
 In the UK, a trust established for the purpose of securitising receivables 
takes the form of an express trust created via a trust deed.  The deed will set out the 
ambit of the trustee’s duties and responsibilities.  Either the originator or the banker 
can be the settlor but neither is permitted to be trustees or beneficiaries.  The deed 
will also dictate the life of the trust and deal with reinvestment of profit.  Where 
reinvestment is not required then the trust takes the status of a non-trading trust.  
Conversely, where trustees are instructed to reinvest profits or funds into the pool of 
receivables by purchasing additional receivables then the status is that of a trading 
trust which is liable for taxation on any profits.  An alien originator is free to use a UK 
trust to facilitate a securitisation, though commonly, trusts are established in 
offshore jurisdictions for tax purposes.   
 The US has created three types of trusts, grantor, owner and master trust.  A 
grantor trust is structured specifically so as to enable it to acquire a non-taxable 
status.  Regulations in place ensure that the trust maintains its non-taxable status 
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(US Department of Treasury Regulations, s.301.7701-4).  In short, they provide that 
the trust must not engage in a profitable business, must not be empowered to vary 
the terms of the investment and must only issue ownership interest based on a 
single class of certificates.  The first of these requirements means that the trust must 
not hold itself out as a trading trust.  Thus, it cannot be used if reinvestment in new 
receivables is sought.  The trust must issue one class of certificates – it is prohibited 
by tax regulations from issuing a multiple class of securities, i.e. commercial paper 
and medium-term notes.  However, the regulations do permit an exception in that a 
multiple class may be issued in the form of senior and subordinate classes as long 
as the originator retains the subordinate class as credit support for the trust (US 
Department of Treasury Regulations, s.301.7701-4(c)(2)).   
 A grantor trust is included when securitising instalment obligations with 
defined amortisation schedules and fixed final maturity dates, such as mortgages, 
car loans and other instalment loans.  The reason for this is that the income from the 
receivables will flow freely and merely “pass through” the grantor trust to the 
investors.  There is no need to reinvest income in new receivables as the securities 
issued and the receivables will have the same maturity dates, save for early 
redemption.   
An owner trust will not qualify as a non-taxable trust because the trust 
manager is empowered to deal with the cashflows of the receivables.  Instead of the 
income flowing from the receivables and passing through to the investor, it is 
withheld by the trust manager and paid according to the income demands of the 
investors.  An owner trust will issue interests in the trust backed by receivables with 
different maturity dates and interest payment dates.  If this were a “pass through” 
transaction, inevitably this would lead to a mismatching of income and payments.  
Since an owner trust can engage in business activity it can reinvest principal 
payments received from the receivables by purchasing new receivables so that the 
investor’s interest in the trust remains at original level.  The receivables are usually 
short term obligations, i.e. credit card receivables, which expire rapidly.  As a result 
the trust manager ensures that the trust’s pot of receivables is not exhausted.  To do 
this the trust manager purchases new receivables and thus maintains the pot, which 
allows the investors a continuing interest in the trust.  The interest is paid to the 
investors in arrears and during the “interest only” period of the securities.  The 
originator takes the proceeds from the sale of the certificates together with the 
unsold ownership interest in the trust.  This allows the originator to have a vested 
interest in the structure and an incentive to sell receivables to the trust.  Interest for 
the originator’s share of ownership is paid directly to the originator. 
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A master trust is used so as to give the issuer access to multiple markets 
simultaneously.  The originator transfers receivables to a master trust which will 
issue more than one class of ownership certificates backed by fractional shares in a 
common pool of receivables.  For example, 75 per cent of the pool will be used to 
back a medium-term issue while the remainder will be used to back a commercial 
paper issue.  The trust manager is empowered to manage the cashflows of the 
structure.  Reinvesting income is common as commercial paper is a short-term 
security.  It also acts as over-collateralisation.  The master trust is structured so that 
it is either a partnership or a vehicle generating debt for the originator for tax 
purposes.   
A trust is thus, a flexible and useful arrangement with use as unlimited as the 
imagination of lawyers in taking account of the wishes of bankers and businessmen. 
 
3. FORMATION OF THE SPV 
 The uniqueness of asset-backed securities derives from their structure, that 
is, that solely the collateral, creditworthiness and cashflows of a pool of receivables 
support them.   Since this is the sole income generating mechanism held by the 
SPV, it is important that internal and external parties or their actions do not affect 
this mechanism.   
 To minimise external actions affecting the SPV’s assets, rating agencies 
insist that the SPV is created so that firstly, it is independently owned and controlled 
and secondly, it holds a bankruptcy-remote status.  Such a position is achieved 
when the SPV, after the rating agency’s structural analysis, proves that it is remote 
from any potential threat of being consolidated with the originator and/or remote 
from involuntary bankruptcy which may be imposed upon it by creditors and 
surprisingly its debtors.  Regardless of the care and detail with which the SPV is 
created, it is important to note that the SPV is merely bankruptcy remote and not 
bankruptcy proof.  Note that it is against public policy to restrict an entity from 
voluntary bankruptcy.  For example, in the UK, s.84 Insolvency Act 1986 allows a 
company, after the passing of a special resolution, to voluntarily be subjected to 
bankruptcy proceedings.  In the US, s.101 Chapter 11 United States Code states 
that an entity is free to file or avail itself of rights under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 
  
4. INDEPENDENTLY CONTROLLED AND OPERATED 
 Aside from the internal structuring of the SPV to minimise involuntary 
bankruptcy it is also important to restrict potential adverse consequences associated 
with its parent or affiliate.   Because the SPV is created to benefit the originator, the 
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originator will undoubtedly make a contribution to the formation of the SPV.    
Because there are no rules prohibiting the originator from contributing physically or 
financially to the formation of the SPV, there has been some guidance created by 
case law in the US that provides some assistance in this area.   
This assistance is generally known as the “doctrine of substantive 
consolidation”.  It means ‘the merger of separate entities into one action so that the 
assets and liabilities of both parties may be aggregated in order to effect a more 
equitable distribution of property among creditors’ (Sargent, 1989: 1224).  Thus, if 
the parent faces bankruptcy proceedings the SPV’s assets can be used to pay its 
parents debts.  The rating agency will insist that the SPV is not owned or operated 
by an entity that is far from bankruptcy remote.   The rating agency as well as the 
courts will analyse the relationship between the SPV and its parent or disguised 
parent by utilising an alter ego approach (Standard and Poor’s, 1993i: 44).    
The investigation aims to seek any links between the SPV and the originator 
that show that they are in effect one entity and that their assets and liabilities should 
be combined.  In the UK, there is case law which deals with the issue of 
consolidation.  The case of Smith, Stone & Knight v. Birmingham Corporation [1939] 
4 All ER 116, is an early case on consolidation.  Although not in the context of 
securitisation, Atkinson J offers useful guidance: 
 
‘I find six points which were deemed relevant for the determination of the question: 
Who was really carrying on the business? In all the cases, the question was whether 
the company, an English company here, could be taxed in respect of all the profits 
made by some other company, being carried on elsewhere.  The first point was: 
Were the profits treated as the profits of the company? – when I say “the company” I 
mean the parent company – secondly, were the persons conducting the business 
appointed by the parent company? Thirdly, was the company the head and brain of 
the trading venture? Fourthly, did the company govern the adventure, decide what 
should be done and what capital should be embarked on he venture? Fifthly, did the 
company make profits by its skill and direction? Sixthly, was the company in 
effectual and constant control,’ 
 
Where these questions can be answered in the affirmative then the SPV may 
be treated as a front or the “child” of the originator and can be dragged into any 
bankruptcy proceedings affecting the originator. 
But English law in relation to consolidation goes back to the authoritative 
case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22.  The case established the 
principle that a company upon incorporation is a new and separate artificial entity.  
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In law, a company is a distinct entity with its own personality separate from and 
independent of the persons who form it, who invest money in it and who direct and 
manage its operations.  Thus, the rights and duties of a company are not the rights 
and duties of its directors or members who can be hidden by a corporate veil 
surrounding the company. This ruling has been tested by time and came under 
examination in Re Polly Peck International Plc [1996] 1 BCLC 428.  Here the SPV 
was set up in the Cayman Island as a thinly capitalised subsidiary of the originator – 
it had common directors too.  However, the Court refused to treat the SPV as a 
mere facade and emphasised that it is legal substance rather than economic 
substance that should guide the court. 
 However, the US has witnessed a different picture regarding consolidation.  
A leading and illustrative case involving substantive consolidation in a bankruptcy 
proceeding is Re Vecco Construction Industries, Inc 4 B.R.  Here the court in a 
Chapter 11 proceeding (company reorganisation in order to save it from bankruptcy) 
considered whether substantive consolidation of four wholly-owned subsidiaries with 
the parent corporation was appropriate.  Although individually incorporated, the 
court discovered facts that indicated only a marginal separateness amongst the 
companies.  Part of the evidence was the commingling of funds, consolidation of 
financial reports and accounts, disbursements and receipts paid from a single 
account, use of the same office space, transfer of inventory between concerns 
without documentation or record, and identical governing boards. 
Commencing its determination of whether to order substantive consolidation, 
the court considered the equitable doctrine of substantive consolidation.  The court 
stated that a determination of whether to allow consolidation should be based on the 
following criteria: firstly, the degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining 
individual assets and liability of the companies.  Secondly, the presence of 
consolidated financial statements.  Thirdly, the profitability of consolidation at a 
single physical location.  Fourthly, the commingling of assets, and fifthly, the 
existence of parent and inter-corporate guarantees on loans and finally, the transfer 
of assets without formal observance of corporate formalities.   
Citing the decision in Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. v. Kheel 369 F.2d 
845 (2d Cir. 1966), the court recognised the additional consideration of ‘whether the 
individual assets of the corporate entities were so unascertainable and hopelessly 
obscured as to entail substantial expense in segregating such assets and liabilities 
as to threaten the realization of net assets for the benefit of creditors’ (pg. 407-408).  
Consequently, the court ruled that the subsidiaries ‘were but instrumentalities of the 
bankrupt with no separate existence of their own’ and granted the request to 
  96 
substantively consolidate the estates. 
Also consider Re Buckhead America Corporation (The Days Inn Case) 161 
B.R. 11 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993).  The facts - Days Inn of America, Inc. (“DIA”), a motel 
franchiser, transferred its franchise fee receivables along with the corporate 
trademark and accompanying goodwill to Days Inn Receivables Funding Corp. 
(“issuer”).  The issuer qualified under Standard & Poor’s criteria as a special 
purpose bankruptcy-remote subsidiary and publicly issued $155 million in notes 
secured by the franchise fee receivables.  A company memorandum, distributed 
upon the issuance of the notes, expressly provided that the issuer would not be 
consolidated with DIA in the event of DIA’s insolvency.  From all aspects it appeared 
as though the securitisation would be a success.  Following the completion of the 
securitization transaction, DIA petitioned for relief under chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  After filing DIA received a comprehensive offer for all the 
company’s assets, including the franchise fee receivables and the corporate 
trademark rights.  In order to reacquire the Days Inn trademark and franchise 
agreements and to facilitate the sale of the corporation’s assets, DIA filed the 
solvent Issuer into bankruptcy as well. The filing of issuer was occurred despite the 
presence of an independent director.  DIA and issuer were subsequently 
consolidated pursuant to an order of the bankruptcy court.  
The Days Inn case raises a number of significant yet disturbing points 
(Gusset, 1996: 6; Kravitt, 1996).  Firstly, the transfer of the franchise fee receivables 
and corporate trademark was structured as a true sale assignment.  However, the 
lawyers involved failed to consider that a court may classify the franchise fees as 
accounts rather than general intangibles and failed consider the approach 
mentioned in Octagon Gas Systems Inc. v. Rimmer 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(discussed in chapter 4).  Secondly, a legal memorandum was issued indicating 
both the intent of DIA and the issuer to effectuate a true sale and more importantly 
not to file the issuer into bankruptcy so long as issuer was solvent.  Thirdly, although 
an independent director sat on the board of issuer there was a requirement that all 
directors must vote in favour of any bankruptcy filing.  
Despite the presence of several factors mitigating against consolidation, the 
bankruptcy court ordered substantive consolidation of the assets of issuer with the 
estate of DIA.  The court stated that there were facts which justified the merger of 
the two estates without going into any detail.  The court failed to recognise that the 
SPV was a separate entity – it failed to recognise the presence of an independent 
director – it failed to recognise that the Octagon Gas case and its failure to correctly 
acknowledge securitisation.  Despite this the court recharacterised the transaction 
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thereby voiding the asset transfer.  This case consequently sparked the question - 
do courts actually understand the mechanism behind securitisation? (Gusset, 1996: 
6-7). 
The US government reacted to the inconsistency in judicial evaluation by 
proposing this amendment to s. 541 of the Bankruptcy Code –  
 
s. 541…” (b) Property of the estate does not include –  
… 
5) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such eligible asset was 
transferred by the debtor, before the date of commencement of the case, to an 
eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed securitization, except to the extent 
that such asset (or proceeds or value thereof) may be recovered by the trustee 
under section 550 by virtue of avoidance under section 548(a); 
 
The “eligible asset” requirement was key to avoiding recharacterisation.  The 
proposed amendment recognised securitisation as a reason to transfer assets and 
went further to define such assets, 
 
(2) The term "eligible asset" means –  
(A) financial assets (including interests therein and proceeds thereof), either 
fixed or revolving, including residential and commercial mortgage loans, 
consumer receivables, trade receivables, and lease receivables, that, by 
their terms convert into cash within a finite time period, plus any rights or 
other assets designed to assure the servicing or timely  distribution  
of proceeds to security-holders; 
(B) cash;  
(C) securities; 
 
Another surprise was,  
 
(5) The term "transferred" means the debtor, under a written agreement, 
represented and warranted that eligible assets were sold, contributed, or otherwise 
conveyed with the intention of removing them from the estate of the debtor pursuant 
to subsection (b)(5), irrespective, without limitation of –  
(A) whether the debtor directly or indirectly obtained or held an interest in 
the issuer or in any securities issued by the issuer  
(B) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase or to service or 
supervise the servicing of all or any portion of such eligible assets; or 
(C) the characterization of such sale, contribution, or other conveyance for 
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tax, accounting, regulatory reporting, or other purposes. 
 
 Section 541(5)(c) was interesting since it provided that as long as a 
document evidencing the intentions of the parties to effect a true sale, such 
transaction will not be recharacterised.  This proposed amendment was drafted in 
2000 following lengthy snail-paced discussions and were later dropped by Congress 
following the financial scandal involving Enron.   
A fundamental principle gleaned from case law, such as Union Savings Bank 
v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988) suggests that 
substantive consolidation should be ordered when ‘the affairs of the debtor are so 
entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors’ (pg. 524).  Thus, we have seen 
the disparity in how the UK and US courts approach consolidation.  The UK courts 
are reluctant to order consolidation in the absence of a sham or fraud whereas, in 
the US, the courts will seek out links between the SPV and the originator and order 
consolidation.  
Case law has therefore, produced the following factors, which help to 
determine whether the SPV is merely a front for the originator: 
 
1. the originator owns all or a majority of the equity in the SPV 
2. the originator and the SPV share directors and officers 
3. the originator financially assisted the SPV during formation 
4. the originator was responsible for the SPV’s incorporation. 
5. the SPV has insufficient capital  
6. the originator is responsible for and pays all the SPV’s operational 
expenses 
7. the SPV is commonly referred to as belonging to the originator. 
8. directors and officers of the SPV take instructions from the originator 
 
 Additionally, courts from different nations/states have used slightly varied 
factors but generally, the analysis is alike.  However, one should not assume that 
because circumstances of a particular structure meet these requirements the SPV 
would be assumed as belonging to the originator.  The courts will decide 
consolidation on a case-by-case basis – though these requirements provide a good 
guidance. 
To assist all parties involved in the securitisation to eliminate any potential 
adverse effects of substantive consolidation the SPV needs to be formed with care 
and detail.  The rating agency will offer some guidance.  In addition, a legal opinion 
from the SPV’s legal counsel should be sought setting out exactly the SPV’s position 
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should any parent face financial difficulty – this is a pre-requisite before any 
indication of a rating is made (standard and Poor’s, 1993i: 47).  In short, the 
following undertakings are imperative: 
 
• the SPV maintains separate books and records pertaining to its operations 
• there is no commingling of assets, funds  or accounts 
• the SPV holds itself out to the public as a separate and distinct entity 
• the SPV prepares its own tax returns (if relevant) 
• An independent director is seated on the SPV’s board 
• The SPV’s assets are clearly shown on its financial statements 
• The SPV will not pay or guarantee the debts or obligations of its parent or 
affiliate and vice versa 
• Any transaction between the SPV and the originator should be at arm’s length 
• The SPV utilises its own letterhead, telephone and operational offices 
 
 This list is, of course, not exhaustive but gives indications as to the degree of 
care and detail that is needed when forming the SPV.  The rules are relaxed when 
utilising a non-trading or grantor trust as trust law protects the trust property.    
 
5. BANKRUPTCY REMOTE 
 The SPV, aside from ensuring that the receivables are purchased correctly 
from the originator, also needs to ensure that it itself is “bankruptcy remote”.  This is 
jargon which means that the SPV is not threatened with potential bankruptcy.  It 
achieves this status through careful construction and operation.  The SPV can be 
made to hold a bankruptcy remote status but it can never be made bankruptcy 
proof.  Many commentators, for example, Aicher and Fellerhoff (1991) and Gusset 
(1996) have concisely restated what and how such bankruptcy remote status is 
achieved without treading further.  However, the author will now discuss bankruptcy 
remote by incorporating existing commentary before testing the strength and validity 
of such bankruptcy remote status. 
It is important to note that the SPV (whether a corporation or a trust) is 
created solely to purchase or receive a pool of receivables from the originator or 
pools of receivables from a number of originators.   However, this ability to contract 
with parties is clearly stated in its memorandum or trust documents and to facilitate 
the acquisition of a bankruptcy remote status, on the recommendation of the rating 
agency, these documents should list clearly which party(ies) the SPV can transact 
business with.  Where the SPV is created for a “one-off” securitisation then its ability 
to purchase additional pools of receivables should be restricted so that it does not 
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expand its list of creditors, which in all cases should be kept to a minimum (Standard 
and Poor’s, 1993i: 39-41).   
 The documents should also include details of the activity the SPV is 
permitted to undertake.   Since it is created for a special purpose with limited 
operational parameters which are dictated by the rating agency’s analysis, this 
should be included together with all restrictions so that the SPV cannot transact 
business which it is not permitted to undertake.  The rating agency’s analysis will 
provide guidance as to what type of receivables should be purchased in the event 
that the pool is declining and the amount permitted periodically (expressed as a 
percentage called the purchase rate) so that the process of receiving payments and 
making payments advised by the rating agency is not deviated thus, cause financial 
and cashflow difficulty for the SPV.  A securitisation structured using a pool of 
revolving receivables will have in the servicing agreement strict clauses relating to 
the additional purchasing of receivables.  Revolving receivables are those with a 
short life expectancy, such as trade receivables, which materialise within an 
expected time period.  A pool of revolving receivables needs to be refilled so those 
sufficient funds exist to pay investors (Standard and Poor’s, 2000a: 5).  An important 
consideration for the SPV when purchasing additional receivables is to ensure that 
the additional receivables are similar to those they are replacing in terms of financial 
strength and reliability.   Further, it can also lay the foundation for any malpractice 
claim against the management company should the SPV transact unnecessary or 
wrongful business.  
The SPV will have a list of creditors which are either created by law, (i.e. tax 
authority if the SPV is to pay taxation) or the regulatory authority governing its 
incorporation or by contract such as the management company.  These creditors 
have been accounted for in the financial calculations and all fees have been either 
raised or held in reserve accounts or will emerge from the profit the SPV will make 
periodically.   Because certain creditors were anticipated at the outset of the whole 
transaction, steps are taken to minimise any threat of involuntary bankruptcy that 
can be posed from these creditors.  In practice, inherent in each document signed 
by each creditor and the SPV is a covenant which prohibits such creditor from 
exercise its right to file any involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against the SPV 
during the life of the securities.  But such bankruptcy waivers are questionable since 
they restrict the rights of creditors to file a petition (Gusset, 1996:3). 
A significant case in the US is Re Kingston Square Associates 214 B.R. 713 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) – where a bankruptcy court held that a debtor may 
orchestrate an involuntary bankruptcy petition for the purpose of avoiding 
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bankruptcy remote provisions – questioned again the judicial approach towards 
securitisation and more importantly questioned whether a SPV is truly bankruptcy 
remote.                    
Kingston Square involved a mortgage-backed securitisation – the parties 
included two trustees, eleven SPV’s (all controlled by the same person, the 
"principal") and seven creditors (who each filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition 
against the SPVs).  The trustees represented investors who were the beneficiaries 
of mortgage pass-through certificates issued by the SPVs in a securitisation 
transaction.  The mortgage certificates entitled the beneficiaries to a stream of future 
payments.  For the purpose of securing the (approximately) $277,000,000 the 
trustees spent purchasing the pass-through certificates, they took a mortgage on 
various properties owned by the debtors.  As part of the securitisation, the debtors 
inserted “bankruptcy remote” provisions in their bylaws.  The provisions required a 
unanimous vote of the directors in order to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition.  In 
conjunction with the unanimity requirement, the provisions also called for an 
independent director whose purpose was, in part, to prevent the required unanimous 
agreement for the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition thereby making the 
likelihood of a filing virtually nonexistent. 
      As a result of a default on the pass-through certificates the trustees 
instigated foreclosure proceedings on all of the properties securing the certificates.  
The only way that the debtors could stop the foreclosures was to file a bankruptcy 
petition and availing themselves of the protections of the Bankruptcy Code's 
automatic stay.  However, due to the bankruptcy remote provisions in the bylaws, 
the principal had to consider methods other than a voluntary petition to get each of 
the debtors into bankruptcy.  Thus, the principal gathered a group of “friendly” 
creditors for the purpose of orchestrating an involuntary petition against each of the 
debtors whom he controlled. 
     The trustees moved for a dismissal pursuant to section 1112(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Code arguing that each of the involuntary petitions was the result of 
collusion and therefore filed in bad faith.  They argued that the principal ‘initiated, 
funded and identified seven friendly creditors to prosecute the involuntary petitions 
so each debtor could obtain improper leverage against the [trustees] by gaining 
access to the bankruptcy court without violating the bankruptcy restrictions in the 
bylaws of the various debtors’ (pg. 719).  On the other hand, the petitioning principal 
claimed that seeking bankruptcy protection was their only means to ‘(i) preserve any 
chance of recovery on their claims…before the [trustees] foreclosed on the assets of 
each debtor, (ii) challenge the validity of the [trustees'] claims, and (iii) find a third 
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party to fund a plan of reorganization or purchase the properties, which would result 
in a greater recovery to all parties than would be obtained from the pending 
foreclosures’ (pg. 722). 
      The arguments made by the principal appears to have some merit but should 
be viewed in light of the following – the “friendly” creditors the principal gathered for 
the purpose of this orchestration consisted of two trade creditors and five 
professional organisations (such as law firms and a consulting firm) whose overall 
debt was not significant enough to cause them on their own to file an involuntary 
petition prior to the solicitation by the principal.  Furthermore, the principal paid a law 
firm to do the work, and several of the creditors were only willing to join in the filing 
of the involuntary petitions on the condition that the principal would handle all legal 
fees and administrative matters.  One of the creditors had already written off the 
debt as “uncollectible” and only one of the creditors had taken any action beyond 
sending invoices to enforce its legal rights prior to the filing. 
On this set of facts, the court correctly noted at first blush, these cases seem 
ripe for dismissal.  However, that statement is the closest the court came to 
acknowledging the questionable tactics employed by the principal.  Aside from the 
fact that the case appeared right for dismissal, the court noted that within the 
boundaries of well-settled principles, a bankruptcy judge has wide discretion to 
determine if cause exists and how ultimately to dispose of the case.  Although this is 
true and would seemingly help to facilitate a just result, the court's opinion did not 
analyse the underlying motives in this type of transaction.  Nor did it consider how ill-
suited the case may be for judgement based on well-settled principles (Lipson, 
2002: 6). 
The trustees, however, relied on Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Cortez 
96 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1996) where the court held that a bankruptcy petition may be 
dismissed when a court determines that the filing was collusive because it is a fraud 
upon the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court.  The court reviewed Cortez and 
concluded, ‘[in] each of [those] cases, a debtor attempted to bypass a statutory or 
court-imposed restriction on filing a new bankruptcy case by arranging the filings of 
involuntary cases with friendly creditors’ (cited by Lipson, 2002: 8).  The primary 
difference between Cortez and Kingston Square is that the petitioners in Kingston 
Square were acting in concert with the debtor's principal for the purpose of 
circumventing the bankruptcy remote provisions whereas, Cortez dealt with the 
circumvention of statutes or court-imposed orders.   
      The court in Kingston Square acknowledged that debtor orchestration of 
involuntary petitions is indicative of bad faith but it held that orchestration standing 
  103 
alone is not enough for a bad faith dismissal based on collusion.  The court declined 
to extend Cortez and did not adequately explain why.  Consequently, the court 
allowed the petition.  The Kingston Square transactions were specifically structured 
to avoid bankruptcy but the court allowed the debtors to use what is essentially a 
creditor's protective tool – an involuntary petition – for the purpose of achieving what 
the debtor could not legitimately achieve on its own.  The message it seems from 
Kingston Square is clear – there is no reason to labour over bankruptcy remote 
provisions in a SPV’s bylaws because they are easily circumvented.  All that is 
necessary for a SPV seeking to avoid the bankruptcy remote provisions is a supply 
of “friendly” creditors.   
 Thus, this indicates that a SPV is never bankruptcy proof and certainly its 
bankruptcy remoteness can be attacked by persons who are not potential threats to 
the SPV.  The SPV although created to serve a purpose with limited operational 
parameters is nevertheless still a corporate entity liable under the provisions of 
bankruptcy law.  Careful construction and operation of the SPV can deter, to some 
extent, any threats of bankruptcy posed by creditors and, as just discussed, debtors.  
One should, however, never be complacent in the belief that a SPV will survive all 
attacks of causing it into bankruptcy.  
 Solutions to this problem unfortunately only exist in loopholes of bankruptcy 
law and judicial thought.  Since the corporate entity is widely used as a SPV rather 
than employing a trust for securitisation, bankruptcy remoteness will always need to 
be analysed and monitored throughout the life of the SPV.  One solution the author 
suggests which can eliminate some uncertainty of bankruptcy remoteness is to have 
a SPV set up as a trust which owns the receivables but is controlled in part by a 
corporate entity.  The corporate issues the securities while the trust owns and 
manages the receivables.  (This solution may introduce the next generation of SPVs 
and forms part of the author’s post-doctoral research.)  
The second mechanism introduced to achieve bankruptcy remoteness for 
the SPV is creating an independent director to operate the SPV alongside its 
existing directors.  The concept of having an independent director is one that 
originated in the US.  Its aim is to reduce any risk of voluntary bankruptcy by stating 
in the documentation pertaining to the formation of the SPV that the concurring vote 
of the independent director is imperative in matters relating to selling or otherwise 
transferring the SPV’s property or the voluntary placing of the SPV into bankruptcy 
or other insolvency proceedings (Ellis, 1999: 12-14). 
 The SPV’s documents will require that a unanimous vote is required to place 
the SPV into voluntary bankruptcy.  Thus, the presence of an independent director 
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ensures that such unanimity is not achieved because the independent director is 
positioned to look after the interests of the investors and is under the obligation to 
vote against any voluntary petition for bankruptcy.  Having such a director satisfies 
the credit rating agency too since it shows that investors would not be led into a loss 
making scenario – assets frozen and prioritised to satisfy creditors (Standard and 
Poor’s, 1993i). 
 But how important is the presence of the independent director?  Assume that 
the SPV is experiencing financial problems which can potentially affect investors.  
Now assume that the board agrees that voluntary bankruptcy is the only viable 
solution.  The independent director is under an obligation to protect the investors 
and the SPV from voluntary bankruptcy.  However, in the real world this poses a 
conflict of interest issue for the independent director – who does he protect – the 
investors or the shareholders?  As a director of the SPV he owes fiduciary duties to 
the shareholders which need to be balanced with his obligation to protect investors 
against leading the SPV into voluntary bankruptcy.  Thus, in reality he owes duties 
to both the shareholders and the investors.   
 The unwritten rules relating to the construction of the SPV state that the 
independent director is created solely for the protection of the investors.  However, 
the written rules relating to such construction state that each director owes fiduciary 
duties to the company and its shareholders and must diligently act in the interests of 
the SPV.  So which rules take priority? 
 A lawyer will say that the written rules will guide a court should a dispute 
arise.  However, where does this leave investors who have relied on the unwritten 
rules to safe guard their investment?  Further, how independent is the independent 
director if he needs to balance fiduciary duties with duties to the investor?  It seems 
that bankruptcy remote provisions are ripe for judicial scrutiny which would certainly 
add clarity to the validity of such provisions.  Moreover, it seems that such 
provisions can become the subject of litigation brought by SPV shareholders and 
investors.  For example, the shareholders bring an action against the independent 
director for breach of fiduciary duty based on a refusal to sign a petition when it is in 
the best interest of the SPV.  Or if a petition is filed by the board without the consent 
of the independent director can be challenged for lacking the director's consent.   
The investors too can bring claims against the originator and the SPV’s 
directors for failing to protect investors if such provisions fail to protect.  Bankruptcy 
remote provisions do have the potential to be challenged in the courts – but to date 
there has been no direct case on the issue.  In closing, though such provisions are 
drafted with the intention of protecting investors and gaining a better credit rating, it 
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seems that in the real world this far from reality.  In all cases such provisions will 
work but will work with the overhead threat that they can fail under certain the 
circumstances.   
 
6. PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTEREST  
 Perfecting the security interest in the purchased receivables is an important 
undertaking as it secures the SPV’s title against subsequent purchasers or 
encumbrances who may have purchased an interest in the same receivables.  
Although this would not ideally occur in practice, it is advisable that any assets 
transferred by the originator to the SPV are perfected as belonging solely to the 
SPV.  Where the transfer has fallen short of a true sale then it is considered 
imperative that all security interests in the pool of receivables are perfected 
according to the law of the jurisdiction in which the SPV is incorporated and in which 
the receivables originated, if sold cross border.  Even if the transfer is conducted 
according to the true sale criterion, perfection of security interests is still advisable 
since perfection does not guarantee priority over subsequent incumbrances which, 
of course, is decided by the priority rules.  Legal opinions are, of course, needed 
when dealing with perfection issues.  However, under English law charges by an 
English company are registerable even if created outside the UK and moreover, a 
charge on property in England by an overseas company is registerable under s.395 
Companies Act 1985 regardless of whether the overseas company is not 
incorporated under the Act. 
 Section 396 Companies Act 1985 lists the categories of charge by a 
company which require registration.  However, its relevance as far as a SPV is 
concern is that it only needs compliance if the pool of receivables contains charges 
over land, ships and aircrafts.  Charges over book debts are governed by s.395 CA 
1985.  Section 396 (4) CA 1985 states that “charges” includes mortgages.  Book 
debts, according to Professor Goode, are debts ‘arising in the course of a trader’s 
business… [and]…entered in a trader’s [book]’ (Goode, 2003).  This wide definition 
encompasses all forms of revolving receivables, such as trade and auto receivables.   
Negotiable instruments are exempt from registration so their mere possession 
perfects the security interest.  The exemption applies to bearer form securities so 
that the concept of negotiability is not interfered with.  There have been asset-
backed securities created by tying negotiable instruments with swaps to create a 
desired payment. 
 In the US, perfection rules are found in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
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Code (UCC).  In short, all interests in “chattel paper” and “instruments” (as defined 
by Art. 9) are registerable by either filing a UCC-1 financing statement against the 
debtor or taking possession of the “chattel paper”.  However, there seems to be 
some confusion with regards to mortgages.  Section 9-104(j) excludes from Article 9 
‘the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate’ implying that 
mortgages are not covered by the ambit of Article 9.  Section 9-102(3) states, 
however, that Article 9 applies to obligation secured by transaction or interests 
outside the ambit of Article 9.  The safest answer it seems is to perfect the mortgage 
interest according local real estate law regardless of the wording of Article 9. 
 
7. ASSET BACKED SECURITIES IN THE UK 
Since the birth of asset-backed securities (the product of securitisation) 
capital markets have seen and handled a range of imaginatively named securities 
that are generally classed as asset-backed securities, for example, CLEOS 
(Collaterised Lease Equipment Obligation), FRENDS (Floating Rate Enhanced Debt 
Securities), CARs (Certificate of Automobile Receivables), CARDs (Certificates of 
Amortising Revolving Debts).  Asset-backed securities can be categorised, based 
on their payment mechanism, as either “pass-through” obligations or “pay-through” 
obligations. 
“Pass-through” obligations are ideally issued if the payment pattern of the 
underlying pool of receivables corresponds with the payment pattern of the 
securities issued.  Thus, scheduled principal and interest payments from the 
receivables are passed through to the investors who have purchased an undivided 
fractional share of the receivable pool.  Because the issuer under this payment 
pattern acts merely as an interface allowing received payments to be formally 
passed through it and on to the investors, the issuer does not need to be formed as 
a business entity with the capacity to trade.  In the US, the issuer, in this situation, is 
formed as a grantor trust, which acquires a non-taxable status, thus under US Dept. 
of Treasury Regulation s. 301.7701-4, the trust must not conduct itself as a business 
for profit, must not have the capacity to reinvest receivables or alter the terms of any 
investment, and finally must issue a single class of securities.  In the UK, the issuer 
is formed as a non-trading trust, which is exempt from the imposition of taxation. 
However, where the payment pattern of the receivables is unpredictable then 
issuing pass-through securities would not be ideal since investors will have been 
promised a fixed sum each month and failure to deliver will trigger a default.  With 
this type of payment pattern the securities would need to be “pay-through”, in that 
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the investors are paid interest payments initially with the principal being paid over 
the last quarter of the securities’ life or in a lump sum on the last day of the 
securities’ life – in practice, this is called a bullet payment.  The issuer, in this 
situation, will need the capacity to reinvest receivables and undertake the 
maintenance of (perhaps) a multiple class of securities.  Under the restrictive 
regulations pertaining to non-trading or grantor trusts these activities are not 
possible since a breach of the regulations converts the non-trading or grantor status 
to a trading or an owner trust, respectively.  Thus, the objective to secure and 
maintain tax-exempt status will have been lost.  
The law and regulatory procedure which permits a securities’ offering will be 
dictated by the jurisdiction in which the SPV intends to offer securities.  In the UK, 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the FSA Listing Rules prepared 
thereunder collectively govern the offering of asset backed securities both through a 
public and private issue.  Asset backed securities are issued either as commercial 
paper or as bonds with a specified maturity date.  Commercial paper is a short term 
security which matures within 365 days of its issue.  It is typically issued where the 
underlying pool of receivables has a life of 365 days or structured so that it lives for 
365 days and any residual amount is sold back to the originator.  In contrast, bonds 
are issued with a life ranging between 2 to 25 years depending on the life of the 
underlying pool of receivables.   
The securities’ offering is undertaken by the SPV with the assistance of an 
investment banker.  The investment banker acts as an intermediary for legal and 
practical purposes.  From a legal standpoint, the FMSA only permits certain persons 
to undertake investment activities – s.21 provides,  
 
(1) A person ("A") must not, in the course of business, communicate an invitation or 
inducement to engage in investment activity. 
 
   (2) But subsection (1) does not apply if - (a) A is an authorised person;   
 
In the UK, the banker will make an application to the “competent authority” – 
FSA – to have securities issued to the public or privately.  The application includes 
details of the issuer, its financial position given by the accountant and brief details 
about the bond issue.  This application is either approved or rejected.  Typically, it is 
rejected if the included information lacks detail or is confusing.  Once approved the 
issuer then compiles a prospectus – all new asset backed securities issued must be 
sold with a prospectus – ss. 85 and 86 FSMA 2000, 
  108 
 
s. 85(1) If listing rules made under section 84 require a prospectus to be published 
before particular new securities are admitted to the official list, it is unlawful for any 
of those securities to be offered to the public in the United Kingdom before the 
required prospectus is published. 
 
The FSA Listing Rules further provide, 
 
s. 85(1) It is unlawful for transferable securities to which this subsection applies to be 
offered to the public in the United Kingdom unless an approved prospectus has been 
made available to the public before the offer is made. 
 
 If the SPV intends to offer asset backed securities to select group of 
investors then s.86 is triggered.  This section deals with when an approved 
prospectus does not have been made available to the public before the securities 
issue – the section lists certain persons or circumstances.  In essence, s.86 will 
apply when the SPV is offering asset backed securities by way of private placement 
to qualified investors who are recognised by the FSA as experienced and educated 
persons – in practice, dealers.    
A prospectus is a very important document prepared by the SPV, with the 
assistance of the investment banker, when offering securities to the public.  If the 
securities issue is by private placement then an offering memorandum is prepared 
and distributed to the investors.  Both documents, although they differ aesthetically,   
are similar in nature.  They are both designed to give an investor information (factual 
and opinions) about the SPV and its securities.  The difference in their names is 
simply to help distinguish an offering to the public from one made by private 
placement.  For ease, the word “prospectus” will be used to mean both a prospectus 
and an offering memorandum.   
A prospectus will first contain a summary (s.87A(5) which in no more than 
2,500 words ‘briefly and in non-technical language, [conveys] the essential 
characteristics of, and risks associated with, the issuer’ (s.87A(6).  The summary 
must also contain a warning that such summary must be read as an introduction and 
any investment decision should be based on consideration of the prospectus as a 
whole.  Article 10 the Prospectus Directive Regulation (No 2004/809/EC) sets out 
the minimum information which must be incorporated into a prospectus offering 
asset backed securities.  Article 10 makes reference to Annex VII and Annex VIII of 
the PDR which actually lists the minimum information, as follows:  
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Annex VII: 
1.  PERSONS RESPONSIBLE 
1.1  All persons responsible for the information given in the Registration 
Document and, as the case may be, for certain parts of it, with, in the latter 
case, an indication of such parts. In the case of natural persons including 
members of the issuer's administrative, management or supervisory bodies 
indicate the name and function of the person; in case of legal persons 
indicate the name and registered office. 
1.2  A declaration by those responsible for the registration document that, having 
taken all reasonable care to ensure that such is the case, the information 
given in the registration document is, to the best of their knowledge, in 
accordance with the facts and does not omit anything likely to affect its 
import. As the case may be, declaration by those responsible for certain 
parts of the registration document that having taken all reasonable care to 
ensure that such is the case, the information contained in that part of the 
registration document for which they are responsible is, to the best of their 
knowledge, in accordance with the facts and contains no omission likely to 
affect its import. 
 
2.  STATUTORY AUDITORS 
2.1  Names and addresses of the issuer's auditors for the period covered by the 
historical financial information (together with any membership of any relevant 
professional body). 
 
3.  RISK FACTORS 
3.1  The document must prominently disclose risk factors in a section headed 
"Risk Factors" that are specific to the issuer and its industry. 
 
4.  INFORMATION ABOUT THE ISSUER: 
4.1  A statement whether the issuer has been established as a special purpose 
vehicle or entity for the purpose of issuing asset backed securities; 
4.2  The legal and commercial name of the issuer; 
4.3  The place of registration of the issuer and its registration number; 
4.4  The date of incorporation and the length of life of the issuer, except where 
indefinite; and 
4.5  The domicile and legal form of the issuer, the legislation under which the 
issuer operates its country of incorporation and the address and telephone 
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number of its registered office (or principal place of business if different from 
its registered office). 
4.6  Description of the amount of the issuer's authorised and issued capital and 
the amount of any capital agreed to be issued, the number and classes of 
the securities of which it is composed. 
 
 
5.  BUSINESS OVERVIEW 
5.1  A brief description of the issuer's principal activities. 
5.2  A global overview of the parties to the securitisation program including 
information on the direct or indirect ownership or control between those 
parties. 
 
6.  ADMINISTRATIVE, MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISORY BODIES 
6.1  Names, business addresses and functions in the issuer of the following 
persons, and an indication of the principal activities performed by them 
outside the issuer where these are significant with respect to that issuer: 
(a) members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies; and 
(b) partners with unlimited liability, in the case of a limited partnership with a 
share capital. 
 
7.  MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS 
7.1  To the extent known to the issuer, state whether the issuer is directly or 
indirectly owned or controlled and by whom, and describe the nature of such 
control and describe the measures in place to ensure that such control is not 
abused. 
 
8.  FINANCIAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ISSUER'S ASSETS AND 
LIABILITIES, FINANCIAL POSITION, AND PROFITS AND LOSSES 
8.1  Where, since the date of incorporation or establishment, an issuer has not 
commenced operations and no financial statements have been made up as 
at the date of the registration document, a statement to that effect shall be 
provided in the registration document. 
8.2  Historical Financial Information 
… 
The most recent year's historical financial information must be presented and 
prepared in a form consistent with that which will be adopted in the issuer's 
next annual published financial statements having regard to accounting 
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standards and policies and legislation applicable to such annual financial 
statements … If the audited financial information is prepared according to 
national accounting standards, the financial information required under this 
heading must include at least the following: 
(a) the balance sheet; 
(b) the income statement; and 
(c) the accounting policies and explanatory notes. 
The historical annual financial information must be independently audited or 
reported on as to whether or not, for the purposes of the registration 
document, it gives a true and fair view, in accordance with auditing standards 
applicable in a Member State or an equivalent standard. 
… 
8.3  Legal and arbitration proceedings 
Information on any governmental, legal or arbitration proceedings (including 
any such proceedings which are pending or threatened of which the 
company is aware), during a period covering at least the previous 12 
months, which may have, or have had in the recent past, significant effects 
on the issuer and/or group's financial position or profitability, or provide an 
appropriate negative statement. 
8.4  Material adverse change in the issuer's financial position 
Where an issuer has prepared financial statements, include a statement that 
there has been no material adverse change in the financial position or 
prospects of the issuer since the date of its last published audited financial 
statements. Where a material adverse change has occurred, this must be 
disclosed in the registration document. 
 
9.  THIRD PARTY INFORMATION AND STATEMENT BY EXPERTS AND 
DECLARATIONS OF ANY INTEREST 
9.1  Where a statement or report attributed to a person as an expert is included in 
the Registration Document, provide such person's name, business address, 
qualifications and material interest if any in the issuer. If the report has been 
produced at the issuer's request a statement to that effect that such 
statement or report is included, in the form and context in which it is 
included, with the consent of that person who has authorised the contents of 
that part of the Registration Document. 
9.2  Where information has been sourced from a third party, provide a 
confirmation that this information has been accurately reproduced and that 
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as far as the issuer is aware and is able to ascertain from information 
published by that third party, no facts have been omitted which would render 
the reproduced information inaccurate or misleading. In addition, the issuer 
shall identify the source(s) of the information. 
 
10.  DOCUMENTS ON DISPLAY 
10.1  A statement that for the life of the registration document the following 
documents (or copies thereof), where applicable, may be inspected: 
(a) the memorandum and articles of association of the issuer; 
(b) all reports, letters, and other documents, historical financial information, 
valuations and statements prepared by any expert at the issuer's request 
any part of which is included or referred to in the registration document; and 
(c) the historical financial information of the issuer or, in the case of a group, 
the historical financial information of the issuer and its subsidiary 
undertakings for each of the two financial years preceding the publication of 
the registration document. 
An indication of where the documents on display may be inspected, by 
physical or electronic means. 
 
Annex VIII: 
1  THE SECURITIES 
1.1  The minimum denomination of an issue. 
1.2  Where information is disclosed about an undertaking/obligor which is not 
involved in the issue, provide a confirmation that the information relating to 
the undertaking/obligor has been accurately reproduced from information 
published by the undertaking/obligor. So far as the issuer is aware and is 
able to ascertain from information published by the undertaking/obligor no 
facts have been omitted which would render the reproduced information 
misleading.  In addition, identify the source(s) of information in the Securities 
Note that has been reproduced from information published by an 
undertaking/obligor. 
 
2  THE UNDERLYING ASSETS 
2.1  Confirmation that the securitised assets backing the issue have 
characteristics that demonstrate capacity to produce funds to service any 
payments due and payable on the securities. 
2.2  In respect of a pool of discrete assets backing the issue: 
2.2.1  the legal jurisdiction by which the pool of assets is governed 
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2.2.2  (a) In the case of a small number of easily identifiable obligors, a general 
description of each obligor. 
(b) In all other cases, a description of: the general characteristics of the 
obligors; and the economic environment, as well as global statistical data 
referred to the securitised assets, 
2.2.3  the legal nature of the assets; 
2.2.4  the expiry or maturity date(s) of the assets; 
2.2.5  the amount of the assets; 
2.2.6  loan to value ratio or level of collateralisation; 
2.2.7  the method of origination or creation of the assets, and for loans and credit 
agreements, the principal lending criteria and an indication of any loans 
which do not meet these criteria and any rights or obligations to make further 
advances; 
2.2.8  an indication of significant representations and collaterals given to the issuer 
relating to the assets; 
2.2.9  any rights to substitute the assets and a description of the manner in which 
and the type of assets which may be so substituted; if there is any capacity 
to substitute assets with a different class or quality of assets a statement to 
that effect together with a description of the impact of such substitution; and 
2.2.10  a description of any relevant insurance policies relating to the assets. Any 
concentration with one insurer must be disclosed if it is material to the 
transaction. 
2.2.11  Where the assets comprise obligations of 5 or fewer obligors which are legal 
persons or where an obligor accounts for 20% or more of the assets, or 
where an obligor accounts for a material portion of the assets, so far as the 
issuer is aware and/or is able to ascertain from information published by the 
obligor(s) indicate either of the following: 
(a) information relating to each obligor as if it were an issuer drafting 
a Registration Document for debt and derivative securities with an 
individual denomination of at least EUR 50 000; and 
(b) if an obligor or guarantor has securities already admitted to 
trading on a regulated or equivalent market or the obligations are 
guaranteed by an entity admitted to trading on a regulated or 
equivalent market, the name, address, country of incorporation, 
nature of business and name of the market in which its securities are 
admitted. 
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2.2.12  If a relationship exists that is material to the issue, between the issuer, 
guarantor and obligor, details of the principal terms of that relationship. 
2.2.13  Where the assets comprise obligations that are not traded on a regulated or 
equivalent market, a description of the principal terms and conditions of the 
obligations. 
2.2.14  Where the assets comprise equity securities that are admitted to trading on a 
regulated or equivalent market indicate the following: 
(a) a description of the securities; 
(b) a description of the market on which they are traded including its date of 
establishment, how price information is published, an indication of daily 
trading volumes, information as to the standing of the market in the country 
and the name of the market's regulatory authority; and 
(c) the frequency with which prices of the relevant securities, are published. 
2.2.15  Where more than ten (10) per cent of the assets comprise equity securities 
that are not traded on a regulated or equivalent market, a description of 
those equity securities and equivalent information to that contained in the 
schedule for share Registration Document in respect of each issuer of those 
securities. 
2.2.16  Where a material portion of the assets are secured on or backed by real 
property, a valuation report relating to the property setting out both the 
valuation of the property and cash flow/income streams.  Compliance with 
this disclosure is not required if the issue is of securities backed by mortgage 
loans with property as security, where there has been no revaluation of the 
properties for the purpose of the issue, and it is clearly stated that the 
valuations quoted are as at the date of the original initial mortgage loan 
origination. 
2.3  In respect of an actively managed pool of assets backing the issue: 
2.3.1  equivalent information to that contained in items 2.1 and 2.2 to allow an 
assessment of the type, quality, sufficiency and liquidity of the asset types in 
the portfolio which will secure the issue; and 
2.3.2  the parameters within which investments can be made, the name and 
description of the entity responsible for such management including a 
description of that entity's expertise and experience, a summary of the 
provisions relating to the termination of the appointment of such entity and 
the appointment of an alternative management entity, and a description of 
that entity's relationship with any other parties to the issue. 
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2. 4  Where an issuer proposes to issue further securities backed by the same 
assets, a prominent statement to that effect and unless those further 
securities are fungible with or are subordinated to those classes of existing 
debt, a description of how the holders of that class will be informed. 
 
3  STRUCTURE AND CASH FLOW 
3.1  Description of the structure of the transaction, including, if necessary, a 
structure diagram. 
3.2  Description of the entities participating in the issue and description of the 
functions to be performed by them. 
3.3  Description of the method and date of the sale, transfer, novation or 
assignment of the assets or of any rights and/or obligations in the assets to 
the issuer or, where applicable, the manner and time period in which the 
proceeds from the issue will be fully invested by the issuer. 
3.4  An explanation of the flow of funds including: 
3.4.1  how the cash flow from the assets will meet the issuer's obligations to 
holders of the securities, including, if necessary, a financial service table and 
a description of the assumptions used in developing the table; 
3.4.2  information on any credit enhancements, an indication of where material 
potential liquidity shortfalls may occur and the availability of any liquidity 
supports and indication of provisions designed to cover interest/principal 
shortfall risks; 
3.4.3  without prejudice to item 3.4.2, details of any subordinated debt finance; 
3.4.4  an indication of any investment parameters for the investment of temporary 
liquidity surpluses and description of the parties responsible for such 
investment; 
3.4.5  how payments are collected in respect of the assets; 
3.4.6  the order of priority of payments made by the issuer to the holders of the 
class of securities in question; 
3.4.7  details of any other arrangements upon which payments of interest and 
principal to investors are dependent; 
3.5  the name, address and significant business activities of the originators of the 
securitised assets; 
3.6  where the return on, and/or repayment of the security is linked to the 
performance or credit of other assets which are not assets of the issuer, 
items 2.2 and 2.3 are necessary; 
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3.7  the name, address and significant business activities of the administrator, 
calculation agent or equivalent, together with a summary of the 
administrator's/calculation agents responsibilities, their relationship with the 
originator or the creator of the assets and a summary of the provisions 
relating to the termination of the appointment of the administrator/calculation 
agent and the appointment of an alternative administrator/calculation agent; 
and 
3.8  the names and addresses and brief description of: 
(a) any swap counterparties and any providers of other material forms of 
credit/liquidity enhancement; 
(b) the banks with which the main accounts relating to the transaction are 
held. 
 
4.  POST ISSUANCE REPORTING 
4.1  Indication in the prospectus whether or not it intends to provide post-
issuance transaction information regarding securities to be admitted to 
trading and the performance of the underlying collateral. Where the issuer 
has indicated that it intends to report such information, specify in the 
prospectus what information will be reported, where such information can be 
obtained, and the frequency with which such information will be reported. 
 
 The FMSA makes it clear that its underlying policy is based, in part, on 
investor protection, meaning, that one of the aims of the FMSA is protect investor 
confidence in the financial markets.  This protection has be translated into the FMSA 
by having certain provisions which (i) make it an offence to attack investor 
confidence by providing insufficient and/or misleading information in a prospectus, 
and (ii) levying financial penalties on those who contravene the provisions of the 
FMSA.  Each person contributing to the prospectus is responsible for their 
respective contribution, thus, each party is potentially exposed to some liability if 
their contribution is inaccurate or misleading in any way.  Accordingly, the 
investment banker can be punished under s.206 FMSA for contravening the FMSA 
in its capacity as an authorised person; and the issuer and third parties who have 
contributed to the prospectus can be punished under ss. 90 and 91 FMSA.  The 
FMSA also has in place additional remedies such allowing the FSA to seek an 
injunction or restitution order against those who potentially can contravene the 
FMSA, or who have benefited financially by a contravention.   
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 The SPV must ensure that it complies with the provision of the FMSA (and 
the FSA Listing Rules drafted thereunder) if it intends to issue asset backed 
securities in the UK.  Failure to do so is not only an offence and financially 
detrimental, but also professionally embarrassing. 
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CHAPTER 6 SECURITISATION FACILITATES MONEY LAUNDERING? 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to discuss the essence and purpose of the thesis – is it 
possible for securitisation to be used and abused so as to facilitate money 
laundering?  In previous chapters the author examined what securitisation is, and 
how it works from both a legal and practical perspective; knowledge which is 
essential and a good foundation in order to answer the above question.  As stated 
earlier, the inspiration behind this research was sparked by the fraudulent activities 
committed by certain executives at the energy giant that once existed as Enron.  
The Enron scandal as it unfolded and was reported, uncovered what is now a known 
fact, that securitisation can be used and abused to commit fraud, a fraud which will 
be discussed later in this chapter.  Although the wrongful activities behind the Enron 
scandal only demonstrate that securitisation can be used and abused to raise funds 
in a fraudulent manner, such disclosure inspires one to think whether securitisation 
can be used and abused to commit other forms of financial crime.   
To narrow the inquiry to the extent that it can be practically tested, one 
needs to formalise a workable hypothesis that connects the activities behind the 
Enron scandal, securitisation, and money laundering.  Thus, the question, is it 
possible for securitisation to be used and abused so as to facilitate money 
laundering, then becomes, as a working hypothesis: if the activities behind the 
Enron scandal are related to the vulnerabilities of a securitisation transaction, then 
such vulnerabilities may be exploited to the extent that a securitisation transaction 
may facilitate money laundering. 
  
2. THE ENRON SCANDAL: WHAT CAUSED IT? 
An example of how securitisation can be abused to facilitate financial crime 
was exposed by the Enron scandal.  The Enron scandal perpetrated by certain 
executives at the Houston-based energy giant and its auditors succeeded, in part, 
because of the active part played by several prominent bankers – J P Morgan 
Chase, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse First Boston, Canadian Imperial Bank 
of Commerce (CIBC), Bank of America, Barclays Bank, Deutsche Bank and Lehman 
Brothers.  These key players, in a series of fraudulent transactions, ultimately cost 
shareholders more than $25 billion.  It was uncovered that almost $1.2 billion was 
earned through insider trading by 28 Enron directors and officers (Senate 
Committee, 2002: 3). 
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 The methodology was as follows (Schwarcz, 2002).  Enron was a corporate 
giant which presented falsified information to the world with regards to its business 
operations and prosperity.  Enron set up a SPV to which it transferred its own stock   
The SPV purchased this stock by issuing bonds to investors supported by the 
cashflow and creditworthiness of the Enron stock.  Because Enron was purportedly 
successful the stock and additional guarantees given by Enron secured a successful 
bonds issue.  The bond proceeds were passed back to Enron and invested in 
Enron’s other business ventures without appearing on Enron’s financial statements.   
Enron also created an arrangement whereby the SPV would be obliged to 
purchase other stock which Enron owned if the price of that stock fell to a pre-
arranged price.  This was a separate contract – Enron sold a call option (rights to 
purchase stock at a fixed pre-arranged price or at a specified time). The SPV would 
purchase this stock using the cashflow from the Enron stock less any interest 
payments to the investors.   
 
 
                  Arrangement 2 
 
Arrangement 2 – the SPV was obligated to purchase a fraction of 
stock which appeared on Enron’s balance sheet.  This 
transferred risk from Enron to the SPV.  But Enron ensured that 
in practice the price did not fall below the purchase trigger price.   
               Stock             $$$ 
                          $$$ 
      Guarantee      
                  
Bonds 
 (Source: Schwarcz, 2002) 
 
 The structure was carefully put together so that the SPV would not face any 
financial difficulty – Enron ensured that its stock price would not fall so that its 
guarantee to the SPV would not materialise.  It did this by continuing to give a 
conceited view of its trading and success which consequently kept its stock price at 
a safe level.  It also ensured that the second arrangement it had with the SPV would 
not cause unforeseeable loss to the SPV.  Again, its conceited operations kept this 
second stock price at a safe level so that the SPV was not obliged to purchase this 
stock.          
 This was the structure of Enron’s dealings – multiplied by more than 3000 
times – Enron had over 3000 SPVs which formed a huge operation of more than 
3000 securitisation transactions.  This added the complexity to Enron’s structure.  
Enron’s trading was, in part, nothing more than bank borrowings which, with the aid 
  Enron 
 
Investors     SPV 
Enron 
Stock 
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of balance sheet manipulation, appeared as income.  This income gave the 
impression that Enron was a successful energy giant.  Thus, Enron’s stock was 
falsely inflated which Enron used in the transfer to the SPVs for the bond issues.  
Further, the bankers facilitated the bond issues supported by the sale of the 
overvalued Enron stock.  For example, as underwriters, J P Morgan Chase helped 
Enron raise $2 billion in publicly traded securities that were later almost worthless 
(Powers, 2002: 14-17).   
The bankers, further, played a dual role in the elaborate scheme – helping 
conceal the true state of Enron's precarious financial condition while securities’ 
analysts at the same banks were making false and inflated assessments of Enron to 
entice investors.  As a result, Enron executives were able to deceive investors by 
moving billions of dollars of debt off its balance sheet and artificially inflating the 
value of Enron stock.   
Enron's financial manipulations finally became public and consequently the 
stock collapsed in November 2001 triggering the guarantees it owed to the 3000 and 
more SPVs.  The SPVs could not repay the bondholders because Enron’s stock (the 
receivables supporting the bonds) were dropping in value.  Moody's, the credit rating 
agency, was asked by the bankers to keep Enron's credit rating unchanged until the 
bankers could arrange a solution to avoid insolvency.  However, the combined effect 
of the falling stock, the publicity and the potential legal proceedings forced Enron to 
file for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001 with losses estimated at more than $25 
billion (Powers, 2002: 36; Senate Committee, 2002: 105-106).  The Enron scam 
shows some significant points – stock can be used as receivables; accounting rules 
can be manipulated; the more SPVs in a structure the more complicated it appears; 
disclosure can be limited to what an average investor can understand; and 
professionals can be utilised to facilitate fraud. 
From a theoretical perspective, the activities behind the Enron scandal fit 
within what is described as financial crime.  In simple terms financial crime is any 
non-violent crime resulting in a financial loss.  An elaborate definition incorporates 
an array of dishonest financial activities which cause loss, for example, ‘the concept 
of financial abuse [includes] illegal financial activities, many of which have the 
potential to harm financial systems, and legal activities that exploit undesirable 
features of tax and regulatory systems’ (IMF, 2001: 5).  This definition, just one of 
many which, reflects with some accuracy the activities exposed in the Enron 
scandal.  An analysis of the Enron scandal exposes certain vulnerabilities of a 
securitisation transaction such that there is little, if any, detection by the authorities 
of what goes on behind the scenes in a securitisation transaction; there is virtually 
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no method for participants to detect wrongdoing in a securitisation transaction; the 
credit rating agencies who analyse receivables have no ability to detect any 
wrongdoing underlying the receivables; and the time within which a transaction 
closes is insufficient to allow a thorough verification of its key components by those 
parties involved. 
 
3. WHAT IS MONEY LAUNDERING? 
 Money laundering is a financial crime, defined by many academics, all of 
whom follow the same underlying definition, that it is a process of converting money 
or money equivalent which derives from criminal activity into money or its equivalent 
which then appears to be legally generated.  Lyman offers a useful definition, ‘the 
term 'money laundering' refers to the transformation of illegally obtained currency to 
that which appears legitimate.  In addition, it is the concealment of the illegal source 
of the income or its applications’ (1989: 7-8).  A more comprehensive definition is 
‘the process whereby proceeds, reasonably believed to have been derived from 
criminal activity, are transported, transferred, transformed, converted, or 
intermingled with legitimate funds, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the 
true nature, source, disposition, movement or ownership of those proceeds.  The 
goal of the money laundering process is to make funds derived from, or associated 
with illicit activity appear legitimate’ (US Customs, 1990: 1149). 
Levi’s definition focuses upon Article 1 of the draft European Community 
Directive of March 1990, and defines money laundering as, ‘the conversion or 
transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from a serious crime, for 
the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting 
any person who is involved in committing such an offence or offences to evade the 
legal consequences of his action, and the concealment or disguise of the true 
nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership 
of property, knowing that such property is derived from a serious crime’ (1991: 109-
125). 
If correctly done it allows criminals to gain and maintain control over their 
proceeds and provide a legitimate cover for the source of the income.  The process 
of laundering plays a crucial role in allowing the drug trafficker, the terrorist, the 
organised criminal gang, the insider trader, the tax evader, to name a few, to avoid 
suspicion that sudden wealth brings, if such wealth derives from criminal activity.  So 
how is money laundered?  The process itself occurs over three stages – placement, 
layering and integration (Ehrenfeld, 1992: 34-41). 
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 Placement is the first stage where the launderer will introduce the dirty 
money into the banking and financial system with the aim of “washing” it.  Usually 
such money is placed under a disguise into the banking or financial system so as to 
reduce detection from the authorities, and any links with the launderer’s criminal 
activities.  The disguise usually takes the form of a legitimate business operation 
capable of generating either a stable or a fluctuating amount of income.  The 
launderer is careful not to arouse suspicion and embarks upon an elaborate cover 
up operation by creating invoices, receipts or any other documentary evidence 
which can substantiate the income and the business operation.  The first stage of 
laundering is where the initial alarm bells are likely to ring since the launderer is 
introducing the proceeds into the banking and financial system against the response 
to laundering by the financial institutions through which such funds must pass. 
 Layering occurs once the proceeds have entered the financial system and 
start going through the cleaning process.  Since the aim of laundering is to 
dissociate the proceeds from its criminal origin the proceeds are placed through a 
series of transactions which act as layers of cover so as to eliminate any audit trail.  
The financial system offers numerous opportunities which can be used to act as 
layers of cover.  Typically, the proceeds are wired to offshore bank accounts and 
then split into several portions which are then used to purchase financial products 
like shares, bonds and other products where details of ownership can be disguised. 
Electronic money has introduced another opportunity where proceeds can be 
transferred with little ownership disclosure or complete anonymity (IMF, 2001: 7).   
 Integration is the final stage and the aim here is to introduce the proceeds 
back into the legitimate financial system and associate the proceeds with the 
launderer or its operations so to give the impression that such proceeds have been 
legitimately earned.  At this stage any audit trail will have been broken and thus, 
making it difficult to distinguish legal and illegal wealth.  The usual methods used for 
integration are the creation of anonymous companies in countries where the right to 
secrecy is guaranteed.  The launderer is then able to grant itself loans out of the 
laundered money in the course of a future legal transaction.  Furthermore, to 
increase its profits it will also claim tax relief on the loan repayments and charge 
itself interest on the loan.  Alternatively, the launderer can send false export-import 
invoices – overvaluing goods – which allow the launderer to move money from one 
company and country to another with the invoices serving to verify the origin of the 
monies placed with financial institutions (Ehrenfeld, 1992: 43). 
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The ongoing battle against money laundering through laws and regulations is 
driven by a legislative policy with three aims: (i) asset detection/tracing; (ii) 
disruption; and (iii) asset seizure (Sergeant, 2003: 7).  Asset tracing consists of 
following the trail of the proceeds from origin to the launderer’s pocket.  It is the trail 
that is created during the layering stage of money laundering.  Governments have 
introduced laws and regulations which empower and assist law enforcement 
authorities to undertake asset tracing, for example, in the UK the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 2002 established the Assets Recovery Agency.  Disruption means to disrupt the 
flow of money generated through illegitimate means.  This is achieved to a varying 
degree by having in place laws and regulations which make it difficult for the 
launderer to move money around, for example, through a series of transactions 
(Lormel, 2005: 4).  Asset seizure, in contrast, involves seizing the assets which are 
proven to be originated by the proceeds of crime.  Asset seizure is triggered at the 
integration stage of the laundering operation – when the launderer retrieves the 
proceeds.  
On an international scale the fight against money laundering is rooted in the 
Forty Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an organisation 
set up by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 
1989.  Its purpose is to address the longstanding global problem of money 
laundering by issuing recommendations and directions to member and non-member 
nations, and periodically monitoring the problem and suggesting amendments 
accordingly. 
 The UK adopted and implemented some key suggestions by enacting the  
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 which consolidates, updates and expands the money 
laundering offences in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the Drug Trafficking Act 1994 
and in the Terrorism Act 2000.  Moreover, regulatory measures were introduced by 
the Money Laundering Regulations 1993 – superseded by the Money Laundering 
Regulations 2001, and again by the Money Laundering Regulations 2003.  The 
salient points of the POCA are firstly, the creation of the Assets Recovery Agency 
which will investigate and commence both criminal and civil proceedings in order to 
trace and seize proceeds of crime.  Secondly, allowing a court to assist in the 
seizure of assets through tougher confiscation orders.  Thirdly, allowing the Assets 
Recovery Agency to pursue civil recovery of assets through the High Court.  
Fourthly, empowering certain authorities such as the police and Customs & Excise 
officers to seize large amounts of cash and finally, the introduction of tougher 
measures to assist in tracing assets and disrupting organised criminal enterprises 
on a domestic and international scale.   
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 In the US the parallel legislation is the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001 
(USA PATRIOT Act).  One of the primary goals of the USA PATRIOT Act is to 
provide law enforcement authorities with enhanced investigative tools, new 
surveillance procedures, new immigration laws, and new and more rigorous anti-
money laundering laws.  In general, Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act amended two 
existing statutes – the Money Laundering Control Act 1986 which provided criminal 
laws designed to fight money laundering.  The second statute was the Bank Secrecy 
Act 1970 which was a recordkeeping and reporting statute that applied to banking 
institutions generally.  We shall see the effect of these rules when we examine 
whether securitisation facilitates money laundering.  
 
4. CAN SECURITISATION FACILITATE MONEY LAUNDERING? 
Now that a basis for the hypothesis has been established, the author will 
now turn to testing such hypothesis with the aid of empirical research, where 
necessary.  Some of the empirical research carried out involved communications 
with individuals who agreed to participate on the condition that I maintain their 
anonymity given that their contribution may be considered to be of a frank and 
sensitive nature.  Where this is applicable the author has omitted names. 
To recap: if the activities behind the Enron scandal are related to the 
vulnerabilities of a securitisation transaction, then such vulnerabilities may be 
exploited to the extent that a securitisation transaction may facilitate money 
laundering. 
The structure of securitisation is put together essentially by two main 
contracts – originator transferring receivables to the SPV, and the SPV issuing 
bonds to investors.  The other contracts with third parties drive the structure so that 
it functions appropriately.  Hypothetically, the originator will have a pool of 
receivables which is sold or pledged to the SPV.  These receivables are rights to 
funds, which the originator has created through contracts with third parties. The 
receivables sold or pledged can be proceeds of crime – rights to payments created 
with third parties by contract to originate the proceeds or as part of the layering 
stage of laundering.  Note that the receivables are intangible property since they 
have no physical existence other than being contractual rights forming part of the 
underlying contract with third parties and which are witnessed by paperwork.  The 
receivables are placed into the financial system when they are transferred to the 
SPV – this assists the launderer by allowing the proceeds to achieve the layering 
stage.  The launderer will exchange the dirty money for clean money when it 
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receives the purchase price from the SPV – thus, achieving integration stage.  
Additionally, the launderer can raise funds in this way to further its criminal activities.   
Further, unless an entity directly declares criminal intentions or is subjected to 
criminal intelligence surveillance, there is very little prohibiting entities (including 
criminals or launderers) from securitising rights to payments – a possible affirmative 
conclusion of the hypothesis.     
 
4.1 ORIGINATOR APPROACHES THE BANKER  
The originator will approach a banker with the intention of raising finance 
either by removing receivables off its balance sheet or keeping the receivables and 
using them as security for finance.  The banker usually requests audited accounts 
and an opinion from the originator’s accountant which states the current financial 
position of the originator.  This is used as a key tool to conceive a structure.  The 
banker also requires information regarding the originator’s business operations so a 
fuller picture can be achieved before calculating whether a securitisation would be 
appropriate (Schwarcz, 1993: 34-36).    
The banker is known as the “producer” and “director” of the structure – it has 
the know-how and the contacts to make it materialise from paper to reality.  The 
banker will compose the structure and instruct all the professionals involved.  It is 
important to note that while the banker has good knowledge of securitisation it is not 
considered as an expert in every aspect of the structure.  It has a general overview 
of all the aspects but relies heavily on the opinions of other professionals like 
lawyers, accountants and the credit rating agency.  In the absence of any fallout, the 
banker usually has close ties with a law firm, an accountancy firm, placement 
agents, underwriters and a credit rating agency which have been created through a 
history of dealings.  Thus, the investment banker is the biggest and most valuable 
client any lawyer or accountant will have. 
Since the banker can produce and direct a structure, this position makes it 
possible for it to manipulate the structure or be abused.  In other words, the banker 
is a key person who can facilitate a financial crime or be used to facilitate a financial 
crime.  The originator will present itself as a prosperous business with a balance 
sheet of receivables.  The receivables will appear as figures in the balance sheet – 
though supplementary information with the balance sheet will state the nature of the 
assets and explain the figures.  Aside from this the balance sheet will not detail the 
receivables (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, London, interview: 14th May, 2003). 
The next step in the process is isolating the receivables into a pool so that 
the banker can calculate how to structure the securitisation.  The important point is 
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that receivables are rights to payments which exist only by the contract that 
generated them.  For example, a pool of mortgages is evidenced only by the 
mortgage contracts between the originator and the obligors and copies of property 
deeds held as security (Standard and Poor’s, 1993a: 3).  Alternatively, a pool of 
credit card receivables are evidenced only by computer generated printouts of 
account numbers and outstanding amounts (Standard and Poor’s, 1997: 15).  The 
originator will have in mind the amount of finance it wishes to raise and the amount 
of receivables it wishes to remove.  These amounts are calculated with the aid of the 
originator’s accountant.  The isolation is discussed with the banker who will want to 
ensure that it is satisfied that firstly, the receivables exist, secondly, the originator is 
the legal and beneficial owner, thirdly, the originator is not breaching any prohibition 
clauses in other agreements by disposing the receivables, fourthly, the originator 
can transfer the receivables without causing loss to its operations, and finally, that 
the receivables have legitimate source (Standard and Poor’s, London, interview: 
23rd May, 2003). 
 Whether the receivables exist will depend on furnishing sufficient evidence 
as to their existence.  Providing mortgage contracts and the property deeds would 
not be appropriate since they are confidential documents and moreover, it would be 
impractical to produce documentation evidencing every receivable in the pool.  
Thus, in practice, the originator makes representations that the receivables exist – 
this also satisfies that the originator is the owner, since if they exist on its financial 
statements the originator must be the owner.  These representations also include a 
statement that removal of the receivables do not breach any prohibitions or do not 
significantly impact on the originator’s business.  The representations also include a 
statement that upon transfer of the receivables the SPV will acquire a first priority 
security interest in the receivables. 
The receivables are presented as computer printouts which list the account 
numbers representing the underlying contracts together with outstanding amounts 
owed by the obligors.  It is the outstanding amount that is transferred to the SPV.  
Each outstanding amount is identified by the account number which the obligor 
holds (Standard and Poor’s, London).  A typical pool can be evidenced by millions of 
accounts which combine to make the collateral and financial support for a multi-
million bond issue.  The originator transfers the accounts with a priority security 
interest to the SPV.  
 The banker relies very much on the representations given by the originator 
and the supporting documents presented.  The banker warns that should the 
receivables not exist or they are removed in breach of any restrictions or such 
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removal would economically damage the originator, then this would amount to fraud.  
Where the receivables do not exist then the originator is, in effect, raising finance 
without any collateral or honest representations.  Where the originator transfers the 
receivables in breach of restrictions then this would place the SPV in a precarious 
position since firstly, the originator is in breach of contract with a third party and 
secondly, the receivables may need to be returned back to the originator if their 
removal economically damages the originator.  
 How much can the banker verify?  Firstly, it is impractical to verify each 
receivable in a pool – for this reason the originator makes representations.  The 
rating agency is the only professional which closely analyses the pool.  However, a 
rating agency does not have the ability to check every receivable in a pool (Weiss 
Ratings).  Secondly, the legal title can be verified by assumptions – if the 
receivables exist on the balance sheet then look to who is the owner of the balance 
sheet.  Further, professionals such as the accountant and the originator’s banker 
can confirm business operations.  The computer printouts identify the receivables.  
Thus, the accumulative effect is a strong assumption, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, that the originator is the owner of the receivables. 
 Can the banker verify the source?  Identifying the source is crucial in order to 
determine whether the receivables have a clean origin.  The banker will examine the 
originator’s business operations to ascertain its productivity, prosperity, and 
legitimacy based on the financial statements (including tax filings) and general 
knowledge within the originator’s industry.  However, it is possible for the originator 
to have business operations which do not appear in its financial statements.  The 
use of special purpose vehicles is a popular method of taking assets and operations 
off financial statements – for example, Enron’s growth is attributed to the existence 
of more than 3000 special purpose vehicles which did not appear in its financial 
statements.   
 For example, assume ABC Plc is a large producer and wholesaler of coffee.  
Now assume it isolates its wholesale operations and transfers them to a SPV in 
exchange for funds.  ABC Plc then enters into a rolling contract whereby it sells its 
coffee to the SPV which then sells it on to retailers.  The accounting consolidation 
rules, FRS 2, state that as long as ABC Plc does not own a majority of the voting 
rights in the SPV; has the right to strongly direct board meetings and/or decisions; 
has the right to exercise dominant influence over the SPV (para. 4 of Sch. 9 to the 
Companies Act 1989 provides that dominant influence occurs when the originator 
has a ‘right to give directions with respect to the operating and financial policies of 
the [SPV] which its directors are obliged to comply with whether or not they are for 
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the benefit of the [SPV])’; is a party to a control agreement involving the SPV; owns 
a participating interest in the SPV – the SPV will not appear in ABC Plc’s financial 
statements.  Now, if ABC Plc decides to become a party to a securitisation, its 
financial statements will not show the SPV as its subsidiary even if ABC Plc is 
indirectly controlling it and used it solely to raise off balance sheet finance.  ABC Plc 
can appoint its directors as directors of the SPV as long as the majority of ABC’s 
board is not connected with the SPV’s board.  Of course, conflict of interest issues 
will surface – but if ABC intends on hiding the SPV “subsidiary” it can turn a blind 
eye to any conflict of interest issues.  This is what happened in the Enron affair 
(Powers, 2002: 64-66) – which although is governed by different legal and 
accounting rules, nevertheless shows that conflict of interest issues can be ignored 
if the party wishes to, and that no monitoring system is in place which can sound 
alarm bells in the event of such breach.   
The banker will examine the originator’s financial statements and any other 
documents given by its accountant and banker in order to work out the extent of the 
originator’s business operations.  The financial system relies very much on trust and 
integrity of the parties who utilise it (Fisse, 1992: 46-48).  Each participant relies on 
the trust and integrity of each party it engages into business with and the banker is 
no exception to this.  Thus, it will rely on what it is informed by the originator and 
other professionals who give their view as to the business operations of the 
originator – in addition to inspecting the documentation presented by the originator 
and any other findings which result from exercising due diligence.  As long as it 
exercises due diligence and inquires reasonably, it has undertaken the level of 
investigation required by the unwritten rules of the financial community.  
The receivables are intangible property which only exist as computer 
printouts and thus, can be falsely manufactured.  So is it difficult for the banker to 
recognise proceeds of crime mingled with legitimate earnings?  The answer is that it 
can be difficult given that the pool is composed of intangible assets which are 
evidenced merely by paperwork.  The banker can only exercise due diligence and 
investigation to a certain extent before the investigation becomes impractical.  One 
leading banker responded, ‘it’s a tough position to be in, particularly when dealing 
with a less known originator, but given the pressures we are under we have to go 
with what the originator will tell us’ (Goldman Sachs, New York).  When asked 
whether their press office shared this view the source declined to answer.   
The press office of each organisation is in place to give information to the 
inquiring public.  However, the press office will always lean towards giving answers 
or expressing views which do not undermine the organisation or the industry.  It 
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seems that the press office in this incident may not have given the same answer as 
the source.  Another leading investment bank, JP Morgan, London, also expressed 
a similar view to Goldman Sachs but did not want their view expressed in writing. 
Add to this the fact that every bond issue is structured according to a 
deadline which is often dictated by the capital markets – the banker will want to 
launch the bonds in a period of active favourable trading so that the bonds will be 
underwritten and sold.  In practice, the period of active favourable trading is a short 
window of time, anything from a few hours to a few days, which has been picked out 
using reliable economic indicators and predictions (Bloomberg, 1997: 15-16).  Thus, 
in most cases the banker may be working against the clock while ensuring that 
reasonable and practical investigations are undertaken.   
Add to this the fact that the contents of the pool are under constant change – 
the receivables are exposed to prepayment and default risk which can be controlled 
by allocating reserves but nevertheless motivates the banker to act speedily 
(Standard and Poor’s, 1993r: 27-28).  Aside from investigating the originator, the 
banker is also responsible for instructing the other participants – credit rating 
agency, lawyers, management company, insurance companies and credit support 
providers.   
Returning back to the question - is it difficult for the banker to recognise 
proceeds of crime mingled with legitimate earnings? – The answer it seems derives 
from whether it is reasonably possible and practical to recognise proceeds of crime 
during the period of time between receiving instructions from the originator to the 
time when the bonds are issued.  In the author’s view the pressures of the banker’s 
duties makes it difficult for the banker to do anything more than what it already does. 
It is forced to accept the opinions of others (including the originator’s) because of the 
pressures, and also not to unnecessarily question the integrity of the originator and 
others – this can be damaging for professional and business purposes.  And 
moreover, how does one define reasonable due diligence?   
A two-edged factor which warrants an isolated discussion is the underwriting 
duties of the banker.  On the one hand, the banker needs to ensure that the bonds 
are issued according to the predicted active favourable trading period so that it is not 
left holding too much of the risks associated with the bonds.  It works hard to ensure 
that the bonds are made attractive so that its dealers can sell them successfully 
during the selling period.  One the other hand, it also needs to ensure that it has 
practically done what a reasonable banker could, would, and should do when 
composing the structure and investigating the originator and the pool.  It will work 
hard to ensure that satisfactory investigations have been undertaken so that the 
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bonds will sell while bearing in mind that it is holding the risk that should the bond 
issue fail due to lack of investigation or the pool fails, it will be left holding the 
underwriting risk.  Thus, it seems that the banker has a financial interest which it 
needs to protect alongside a professional interest to ensure that it undertakes a 
reasonably possible and practical investigation of the originator and the pool.  And 
this is driven by the window of time within which it must prepare the securitisation 
and launch the bonds.  In other words, during the window of time it needs to 
investigate the originator while bearing in mind that it needs to ensure that the bonds 
are a success – it must not waste time on the investigations but focus on the launch 
of the bonds. 
In conclusion, given the intangible nature of the receivables which can only 
be evidenced by paperwork prepared and controlled by the originator, and the tasks 
and multiple responsibilities of the banker, and the time frame within which the 
structure is composed and made effective, it seems that there is little which can 
detect and recognise a pool containing proceeds of crime.  This affirmative answer 
can be further justified and strengthened by the conclusion (mentioned further in this 
chapter) that even the credit rating agency cannot recognise proceeds of crime who, 
in fact, closely analyse the pool.  
  
4.2 WHAT DOES THE LAW EXPECT OF THE BANKER?   
In the UK, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), Money Laundering 
Regulations 2003, and the numerous press releases and advisory notes published 
by the Bank of England and more recently the Financial Services Authority are all 
based upon the requirement that a banker should know its customer.  Further, that 
any suspicious transaction that indicates money laundering should be reported.  
Thus, the lawmaker has placed the onus of tackling money laundering firmly on the 
banker.  The penalties for non compliance can be heavy – both criminal and 
financial sanctions can be placed on the banker for non compliance.  For example, 
on 17th December 2002 the Financial Services Authority fined the Royal Bank of 
Scotland £750 000 for breaching the Money Laundering rules.  An investigation 
showed that RBS failed ‘either to obtain sufficient 'know your customer' 
documentation adequately to establish customer identity or to retain such 
documentation, in an unacceptable number of new accounts opened across its retail 
network in early 2002’ (FSA/PN/123/2002).   
Section 327 POCA 2002 provides, 
 
 (1) A person commits an offence if he -  
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   (a) conceals criminal property;  
   (b) disguises criminal property;  
   (c) converts criminal property;  
   (d) transfers criminal property;  
(e) removes criminal property from England and Wales or from Scotland or 
from Northern Ireland. 
…  
(3) Concealing or disguising criminal property includes concealing or disguising its 
nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership or any rights with 
respect to it. 
 
Is the banker capable of committing all of the offences mentioned within this 
section?  Since it is both the producer and director it can facilitate the concealing, 
disguising, transferring and removing from the jurisdiction proceeds of crime which 
have been mingled with legitimate earnings.  But the important point to note is that 
the offences are only committed if it knows or should have known that the pool 
contains proceeds of crime.  “Criminal property” is defined by s.340(3) as ‘property 
which the alleged offender knows or suspects constitutes or represents benefit from 
any criminal conduct’.  Thus, the mens rea is in fact embedded in the definition of 
the “criminal property”.  Consequently, if the banker does not suspect that the pool 
contains proceeds of crime, the pool is not “criminal property”.  Conversely, where 
the banker has agreed with the originator to transfer proceeds of crime into the pool 
then obviously the offences have been committed.    
However, where it has no knowledge of the pool’s true contents then it can 
escape liability by showing that the paperwork shown by the originator was proper 
and gave no cause for suspicion.  Section 330(2)(b) introduces an 'objective' test 
which means that failure to disclose information about money laundering will amount 
to the commission of an offence where a person has 'reasonable grounds' for 
knowing or suspecting that another person is engaged in money laundering, even if 
they did not actually know or suspect that money laundering was taking place.  The 
banker is only expected to exercise common sense of an experienced and skilled 
person – in other words, what would a reasonable banker have done in the 
circumstances?  Earlier it was shown how receivables can be falsely manufactured 
thus, provided that nothing else in the surrounding circumstances causes suspicion, 
a reasonable banker would be expected to analyse the paperwork and rule that, 
based upon the paperwork, the receivables appear proper and legitimate – in other 
words, in the paperwork the proceeds are not highlighted in bold to attract attention.   
  132 
 The banker can convert the proceeds of crime when the receivables are 
transferred to the SPV and get converted from proceeds of crime to clean legitimate 
earnings.  This is called layering.  Section 328 provides, 
 
(1) A person commits an offence if he enters into or becomes concerned in an 
arrangement which he knows or suspects facilitates (by whatever means) the 
acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another 
person. 
 
Here the word ‘arrangement’ is interpreted to include a securitisation 
structure.  The banker is capable of committing this offence since it will conceive the 
structure which will aid the ‘acquisition, retention, use [and] control’ of proceeds of 
crime (disguised as receivables) when the pool of receivables is created and ready 
to be assigned to the SPV.  The banker is required by the provisions of POCA to 
report any knowledge or suspicion to an appointed Money Laundering Officer within 
the banker’s organisation or to the police.  The provision expects the report to be 
made within a reasonable period of time.  
A critical examination of the policy behind POCA exposes two points, firstly, 
the onus is on the banker to investigate and report any suspicion or knowledge – the 
policy provides this without fully considering the abilities of the banker.  Money 
laundering and financial crime is hidden behind a complicated fog of transactions 
and ingenuity which the banker may not recognise, let alone become suspicious of.  
Moreover, financial information reflecting intangible property can be falsified and 
manipulated to read whatever its author intends.  Thus, the originator can create a 
pool of whatever it intends – or the banker can assist and create a pool of whatever 
they intend – the paperwork can be falsified and manipulated. 
The second point exposed is that the policy seems to provide an incentive to 
investigate and report suspicion and knowledge by imposing criminal sanctions for 
non-reporting – s.334 POCA 2002 provides, ‘a person guilty of an offence under 
section 327, 328 or 329 is liable – (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a 
term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or 
to both, or (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
14 years or to a fine or to both’.  Should the incentive not entice the banker to assist 
the authorities as opposed to the “big bully” approach – “help me or else”.  In the 
author’s view, the incentive to assist should be one where the banker is actually 
rewarded for the assistance.  Since it is money that drives a banker to assist the 
criminal, in the author’s view, money can also entice the banker to assist the 
authorities.  Moreover, although it is an offence not to report suspicion or 
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knowledge, it is only punishable if the authorities can prove that the banker knew or 
should have suspected the laundering.  Earlier it was shown that a pool of 
receivables can be made to look clean thus, making it difficult, if not impossible, for 
the banker to suspect anything criminal.  Thus, unless the banker knows that the 
pool is of criminal origin and the authorities prove this, only then is the banker 
punishable.  Thus, like all criminals, a banker only commits an offence if it gets 
caught. 
In the US, the fight against money laundering is approached differently 
compared to the UK.  In the US, the USA PATRIOT Act created new anti-money 
laundering requirements for financial institutions, including, for the first time, hedge 
funds and investment companies.  Banks and broker-dealers were already subject 
to existing anti-money laundering laws, including the Money Laundering Control Act 
1986 and the Bank Secrecy Act 1970.  The USA PATRIOT Act amended these laws 
to add new requirements and to extend existing provisions to other types of financial 
institutions.  Financial institutions that fail to comply with these requirements face 
severe civil and criminal penalties.  § 352 of the USA PATRIOT Act requires a 
financial institution to implement an “anti money laundering program” that has, at a 
minimum, the following four requirements: 
 
1. Policies, procedures and controls designed to detect and prevent money 
laundering; 
2. A compliance officer whose role is to oversee the program; 
3. Training for employees on how to detect and prevent money laundering;  
4. Periodic audits of the “anti money laundering program”. 
 
It seems that the USA PATRIOT Act differs from the UK legislation in that the 
US money laundering law is not a “one size fits all” proposition.  The POCA 2002 
sets out the law which applies to all equally and clearly whereas, in the US, each 
financial institution creates and has the flexibility to tailor the anti-money laundering 
law (called an “anti money laundering program”) according to its nature by 
addressing particular risks or vulnerabilities as it sees fit.  Financial institutions 
design their “anti-money laundering program” to implement procedures and policies 
that can reasonably detect and report activity that may be associated with money 
laundering.   
Each institution will have a tailor made “program” which defines what money 
laundering is in the context of an institution’s operation before setting out how to 
recognise it and fight it.  Thus, it is important to have money laundering detection 
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procedures in order to avoid possible criminal liability which can occur if the financial 
institution is wilfully blind to money laundering that is occurring under its roof.   
Once the pool of receivables has been created, the banker then creates the 
SPV and its administrative operations.  Aside from appointing a management team 
to oversee the SPV’s operation, the banker also creates a bank account which will 
hold, in trust for the SPV, the proceeds of the receivables as they are received from 
the underlying debtors.  The originator will set up a system which isolates the 
receivables assigned to the SPV from its own assets.   
The system is a computer based system which recognises the assigned 
receivables and places the proceeds received, by wire transfer, into the bank 
account created for the SPV.  This system works with the management company of 
the SPV so that receivables from the originator pass to the SPV.  In other words, the 
system is the originator’s hand that passes the proceeds to the management 
company, the SPV’s receiving hand.  
The banker will, thus, be instrumental in setting up the two bank accounts.  
The “lockbox” account is simply a collection account in which receivables are 
collected, in trust, for the management company.  To save costs the banker usually 
creates this account internally with instructions to wire transfer the proceeds at the 
request of the management company or periodically – usually every 30 days.   
The management company creates a separate account – a client account – 
which it uses to receive the proceeds and calculate what payment is made to the 
investors or how much is invested in new receivables.  
The Money Laundering Regulations 2003 (brought about by the provisions of 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and which give effect to the Second 
EC Money Laundering Directive) apply to all entities which provide financial 
services.  The regulator, Financial Services Authority, oversees the operation and 
compliance of these regulations.  Aside from the Bank of England, a banker who 
accepts the proceeds from the receivables is regulated by the FSA because it 
provides financial services to third parties.  The regulations define ‘relevant 
business’ to include ‘accepting deposits’ (s. 2(2)).  The regulations thus, also apply 
to the banker instructed to receive the proceeds from the “lockbox” account.   
 Part II of the regulations set out the requirement that those regulated must 
have in place procedures which identify, record and report any action or transaction 
which is associated with money laundering.  Failure to do so results in criminal 
sanctions. 
 The MLR2003 uses the words ‘business relationship’ as the criteria for 
invoking identification procedures.  In short, the banker must as soon as is 
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reasonably practicable know and verify the true identity of the person with whom it is 
establishing a ‘business relationship’.  The USA PATRIOT Act requires the banker 
to (1) verify the identity of the person opening the account to the extent reasonable 
and practicable; and (2) maintain the records of the information used to verify the 
person's identity.   
The “lockbox” account is open once the banker has taken steps to know its 
customer.  The banker will look at the originator’s business operations and identity 
and recommend to the business accounts team the opening of the “lockbox” 
account.  Since this is an internal operation, trust facilitates the opening of the 
account, though the business team will verify the identity of the originator.  If the 
“lockbox” account is opened with an external banker then the external banker will 
verify the identity of the originator.  Regardless of what documents are verified for 
identity purposes, it is not possible to investigate whether the new customer is, in 
fact, a criminal.  For the launderer to have an account opened makes it easier to 
clean the proceeds of crime thus, would not object to the verification procedures.  
The management company will open an account, in trust, for the investors.  Again, 
verification procedures will be followed in order to know the management company. 
Both the UK and US laws require bankers and employees to file a 
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) with an internally appointed money laundering 
officer.  Each bank trains its employees to recognise any money laundering activity.  
The training teaches the usual signs of laundering activity.  Although the employers 
can only teach to a certain extent how to recognise money laundering, in reality it is 
difficult to recognise money laundering.  Furthermore, filing SARs adds to the daily 
workload of the banker and the employees, and bankers are careful not to file and 
investigate a SAR which later appears to be based on misjudgement.  In addition to 
this, customers would not be pleased if a SAR was wrongfully filed and investigated 
only to discover later that the transaction was, in fact, legitimate.  
 For the launderer, placing the money into the banking system poses the only 
real problem.  If the proceeds of crime are mingled with legitimate earnings and 
transferred into a pool of receivables, they can enter the banking system once the 
“lockbox” account is opened and starts to accept the receivable payments.  The 
stream of funds moving from the originator to the “lockbox” account and then to the 
management company’s account is undertaken by wire transfers which are 
evidenced by wiring instructions and a sum of money debited from one account and 
credited into another using a central clearing system.   
Where the banker is directly involved in the securitisation of proceeds of 
crime then the structure and operations will be conducted using the credibility and 
  136 
reputation of the parties involved and a high degree of legitimacy which, the author 
believes, can mask an inconspicuous securitisation of proceeds of crime.  Where 
the banker is not directly involved then it is possible to bypass the banker’s inquiries 
using manipulated and falsified paperwork and then relying on the credibility and 
reputation of the parties involved in order to mask an inconspicuous securitisation of 
proceeds of crime. 
 
4.3 THE CREDIT RATING AGENCY 
 The receivables are first analysed by the credit rating agency which will test 
them using worst case scenarios.  The credit rating agency will closely analyse the 
receivables for any credit, structural and legal risks.  The assessment of the credit 
risk is an important task since it seeks to discover the financial strength and 
credibility of the pool of receivables.  A weak pool will certainly affect the security 
element of the pool.  In other words the assessment discovers and verifies the 
strength of the pool’s collateral.  The assessment of the structural risk seeks to 
discover what internal and external effects can cause cashflow and financial 
hindrances or difficulties.  The legal risk is assessed to ensure that the securitisation 
is structured correctly from a legal perspective and that the parties involved are 
protected from internal and external threats.  For example, to ensure that creditors 
and debtors cannot cause hindrances or difficulties for the SPV or the investors.  
The testing scenarios are designed to consider only those effects which can directly 
or indirectly affect the cashflow and collateral of the receivables.  The scenarios 
used for testing test the behavioural pattern and the predicted pattern of the 
cashflow deriving from the receivables under varying financial circumstances.   
In practice, the rating agency will look at the isolated pool and work out the 
contents and value before inputting certain data into their systems – data such as 
type of assets, life expectancy, financial information (such as interest rates) and 
approximate size of the pool are all entered and computer software runs a series of 
testing scenarios.  The results are produced which then become the basis for 
determining the level of credit enhancement and amendments.   
Since dirty money mingled with clean money does not cause any detrimental 
financial effect upon, or reduces or impacts upon, the cashflow or value and 
collateral of the pool, the criteria under the testing scenarios does not consider the 
effects of dirty money mingled with clean money.  Moreover, dirty money mingled 
with clean money does not “dirty” the value and collateral of the pool – the dirty 
money actually gets cleaned.   
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But is it possible for the rating agency to recognise proceeds of crime during 
the testing?  The author contacted the leading rating agencies and posed the 
question: 
 
Is it possible for a credit rating agency to recognise or detect proceeds of crime 
which may have been mingled with legitimate earnings in an isolated pool of 
receivables?  If so, how? 
 
 The author approached this part of the research with the view that since the 
receivables are tested (using "worst case scenarios") for reliability and strength, 
proceeds of crime that may have been mingled with legitimate earnings would not 
affect the reliability and strength of the pool – dirty money does not affect the value 
and collateral of the pool.  Thus, the testing scenarios are designed only to consider 
those factors which would affect reliability and strength.  A few of the rating agencies 
were helpful only to a certain extent given that the author was inquiring into the 
shortfalls and vulnerabilities of the rating criteria.  Moody’s, London, warned that, 
‘many agencies would be reluctant to give a detailed answer because you are 
exposing vulnerabilities of an established and trusted mechanism that adds 
credibility to a securitisation programme’ (interview: 5th June, 2003).  They were not 
prepared to answer the question directly since they felt, ‘such an answer would 
seriously undermine their rating criteria’.  Aside from the warning and reluctance to 
assist in answering the question, they did say that, ‘they are continuously monitoring 
their rating criteria and undertaking research into any shortfalls of their criteria and 
analysis’.   
 However, Standard & Poor’s, London, kindly responded to the author’s 
question:   
 
‘Generally speaking when we are looking at a portfolio, let’s use credit cards as an 
example, the portfolio is clearly open to fraud and crime at many levels; money 
laundering, fraudulent applications, fraudulent transactions, fraudulent bank staff etc. 
Any purchased portfolio carries the same risks that the portfolio had in the first place 
when it was on the originator’s balance sheet.  
 
The originator will historically have been subjected to these events and would 
display this data either directly in their default data or via separate reporting on fraud 
and other losses.  When we are analysing a transaction we review this historic data 
and stress this at the various rating levels being considered for the issued bonds.  
The stresses are the same as would be used for a standard default caused by non-
payment etc. 
  138 
 
So to answer your question directly, no we don't have the ability to detect the 
fraud/crime being experienced but the originator/servicer does. They will identify 
these actions in their normal way and report accordingly. Historic data has been 
reviewed as part of the rating process and stressed accordingly.’ 
 
The reply makes a number of interesting points.   
 
i. The onus is on the originator to detect any fraud or crime that may allow it to 
mingle dirty money with clean money.  This onus may stem from The 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 which tackles money laundering. 
ii. The originator’s ability to detect fraud/crime is obvious since it is in control of 
its own operations and documents.  It can create documents according to 
how it wishes any third party to read them.  
iii. The rating agency relies largely what the originator informs it with regards to 
any risks associated with fraud – ‘money laundering, fraudulent applications, 
fraudulent transactions, fraudulent bank staff etc’.  Fraudulent applications 
are those which potential obligors are likely to make in order to gain from the 
originator.  It is difficult for the originator to truly estimate the level of false 
applications made which have passed its eligibility criteria.  Thus, the 
originator would aim to keep this estimate very low so as not to expose and 
highlight any vulnerability of its eligibility criteria and its operations.  The 
same would apply to reporting any fraudulent staff and transactions which 
may have passed its criteria and entered its systems.  The originator will aim 
to ensure that its business operations are not viewed as easy targets for 
fraud/crime since this will inevitably affect its credibility and may impact on its 
credit rating.  However, the rating agency would not be impressed if the 
originator declared a complete fraud free estimate since the agency knows 
through experience that fraud/crime can bypass many of the hurdles put in 
place to keep dirty money out.  
iv. The rating agency relies largely on the information given by the originator.  
Thus, if the originator declares that regardless of a tight eligibility and 
verification criteria, the pool will contain 1,000,000,000 receivables of which 
10 can be said to be fraud/crime based, the rating agency will use this figure 
in the testing scenario since there is a risk that the criminal is more likely to 
default on the receivables and generate further receivables which are non-
paying.   
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v. The only consideration associated with fraud/crime is that which derives from 
the possibility that the pool may contain fraudulent applications which will 
generate non-paying receivables.  It is understandable why these 
receivables would need to be weeded out or at least be covered for since 
these are receivables which are as good as guaranteed defaulting 
receivables.  More importantly, these receivables will affect the cashflow, 
value and collateral of the pool whereas, proceeds of crime do not affect 
such cashflow, value and collateral.  The receivables are actually generating 
cashflow (regardless of source) when the launderer pays monies (supported 
by false documents) into the financial system.   
 
 The answer is given in a particular context – whether credit card receivables 
can be checked for abuse and what response is invoked from the rating agency.  
However, how would the credit rating agency react if the receivables were 
generated where the originator could verify the legitimacy or possible fraud?  The 
answer mentioned that the originator of credit card receivables would have in place 
certain eligibility and verification procedures which would weed out fraudulent 
applications and potential non-paying receivables.  How the originator does this is 
taken into consideration when analysing the pool so that all risks can be accounted 
for.  The rating agency admits that they are in a position where they are largely 
reliant on what the originator of credit card receivables would inform them.  
However, what if the receivables were not credit card receivables which could be 
verified or where the fraud risk could not be measured?   
 For example, trade receivables generated by the originator through business 
operations.  These receivables would be generated by contracts which do not 
necessarily have an eligibility or verification criteria.  The originator would have its 
own internal checks which it would make before granting credit or entering into a 
business relationship.  However, whether the other party is capable of committing 
fraud would be beyond consideration since the originator would only do business 
once comfort and confidence surfaces.  And if the contract failed to generate the 
receivable the originator can recover by claiming for a breach of contract.   
 It would seem that the rating agency would look to what internal procedures 
the originator of trade receivables has in order to show that its trade contracts are in 
fact fraud-free and will generate the receivables.  The credit control checks would be 
examined by the rating agency in order to work out whether the originator is granting 
credit in a prudent and cautious manner so as not to generate non-paying 
receivables.   
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 It would also seem that the rating agency would ask the originator what 
internal checks it does in order to protect itself from generating non-paying 
receivables through fraud.  Regardless of assets type, originators would have some 
level of checks to deter criminals from generating non-paying receivables.  But what 
if the originator merely uses the pool of receivables as a placement and layering 
technique to clean dirty money?  In other words, if the originator wanted to mingle 
illegitimate proceeds with receivables and claim to have in place acceptable internal 
checks and controls, can the rating agency consider any risk of fraud beyond what is 
measurable?  The answer would seem to be no.  The rating agency will rely on what 
it is informed by the originator – thus, if the originator mingles proceeds of crime with 
receivables and claims that the pool has undergone its internal checks and controls, 
it seems that the rating agency would gain comfort from this without making further 
inquiries – a fact confirmed by Standard and Poor’s.  
 Another helpful response which strengthens the author’s theory is from 
another leading rating agency (Weiss Rating), 
  
‘The only way a credit rating agency can detect fraudulent receivables is by 
analyzing each of the underlying assets in the pool (each receivable held by the 
SPV).   
 
Very similar to a collateral audit, typically, credit rating agencies will measure the 
quality of the receivables pool as a whole, and will not measure the quality of each 
receivable in the pool.  For example, when looking at an A/R aging report, we 
measure the percentage of receivables which are not past due, not each receivable 
which is current.  Receivables in a securitization program will not be individually 
examined.   
 
In order to avoid fraudulent receivables in a securitization program, the following due 
diligence questions have proven helpful:  What is the basis of the receivable?  
Where is it being generated from?’ 
 
This, again, makes some interesting points: 
 
i. It confirms what the author argues that in order to detect proceeds of crime 
the rating agency would need to investigate each individual receivable.  This, 
in practice, is far from reality given the size of a typical pool and the time 
restraints within which parties are operating.    
ii. Part of the credit analysis involves what is known as a “collateral audit” which 
in essence measures the quality of the pool.  Note that the agency will 
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measure the quality of the pool as a whole and not measure the quality by 
dissecting the pool to measure each individual receivable.   
iii. The rating agency would exercise due diligence by inquiring into the origin of 
the pool.  But the previous quote has confirmed that ‘we don't have the ability 
to detect the fraud/crime being experienced but the originator/servicer does’.  
The rating agency relies on the internal checks conducted by the originator.  
Thus, bogus paperwork can provide evidence to cover receivables which 
have an illegal origin and as long as the originator demonstrates effective 
internal checks, the rating agency has conducted due diligence.  
Unfortunately, the rating agency is limited as to how it can inquire into the 
pool of receivables and given that the financial world relies very much on 
professional trust, it would seem that it is possible to exploit what can now be 
seen as vulnerabilities and shortfalls. 
   
Moody’s, London was also approached again for their reaction and 
comments (interview: 20th June, 2003).  The author presented his view regarding the 
vulnerabilities and shortfalls of the commonalities in the rating criteria, and even 
discreetly summarised the evidence given by Standard & Poor’s and Weiss Rating.  
They still declined to comment or assist in any way whatsoever.  The general 
impression given was that this was a sensitive issue for them given that Moody’s 
holds a worldwide reputation for rating securitisation transactions.  It is 
understandable why such reluctance would be used to answer questions designed 
to reveal a shortfall or vulnerability.  Credit rating is a valuable tool which drives the 
credibility and reliability of the financial system and any vulnerability can affect levels 
of investor and professional confidence.  It seems to safeguard confidence levels.  A 
rating agency would be reluctant to expose certain vulnerabilities even though such 
vulnerabilities are beyond their control.  Standard & Poor’s welcomed the 
questioning and even added that the author’s revelations have prompted Standard 
& Poor’s to research into this area of concern. 
In conclusion, based upon the facts that firstly, investigating the origin of 
each real and (purported) legitimate receivable is beyond the instructions and ability 
of the credit rating agency, secondly, given that invoices and contracts can be 
invented to disguise proceeds of crime, thirdly, it is difficult for the credit rating 
agency to create a system which can investigate the true origin of each receivable, 
and finally, that dirty money cannot cause any detriment or affect the cashflow, 
value and collateral of the pool, the author concludes that proceeds of crime can 
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inconspicuously slide through or bypass the credit rating agency’s testing scenarios 
and enter the placement stage of the laundering process.   
 The Proceeds of Crime Act 2003 (POCA) does, however, require 
professionals to assist authorities in tackling and reducing money laundering.  
Section 327 provides, 
 
(1) A person commits an offence if he -  
    (a) conceals criminal property; 
 … 
(3) Concealing or disguising criminal property includes concealing or disguising its 
nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership or any rights with 
respect to it. 
 
This is only effective against the credit rating agency if the testing scenarios 
and the investigations into the nature and source of the receivables (as disclosed by 
the SPV, the originator and the investment bankers) show that such receivables are 
or can be suspected to be proceeds of crime.  But the research has demonstrated 
how proceeds of crime can inconspicuously slide through or bypass the criteria of 
the testing scenarios thus, the credit rating agency is under no obligation to report 
under s.338 what it does not know or suspect.  Nor, is it safe to say that the rating 
agency should have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting that receivables 
may be the proceeds of crime since their duty is to test the value and collateral of 
the receivables and investigate any effects on the cashflow.   
Dirty money mingled with clean money does not get dirty but gets cleaned.  It 
seems the provisions are drafted to reflect a scenario at a particular point in time in 
which it is possible or reasonably possible for an entity to investigate and then report 
that a transaction is creating or will create, or certain funds are the proceeds of 
crime.  The credit rating agency’s duty is confined to giving a short opinion relating 
to what it sees as the credit standing of the receivables.  Its duties occur before the 
scenario reflected in the provisions of the POCA occurs and furthermore, its findings 
are based partly on what it is informed by the originator’s bankers, accountants, 
auditors, lawyers and the SPV’s directors, trustees, accountants, bankers and 
lawyers.   
 Section 328 POCA is also triggered but is ineffective against the credit rating 
agency.  Section 328 provides,  
 
(1) A person commits an offence if he enters into or becomes concerned in an 
arrangement which he knows or suspects facilitates (by whatever means) the 
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acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another 
person. 
 
The credit rating agency becomes concerned in a securitisation arrangement 
but cannot know or suspect, for reasons already given, that it is dealing with 
proceeds of crime.  The Money Laundering Regulations 2003 also impose on 
professionals the obligation to assist authorities to tackle and reduce money 
laundering.  In short, these regulations do not apply to a credit rating agency – the 
regulations only apply to a ‘relevant business’ as defined by Regulation 2 of the 
MLR 2003, and such definition does not catch the rating agency. 
   
4.4 THE ACCOUNTANT 
 The accountant is also a key player in any securitisation transaction.  The 
originator’s accountant presents the financial statements which the banker uses in 
structuring the transaction.  The accountant can only document what the originator 
informs it – thus, whether an illegal activity is undertaken by the originator, evidence 
of this can only surface if the originator presents documents to the accountant which 
raises suspicion.  Note, that the originator is subjected to an annual audit (usually by 
the same firm of accountants.)  During this audit it may be possible to calculate a 
trail of illegal activity, however, given the inconspicuous sophistication of financial 
crime, false documents can be manufactured to support certain opinions in the 
financial statements.   
 The accountant is placed in a tricky position – on the one hand it must report 
anything which raises suspicion yet conversely, it owes a duty of confidentiality to its 
client.  However, it seems the solution is to report the suspicion given that it is illegal 
not to do so, and then plead the statutory provision to report suspicion in the event 
of any legal action for breaching client confidentiality.  Whether this has any practical 
effect can be gauged from Rosalind Wright CB, Director, Serious Fraud Office 
(lecture: 12th September, 2002),  
 
‘The number of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) last year [2001] amounted to 
21,251, up 13,000 from the year before…The number of STRs from accountants 
was… 0.35%, half the amount reported in 1998.  NCIS say that motoring 
organisations, such as the AA and the RAC have submitted more STRs than 
accountants have in recent years’. 
 
 The figures reported (perhaps dated at the time of writing) do, however, 
show the tricky position an accountant is placed in when dealing with suspicion.  It 
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seems that client confidentiality carries more weight given the commercial and 
financial implications that are involved.  Yet this does not mean that an accountant 
would knowingly breach reporting provisions.  It is a decision which only the 
accountant can make based upon what evidence and suspicion has surfaced.  Yet 
this point indicates a sensitive issue and another vulnerability of the system within 
which securitisation lives.   
 The accountant is also instructed to handle the financial affairs of the SPV.  
The management company usually instructs the originator’s accountant since firstly, 
it is familiar with the receivables in question and secondly, it is cost effective.  Thus, 
the SPV’s accountant undertakes to document the activities of the pool of 
receivables throughout its life.  As receivables are received they are recorded by the 
management company and these records are passed on to the accountant.   
A major part of the accountant’s task is to undertake a “collateral audit” 
which is a sieve like audit that weeds out any non-performing or defaulting 
receivables from the pool (Deloitte and Touché, New York, interview: 23rd June, 
2003).  This is imperative since any opinions given by the credit rating agency would 
have included the assumption that non-performing and defaulting receivables would 
be weeded out at the earliest opportunity so that the collateral value of the pool 
does not fall.  
This “collateral audit” involves analysing the pool’s contents for changes in 
performance and levels of liquidity.  For example, a pool of credit card receivables 
are likely to materialise at a faster pace than mortgages – the behaviour is more 
likely to be different.  Mortgage receivables are long-term whereas, credit card 
receivables are short-term – the payment pattern is different.  The pool of credit card 
receivables needs to be monitored closely so that non-performing or defaulting 
receivables can be weeded out and replaced (through credit enhancement – 
reinvestment) as soon as possible so that the pool’s collateral and cashflow is not 
affected.   
The frequency of this audit depends largely on the term and payment pattern 
of the receivables.  Long term receivables are usually monitored monthly or 
quarterly – a long-term receivable becomes non-performing or defaulting when two 
or more payments have not materialised.  Conversely, short-term receivables 
become non-performing or defaulting when their materialisation falls short of what 
was expected.  A pool of short-term receivables is expected to materialise at a 
predicted pace and generate cashflow in par with the interest and principal 
payments due on the issued bonds.   
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The “collateral audit” only seeks to weed out non-performing and defaulting 
receivables – it is not designed to weed out proceeds of crime or other suspicious 
looking receivables (as confirmed by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, London, interview: 
30th June, 2003),   
 
‘A collateral audit, which is also referred to as a pool audit, is simply a periodic 
process that helps the pool maintain its financial strength.  It is, as you say, not 
designed to catch illegitimate receivables…and I agree with you when you say 
illegitimate receivables are more likely to materialise into cashflow than legitimate 
receivables’. 
 
Thus, any suspicious looking receivables are weeded out because they are 
non-performing or defaulting, and not because they may be proceeds of crime.  
Interestingly, receivables which are in fact proceeds of crime are more likely to 
materialise and generate the income evidenced by manufactured paperwork.  The 
launderer will want to place the proceeds of crime into the financial system.  Thus, in 
a pool of receivables which contains proceeds of crime which will certainly not 
default or be weeded out for non-performance, does the “collateral audit” fail to 
detect proceeds of crime?  It seems it does.   
Both PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Deloitte & Touché recognised the 
author’s view in relation to the shortfall of a “collateral audit” but were not willing to 
admit that they are aware of receivables being mingled deceptively with proceeds of 
crime since this would then put into question their ability to conduct effective due 
diligence.  A forensic accountant at Deloitte & Touché, London, however, admitted 
that (paraphrased), ‘[he/she] would not be surprised if [a] firm unknowingly facilitated 
proceeds of crime to be cleaned in the manner [the author] describes’ (interview: 8th 
July, 2003).  The Transaction Services team at KPMG, London, were also 
approached for their view but their view was not forthcoming.  A member of the team 
said ‘they would email the author with their view’ (interview: 8th July, 2003) but after 
four follow up requests the author concluded that they were reluctant to give any 
assistance.  The Transaction Services team at KPMG, New York, said that the 
author should communicate with their press office – their press office did not 
understand the issue put to them and replied that I should communicate with a 
professional at KPMG (interview: 9th July, 2003).   
According to PriceWaterhouseCoopers, London (interview: 30th June, 2003) 
aside from the “collateral audit” there is no other analysis undertaken by the 
accountant which may detect proceeds of crime in a pool, unless it is ‘frozen and 
investigated’, 
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‘In order to discover possible illegitimate receivables we would have to conduct a 
thorough investigation using our forensic team and technology…this is a time 
consuming exercise which can only be done once the pool is frozen and 
investigated.  Tracking the movements of a changing pool is difficult especially in a 
global financial system’. 
 
Another task undertaken by the accountant is to document the pool’s 
behaviour in annual accounts – how much income was received and how much of 
this was paid out to investors.   
  
5. CONCLUSION 
The essence and purpose of this chapter and this thesis is to expand 
existing knowledge with an original contribution.  Such contribution has been made, 
in part, using empirical research to test the hypothesis: if the activities behind the 
Enron scandal are related to the vulnerabilities of a securitisation transaction, then 
such vulnerabilities may be exploited to the extent that a securitisation transaction 
may facilitate money laundering.  With a good practical understanding of 
securitisation, and the assistance of the professionals mentioned above, the author 
has tested and affirmatively answered the hypothesis, such that the research has 
revealed certain vulnerabilities within a securitisation transaction, vulnerabilities 
which may have played a part in the activities behind the Enron scandal. 
  Financial crime is evolving everyday in response to the changes in law and 
regulation.  The Enron scandal has shown how accountants are clever enough to 
perform magic in financial documents and how lawyers are clever enough to defend 
themselves.  It seems the authorities are too busy chasing the big known criminals 
or suspects and often overlook the inconspicuous criminal hidden behind a fog of 
legitimacy, while the investors, too busy trying to keep afloat in a fluctuating 
economy, overlook certain detail and fail to read between the lines.  Against such 
reality is it safe to say we live in a world where a financial crime is only committed if 
and when the criminal gets caught?   
  
‘Money laundering can only take place where there are sophisticated 
professionals, such as lawyers, accountants and bankers who are willing to 
be actively engaged in criminal acts or simply shut their eyes to the truth’. 
 (Rosalind Wright CB, Director, Serious Fraud Office, lecture: 10th September, 2001) 
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CHAPTER 7 SECURITISATION AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
 
 This final chapter of the work explores the nature of white collar crime as it 
relates to securitisation.  The preceding chapter examined money laundering in the 
context of securitisation which involved empirical research demonstrating how 
securitisation can potentially be manipulated to launder proceeds of crime.  As a 
follow on from that conclusion this chapter, based on certain traditional theories of 
white collar crime, will seek to answer: (1) what are the reasons for those involved to 
take advantage of this vulnerability and commit white collar crime?  (2) who is likely 
to engage in white collar crime? 
  
1. WHAT IS WHITE COLLAR CRIME? 
 The term “white collar crime” was invented by Professor Edwin Sutherland 
(Sutherland, 1949: 3-4) in order to point out weaknesses in typical crime theories 
that considered “social pathology” as the primary explanation behind criminal 
behaviour.  Prior to Sutherland, criminal theory and research had focused on the 
lower classes with confined discussion so that conclusions reached would depict a 
nexus between criminal behaviour and the status of the lower classes.  For 
example, the works inspired by the Chicago School of Sociology: McKay (1930); 
later Shaw and McKay (1942); and those of Robert Merton (1938).  The confinement 
and limitations of the research were, to a certain extent, intentional since at that 
time, and more importantly before Sutherland, the general accepted theory was that 
there is a nexus between low status and criminality.   
Sutherland researched further the notion and nexus of status and criminality 
– his theory on white collar crime was aimed to challenge existing theories and cast 
doubt on the notion that poverty, disturbed home life, and abnormal personalities are 
the root causes of crime.  He introduced the notion of white collar crime in an effort 
to develop a general crime theory that would adequately explain crime in both upper 
and lower classes.  Sutherland argued that members of society occupying positions 
of privilege and status were just as likely to commit crimes as those from the lower 
classes.  Sutherland defined white collar crime as, ‘crime committed by a person of 
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation’ (Sutherland, 
1949: 7).  
This definition attracted much attention – it was supported and developed yet 
also heavily criticised for being vague, inaccurate and wholly inappropriate to the 
extent that ‘if Sutherland merited a Nobel prize, as Mannheim thought, for 
pioneering this field of study, he certainly did not deserve it for the clarity or 
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serviceableness of his definition’ (Nelken, 1996: 123).  So where did Sutherland go 
wrong?   
Firstly, what should be the defining feature of white collar crime – the 
occupational nature of the activities or the social characteristics and status of the 
offender?  This poses the immediate problem of how “high social status” or 
“respectability” are to be defined.  Where is the line to be drawn in the occupational 
hierarchy?  Sutherland did not define “high social status” thus, his definition raises a 
number of possible levels of high status – the aristocracy, the upper classes, the 
middle classes and those who have benefited from social mobility and opportunities.  
Sutherland’s definition, it seems, reflects the type of person who was capable of 
committing white collar crime at the time when Sutherland composed his 
understanding of the subject – ‘a person of respectability and high social status’.  
At the time when this definition was composed, those who held respect and 
high social status were more likely than not to have been well educated.  Thus, 
these persons it seems would have enjoyed employment which would have been 
considered as more skilled and respectable than those undertaken by the lower 
classes.  From Sutherland’s explanation of the subject it can be reasonably deduced 
that white collar crime, as Sutherland perceived it, was only committable by the well 
educated – an intellectually demanding crime.  The method of committing the crime 
was connected with employment – ‘in the course of his occupation’.  It is true that 
white collar crime is usually associated with the crimes of senior management and 
executives but customers and employers can also be defrauded by junior personnel, 
and secretaries can also sell inside information – occupational roles can be abused 
irrespective of status (Mars, 1982: 45-46).  Thus, does Sutherland’s definition only 
reflect white collar crime at the time when he composed it or has it withstood the 
passage of time?  It seems his definition is now somewhat dated. 
 Secondly, Sutherland provides that white collar crime is committable through 
occupation which raises the question: did he perceive that the criminal commits the 
crime during office hours only?  Did he not consider whether white collar crime is 
possible out of office hours and within a personal capacity?  It seems that 
Sutherland limited his discussion of the subject to the social and occupational 
circumstances at the time of writing.  The author agrees that Sutherland, in the 
context and circumstances at the time, originated an interesting theory but with time 
and evolution it is now of limited significance.  Although Sutherland discussed major 
corporations in his research (which he did not name for fear of being sued for libel), 
he failed to recognise that small businesses can also be responsible for similar 
offences.  One view states that ‘white collar crime is not a disease of large 
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businesses…that many medium size firms, partnerships and single owner 
proprietors commit white collar crime’ (Levi and Pithouse, 1991: 56).  For example, 
consumers can be “ripped off” by local corner shops, market stalls or large 
manufacturers, and environmental pollution or safety offences in the workplace can 
be associated with “cowboy” operators or large multinational conglomerates.  
Professor James Coleman expanded on Sutherland's work by defining white 
collar crime as, ‘a violation of the law committed by a person or group of persons in 
the course of an otherwise respected and legitimate occupation or financial activity’ 
(1989: 24).  This definition broadened Sutherland's definition to include individuals of 
all social classes and financial crimes as well as both civil and criminal violations.  
Coleman split white collar crime into “organisational” and “occupational” crime and 
emphasised the difference between “individual” and “corporate perpetrators”.  
According to Coleman, “organisational crime” includes, among others, fraud, tax 
evasion, unfair competition practices, price fixing, unsafe production, bribery and 
corruption.  In contrast, “occupational crime” includes crimes against an employer by 
an employee, embezzlement, computer crime, acceptance of corporate bribes, 
crimes against the public, and crimes against the government.   
 But Coleman’s definition adds ‘financial activity’ to clarify the methods used 
to commit white collar crime.  His definition includes an important point that white 
collar crime is ‘committed by a person or group of persons in the course of an 
otherwise respected and legitimate occupation or financial activity’.  He has 
separated how the crime can be committed – individually or as part of a group.   
Further, the wording ‘in the course of an otherwise respected and legitimate 
occupation or financial activity’ is interesting in that Coleman perceives white collar 
crime as an offence committed outside the scope or boundary of a respected and 
legitimate occupation or financial activity.  The other aforementioned definitions do 
not make this point but simply state that white collar crime is committed in the 
course of an occupation.  Coleman goes further to say that anything done within the 
scope or according to the rules is acceptable but once the criminal act goes beyond 
this it then should be interpreted as a white collar crime, a view shared by Bartol 
(1999). 
Another definition, in Nelken’s view (1996: 364), inspired by the Sutherland 
school of thought is that of Clarke, ‘business crime, however, in the sense it is used 
here, covers a much wider range of misconduct, which may be none the less 
damaging and otherwise undesirable, resulting from duress, incompetence, 
negligence, lack of training, lack of clarity in the rules, opportunism, technical 
infraction, or sheer muddle-headedness, rather than calculated deceit motivated by 
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greed’.  Clarke’s view of white collar crime is that it should be, firstly, called 
“business crime” because it is a crime usually associated with business operations, 
and secondly, that it is not a crime based upon deceit but an act that is caused by 
an individual’s or its employer’s failure to conduct business in a proper manner.   
In response, firstly, why would an act based upon the failure to conduct 
business in a proper manner be a crime?  The legal view is that it is more connected 
with being a civil wrong (if it causes a loss) than a crime.  Secondly, Clarke fails to 
consider that a crime committed in the workplace does not always involve deceit – 
theft and insider trading are examples of crimes where deceit is not part of the act.  
Finally, why call his research “business crime” when he does not view white collar 
crimes committed in the workplace as crimes?     
Professors Marshall Clinard and Richard Quinney (cited in Poveda, 1994: 2) 
offered a definition consisting of two categories: “occupational crime” and “corporate 
crime”, with occupational crime being similar to abuse of trust, and corporate crime 
resembling business crime.  More specifically, the authors explain occupational 
crime as consisting of, ‘offences committed by individuals for themselves in the 
course of their occupations and the offences of employees against their employers’.  
In contrast, corporate crime is defined as, ‘the offences committed by corporate 
officials for the corporation and the offences of the corporation itself’. 
This definition limits white collar crime to offences which a criminal commits 
for him/herself – a self gaining crime.  It is true that a criminal undertakes criminal 
behaviour to gain but this definition excludes those crimes which the criminal may 
be influenced to undertake on another’s behalf with no self gain.  Further, another 
limitation placed in the definition is that it covers offences which an employee will 
commit against the employer – white collar crime can be committed against any 
person or organisation.   
Another definition by Edelhertz (cited by Nelken, 1996) of white collar crime 
focuses more on incorporating elements of fraud into the definition of white collar 
crime, ‘an illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by non-physical means and 
by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss 
of money or property, or to obtain business or personal advantage’.  The definition 
given by Edelhertz should be seen as a giant leap towards an appropriate definition 
that reflects white collar crime.  Edelhertz incorporated the element of fraud into the 
definition and describes white collar crime with more colour.  Firstly, he separated 
criminal acts into physical and non-physical and stated that white collar crime is the 
latter.  Secondly, he recognised that white collar crime can be a single act or part of 
a series – it can be committed as a one-off or a repeated act.  Thirdly, he introduced 
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the mens rea into the definition in that the crime is committable ‘by concealment or 
guile’  – the criminal is aware of the wrongdoing at the outset of the crime.  Fourthly, 
and interestingly he introduced a description of the fruits of the crime – to gain 
something or prevent loss that is beyond what is normal under the circumstances –
‘to obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or 
to obtain business or personal advantage’. 
These newer definitions, however, remove what historically was the major 
feature of white collar crime – its association with high social status.  They also 
make the contents of white collar crime extremely large, incorporating also acts 
usually associated with “blue-collar” occupations.   
On the other hand the definition of white collar crime now has become 
blurred and detracts from what white collar crime originally was.  To a certain extent 
this gives room to develop or refine individual definitions of what white collar crime 
is.  For example, white collar crime can be seen as a wrong, judged by criminal law, 
committed by an individual in the course of their employment and/or which breaches 
a relationship of trust to further their or the employer’s interests or gains.  It should 
be labelled as white collar crime if it infringes criminal law.  It should be renamed 
white collar wrong if it also infringes civil rights. 
This definition is perhaps more workable in the context of securitisation since 
it also incorporates the additional requirement that there may be a relationship of 
trust between the wrongdoer and the victim.  Sutherland’s definition is too dated and 
wholly inappropriate for securitisation purposes since it limits the offenders to high 
status holders.  Coleman’s definition is useful but limits itself to only covering 
criminal acts – it does not cover relationships of trust such as fiduciary duties.  
Clarke’s definition is nothing more than listing individual or corporate 
incompetencies.  Clinard and Quinney, although split white collar crime into two 
categories, still only deal with offences which arguably implies that white collar crime 
does not include breaches of trust – it is a breach of criminal law only.  Professor 
Edelhertz interestingly uses the words ‘concealment or guile’ to depict that the 
criminal can compose a scheme which can mask an illegal act.  His definition 
resembles money laundering.  However, it is debatable whether such scheme to 
mask an illegal act breaches a relationship of trust.  The prima facia view is that his 
wording does not include a relationship of trust, however, does inspire debate as to 
how ‘concealment’ can be defined.  A scheme to mask an illegal act will involve 
more than one party which can imply that there is also a relationship of trust 
between them.   
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The breach of trust is an essential requirement since it expands the 
recognition of an offence or wrong to include acts which fall outside of in the course 
of employment.  The wording “in course of employment” firstly, implies that there 
must be a contract between the employee and the employer (or it can a contract for 
services, i.e., a contractor, or an external party who is employed or under a contract 
of services which are then provided to the firm concerned) – this is vital where the 
employee offends against the employer.  Secondly, it implies that only those acts 
are covered which are done during office hours or the period during which the 
criminal is an “employee”.   
Thirdly, it does not cover any acts done when employment is terminated – for 
example it does not stop an employee selling secrets when he/she is fired.  Finally, 
it does not covers acts done where the criminal takes advantage of his/her or the 
employers reputation, credibility and trust within the industry.   
Incorporating an express breach of trust requirement deals with all these 
shortfalls – an employment contract between the criminal and the victim is not a 
prerequisite for a relationship of trust – it covers all acts done outside of office hours 
or any other period where the criminal is not an “employee” – it covers for a 
reasonable period of time all acts after employment is terminated – it covers acts 
done which take advantage of his/her or the employers reputation, credibility and 
trust within the industry.  
 Such a breach of trust requirement is essential since the professionals who 
abuse securitisation will do so by using the reputation, credibility and trust it enjoys 
within its industry.  For example, the lawyers have no relationship by contract with 
the investors but nevertheless have a relationship of trust implied from the contract 
the lawyer has with the SPV – the investors can sue for (professional) negligence 
regardless of any contractual nexus. 
 
2. THEORIES OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 
Given the large body of theoretical literature that exists in this field, namely, 
traditional, modern and post-modern, the following highlights the traditional theories 
of white collar crime.  
 
1. Social Learning Theory   
Sutherland developed the theory of “differential association” in an effort to 
explain crime across the social strata.  This theory proposes that crime is a 
behaviour learnt in “intimate personal groups” and is a function of contact with 
criminal and non-criminal patterns of behaviour.  Further, the theory suggests that 
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an individual will acquire the behavioural/cultural patterns that surround him/her 
unless he/she is exposed to an alternative or conflicting behaviour.  In that case, 
criminal behaviour will emerge only if or when criminal associations exceed non-
criminal ones (Croall, 1992).   
Finally, criminal behaviour is viewed as a function of frequency, duration, 
priority, and intensity of negative associations (Povenda, 1994: 56).  Thus, 
“intelligent community” (a term used to describe those who are educated and live 
within the accepted social morals yet may be vulnerable to falling short of social 
morals) employees who work alongside peers engaged in employee theft, security 
violations, or treason may view the behaviour as an acceptable option with limited 
risk of detection or punishment.   
In order to account for group, community, and national differences in crime, 
Sutherland included concepts of “culture conflict and social disorganization”.  In 
other words, Sutherland suggested that communities with a higher level of social 
disorganisation experience higher crime rates, with social disorganisation taking the 
form of "anomie" (a sense of normlessness or uncertainty about right/wrong) or 
"culture conflict" where competing norms dictate different behaviours in the same 
situation.  
 
2. Anomie/Strain Theory   
Although “strain theory” was formulated to explain lower class crime and 
urban gang delinquency, this theory was subsequently applied as an alternative 
criminological theory to the explanation of white collar crime.  In its original form, 
strain was viewed as the result of the ‘unequal distribution of means to achieve 
success’ (Nelken, 1996: 157).  This theory was originally inspired by Merton’s theory 
on anomie which proposed that white collar crime was an innovative response by 
business personnel to the strain of surviving in difficult times (Gottfredson and 
Hirschi, 1990: 78).  Personnel would cut corners in order to maintain levels of 
profitability which criminological theory described and justified as “strain”.  This 
theory further proposes that strain – limited access to legitimate means of 
advancement – fosters crime as an alternate path to survival.   
In its application to white collar crime, this theory suggests that the 
competitive marketplace creates a similar kind of strain, which in turn leads 
individuals to engage in questionable behaviour in the pursuit of profits, market 
share, acquisition of desired information, and/or individual advancement.   
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3. Rationalisation and Control Theory  
This theory provides that deviance results when individuals can rationalise 
their actions and avoid the sense of right and wrong about their behaviour. 
Rationalisation (or justification or neutralisation) is seen as the means by which 
individuals "neutralise" their commitment to conventional values and permit 
themselves to engage in questionable behaviour without seeing themselves as 
criminal or deviant (Duffield and Grabowsky, 1984).  According to this theory, 
“neutralisation” occurs prior to the commission of the act in question and in fact 
serves as part of the motivation for the act.  For example, employee theft may be 
motivated and neutralised by the belief that occasional workplace "theft" is just 
compensation for a meager salary and benefits package.   
Neutralisation theory helps to understand the individual and situational 
causes of crime, as neutralisation allows for the commission of an offence in the 
face of and regardless of contradictory normative expectations.  Criminological 
research, for example, Coleman (1989) has revealed several neutralisations, 
including the belief that the action was not criminal because it did not hurt/damage 
the victim; represented borrowing with the intent to return/repay the debt; was 
necessary for survival within a competitive economy; was common practice; the 
employee was entitled to such fringe benefits or compensatory income.    
“Control theory” asserts the importance of interpersonal bonds in buffering 
individuals against criminal involvement.  More specifically, this theory provides that 
crime is a ‘human drive that will emerge unless internal drives are 
curbed/channelled by external social forces’ (Coleman, 1989: 79).  Righteousness is 
maintained by bonds to society, family, peers, church, school, and neighbourhood.  
As these bonds weaken, the risk of involvement in criminal behaviour increases.   
 
4. Integrationist Theory  
This theory focuses on the "culture of competition" as the primary source of 
motivation for white collar crime.  According to Coleman (1989: 203-204) the culture 
of competition is ‘characterised by an intense desire for wealth and success and an 
overwhelming fear of failure’.  Corporations within a capitalistic culture encourage 
the ‘values, attitudes, and personality structures conducive to white collar crime’ and 
thus, ‘ensure an ample supply of potential violators’.  In some instances, 
‘occupational positions virtually force their occupants to violate the law in order to 
succeed’.  Thus, individuals with hard-driving personalities that value success above 
all else are likely to seek out competitive corporate environments, enjoy career 
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advancement, and possess a greater risk for involvement in criminal activities in the 
conduct of their work duties.  
Coleman asserts that the fear of failure/loss of status is a primary motivator 
for white collar criminals and offers three necessary conditions for the commission of 
white collar crime – motivation, ability to neutralise ethical standards that inhibit 
criminal behaviour, and access to criminal opportunities.  Coleman further believes 
that financial motivations are the trigger for white collar crime involvement.  He notes 
that a bulk of white collar crime is motivated by the fear of losing one's status and 
success and not just the greedy desire to acquire wealth without work.   
Further, Coleman proposes that the distribution of opportunities for 
occupational crime is largely determined by the legal system and its approach to the 
prosecution of crime, in other words, lax sentencing of white collar crimes sends a 
message of tolerance thus, increasing perceived opportunity among potential 
criminals.   
 
3. THEORIES AND SECURITISATION 
 So how do these traditional theories of criminological behaviour apply to a 
comparatively new subject like securitisation?  What motivates the originator and the 
professionals involved to undertake a white collar crime?  As stated in the preceding 
chapter, securitisation is exposed to vulnerabilities in the financial system within 
which it lives.   
 The preceding chapter demonstrated one key financial crime which 
securitisation potentially facilitates, namely, money laundering.  This vulnerability 
can be at different levels within the financial system and can either hide behind a 
mask of legitimacy, alternatively, be overlooked due to the trust, reputation and 
credibility that foster relations and transactions within the financial community.  The 
theories of white collar crime apply to behaviours which exist within a professional 
environment and seek to provide some justification for such behaviours.  There are 
also theories which seek to analyse the psychological reasons behind white collar 
crime, however, this discussion shall only focus on linking the mentioned theories 
with potential crimes involving securitisation.   
 Securitisation is a financing technique which is perhaps more technical and 
involved than its alternatives like equity offerings.  There are two key transactions 
which materialise with the assistance of numerous professionals.  The discussion 
and empirical research in the preceding chapter demonstrated how the originator 
can launder proceeds of crime – mingling them with legitimate receivables in order 
to place them into the financial system.  
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4. WHY WOULD THE ORIGINATOR ABUSE SECURITISATION? 
It seems that Sutherland’s theory on “differential association” can assist to 
provide some justification for the criminal originator’s desire to use and abuse a 
legitimate financing technique to launder proceeds of crime.  Using Sutherland’s 
theory of differential association criminal behaviour is learnt – individuals will learn 
how to offend in the context of their criminal associations (Croall, 1992: 89).  For 
example, a graduate may grow up in a family environment that allows a low risk of 
learning how to offend.  During this period the graduate is exposed to good ethics 
and practice.  However, upon entering employment he finds that many of his 
colleagues are corrupt and engaging white collar crime.  These associations 
coupled with the need to establish a customary lifestyle may override the honest 
way of life which he has hitherto learnt. 
Sutherland further proposed that the criminal is more likely to commit a crime 
unless he/she is exposed to an alternative or conflicting behaviour.  In other words 
and in the context of securitisation, the originator will desire to launder the proceeds 
of crime unless it is faced with or is influenced by legitimate behaviour.  However, 
this is not entirely true when applied to an originator seeking to abuse securitisation.     
Money laundering occurs when the financial system is used and abused to 
such an extent that dirty money is cleaned and given a legitimate appearance.  The 
launderer is motivated to do this by his desire to keep the money generated from the 
illegal activities.  Tougher rules also motivate the launderer to become more 
adaptable, evasive, and professional looking.  The author believes such motivations 
would certainly drive the commission of the offence regardless of any exposure to 
an alternative or conflicting behaviour.  Levi and Pithouse (1991: 122) believe that 
regulations, although attempt to hinder or eliminate criminality, also act as a 
motivating factor which allows the criminal to test his/her ability to evade detection.  
However, according to Professor Stotland (1999) white collar crime is not motivated 
solely by financial gain.  He reports that motives and reasons for committing white 
collar crime are more connected with desire for money, threat of loss, sense of 
superiority, ego and power.  In other words, greed alone is not the motivating factor 
to commit a crime.  If applied to money laundering Stotland is proposing that greed 
alone does not drive the launderer – it is also a threat of loss, achieving a sense of 
superiority and feeding the ego that will drive the laundering.  This means that a 
criminal (the launderer) has no respect for the authorities or rules since such respect 
will inevitably impede achieving a sense of superiority and power, confirming Levi 
and Pithouse’s view.   
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 The rules in place which outlaw money laundering and more specifically the 
money laundering officer within an organisation can be seen as the exposure to an 
alternative or conflicting behaviour under Sutherland’s theory.  However, money 
laundering is still a major global concern even with such rules and officers in place.  
Thus, it seems that a launderer will still be motivated to launder the proceeds of 
crime but will do so in an evasive manner that appears professional and legitimate – 
this is where it seems Stotland’s theory is triggered – launder money in an evasive 
and clever manner to show disrespect for the rules and authorities and achieve a 
sense of superiority and power.  For example, the professionals involved in the 
Enron scam all knew what they were doing – mens rea was shown to exist (Powers, 
2002).  They all knew that an alternative and conflicting behaviour existed but were 
motivated to ignore this behaviour.  It would be improper and unsafe to say that the 
Enron professionals had criminal associations similar to what Sutherland theorised 
but it is proper and safe to say that part of what Sutherland theorised holds some 
truth when examining the Enron scam – an alternative and conflicting behaviour was 
visible but ignored (perhaps to achieve a sense of superiority and power.)   
Sutherland also mentioned what he described as the “intelligent community” 
and how these individuals can be influenced by work peers to the extent that 
criminal behaviour is not criminal but an acceptable option.  Although Sutherland 
does not mention what level of professionals he refers to as the vulnerable, the 
author believes that Sutherland refers to those who view their peers as their equals.   
The reason for this belief is that such employees are driven by hunger to succeed, 
and as Sutherland proposes, can be influenced to view criminality as an acceptable 
option.  This is supported by Stotland’s theory that criminals commit white collar 
crime to achieve a sense of superiority – those who are junior and take instructions 
do not have the desire to achieve superiority because they accept the hierarchy in 
the workplace.  However, those who view their peers as equals do have the desire 
to gain the edge and become superior (Stotland, 1999).   
Further, the “integrationist” theory adds some fuel to the debate in that the 
culture of competition is ‘characterised by an intense desire for wealth and success 
and an overwhelming fear of failure;.  Corporations within a capitalistic culture 
encourage the ‘values, attitudes, and personality structures conducive to white collar 
crime’ and thus, ‘ensure an ample supply of potential violators’.  In some instances, 
‘occupational positions virtually force their occupants to violate the law in order to 
succeed’ (Coleman, 1989: 203-4).  Thus, individuals are recruited with hard-driving 
personalities that value success are likely to seek out competitive corporate 
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environments, enjoy career advancement, and possess a greater risk for 
involvement in criminal activities in the conduct of their work duties.   
Applying this to an originator planning to launder proceeds of crime using 
securitisation, it seems that its employees would be classed as the vulnerable who 
are influenced to rule any suspicious activity as acceptable.  Weisburd (1985) 
provides that ‘white collar criminals do not view their actions as criminal and 
themselves as criminals and that the reasons for committing the crime were to 
further the interests of the company’ (cited in Nelken, 1996). 
This view can be attributed to the “rationalisation” theory which proposes that 
“neutralisation” occurs prior to the commission of the crime in question and serves 
as part of the motivation for the crime.  Rationalisation theory helps to understand, 
from a psychological perspective, the individual and situational causes of crime, as 
neutralisation allows for the commission of an offence in the face of and regardless 
of contradictory normative expectations.  Criminological research, for example, 
Coleman (1989) has revealed several neutralisations, including the belief that the 
action was not criminal because it did not hurt/damage the victim; represented 
borrowing with the intent to return/repay the debt; was necessary for survival within 
a competitive economy; was common practice; the employee was entitled to such 
fringe benefits or compensatory income.   
This theory it seems would apply to the criminal behaviour of the originator 
who uses securitisation to launder proceeds of crime.  Regardless of the rules in 
place and the various deterrents, the criminal originator is still motivated to launder 
the proceeds of crime because it “neutralises” the guilt and awareness of its actions 
before committing the crime by believing that it is not committing an offence.  It 
seems the neutralisation occurs because it believes that the risk it is taking while 
laundering justifies keeping the proceeds of crime when they are cleaned.  To fully 
comprehend the neutralisation process requires extending this discussion to 
psychological theories and understanding more about why and how the guilt and 
awareness of criminality can be suppressed.  This extension is beyond the scope of 
this chapter.  However, suffice it is to say that the rationalisation theory would apply 
to the criminal originator.    
However, laundering is a crime that is hidden behind a fog created by falsity 
and those who assist to generate this fog may not be aware the criminal nature of 
their assistance.  It seems Weisburd’s theory is limited to the employee knowing that 
it is doing wrong and consequently denying the criminality of the action.  Where the 
employee is in the dark, influence may be applied upon these individuals so that 
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their enquiries into what they are expected to do are minimised – in other words, 
they do not ask questions if they suspect anything.   
A good example of this is Robin Greenburg of Western Woman’s Group Pty 
Ltd who used her high status position as a qualified company director to defraud her 
clients of million of dollars.  This was achieved by hiring employees that could not 
challenge her authority even though some of the employees were innocent 
accessories (Brown, 2001).  In later research this was interestingly reintroduced and 
described as “sychophant association” and that such employees become organised 
conformists who are easily dominated (Duffield and Grabowsky, 2001).  The extent 
of whether this is true can be gauged from recruitment policies of organisations 
particularly where behavioural analysis is undertaken as part of the interview.   
Big organisations place a lot of emphasis on recruiting the right person who 
can fit into the organisation as opposed to recruiting the right person who can do the 
job (Luhmann, 1979).  For this reason behavioural analysis has become a major 
part of the interview process where employees are asked questions about how they 
would respond to given situations and from their answers recruitment managers can 
assess their suitability and the extent of them conforming to the organisation’s 
values and procedures (Beare, 1996).  Beare believes that behavioural analysis 
tests are designed and used by organisations to look beyond the resume and into 
the mind of the applicant.  His discussion, in short, also alleges that such testing 
allows the criminals within the organisation to use test results when conspiring to 
commit white collar crime.  The author’s view is that behavioural analysis can be 
used to find employees who can be easily conformed thus, achieving what Duffield 
and Grabowsky theorise.    
Whether this influence and such theory go beyond the originator’s 
employees is an interesting question which can be answered affirmatively.  Each 
organisation recruits individuals who fit into the corporate structure and can conform 
easily to its values and culture.  Again, behaviour analysis assists in recruiting the 
right individuals.  Although occupational psychology is outside the scope of this 
discussion, the theory of behavioural analysis can be borrowed to demonstrate how 
organisations recruit and more importantly the reason behind the recruitment.  
Professors Duffield and Grabowsky’s theory is an excellent contribution and 
elaboration of the reasons behind recruiting particular individuals.  They say that a 
corporate is likely to recruit an individual who can be moulded into the employee the 
employers wants.  New entrants, particularly graduates, are susceptible to the 
training which primarily conforms the individual into the ideal employee.  And further 
such an individual balances its needs for employment with the level of conformity it 
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endures and will often conform easily.  Thus, Professors Duffield and Grabowsky’s 
theory, in the author’s view, can be extended to cover all professionals who are 
recruited by organisations involved in a typical securitisation deal.   
In conclusion, Sutherland has made a valuable point which applies to those 
engaged in a securitisation transaction – that professionals are given an alternative 
option which may prevent criminality.  Additionally, that an employee can be 
influenced to view criminality as an acceptable option in certain circumstances 
where the employee may lose the possibility of achieving success. 
 
5. WHY WOULD OTHER PROFESSIONALS ABUSE SECURITISATION? 
What motivates individuals to conform and become white collar criminals?  
Each of the professionals instructed to facilitate the securitisation are governed by 
their own motives, organisational and occupational characteristics and culture.  For 
example, the banker will be driven by its own motives, organisational and 
occupational characteristics and culture which would differ from that of the lawyers 
involved.  The hunger to succeed within the banker’s organisation differs from that of 
a lawyer within a law firm instructed to handle the legalities of the securitisation. 
Though the element of hunger is inherent in each organisation, the manner 
in which it is exposed and the paths to realising goals differ considerably.  A junior 
lawyer is aiming for partnership and seeks to impress the seniors whereas in a bank 
the junior member of the securitisation team is driven by bonuses – the junior is 
aware that a senior position is only available once a vacancy is created thus, 
concentrates on increasing his/her bonus.  The juniors thus, have different motives 
and goals which will reflect in the influence they open themselves up to.   
In contrast, this needs to be balanced with the nature of their respective 
duties within the securitisation transaction.  If the professional is not aware of the 
criminality of his/her actions, is it proper to apply Sutherland’s theory that unless it is 
exposed to an alternative or conflicting behaviour such professional will conform to 
what the employer expects and commit a white collar crime?  It seems the answer is 
no – the employee is not given the opportunity to accept or view his/her actions as 
acceptable if the employee does not know that such actions are criminal.  
Sutherland’s theory it seems works when the employee has some suspicion or is 
aware that the actions which the employer is expecting involves criminality, but due 
to external influences (work peers) conforms to the extent that it becomes 
acceptable to undertake such actions.    
Does Professor Stotland’s theory (white collar crime is not motivated solely 
by financial gain but more connected with desire for money, threat of loss, sense of 
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superiority, ego and power) apply to professionals other than the originator?  It 
seems that Stotland’s theory works according to the hierarchy within the 
organisation.  Junior personnel are not striving to demonstrate ego or superiority.  
They are focused on producing results which will promote them up the career 
ladder.  However, those who view their peers as equals do have the desire to gain 
the edge and become superior.  In the author’s view these would be team leaders or 
senior management who strive to produce a comparatively bigger result for the 
organisation than junior members.  
The “strain” theory provides an interesting reason for white collar crime.  The 
theory proposes that a competitive marketplace creates a kind of strain which 
contributes to the reason why individuals engage in questionable behaviour in the 
pursuit of profits, market share, acquisition of desired information, and/or individual 
advancement (Poveda, 1994).  Though Poveda discusses at length about how 
competition drives corporations to cut corners (reference is made to a study 
involving major car manufacturers in the US who pressurised their car dealers to 
operate even if they had to cut corners in order to survive economically), he does 
however, fail to mention what the author believes is a significant point that pro-
competitive policies of nations in fact cause corporation to become competitive 
which then, in turn, sparks off what Poveda proposes – competition triggers the 
strain to survive.  Pro-competition policies have introduced competition or anti-trust 
legislation in most common law jurisdictions with developed economies that can 
support and drive competition.  Thus, any strain in the market which may ultimately 
lead corporations to cut corners must be attributed to these policies before sinking 
into the theory that Poveda proposes – a point Poveda fails to mention.   
 However, does the strain theory apply to professionals engaged in a 
securitisation transaction?  It seems the answer would depend very much on the 
organisation’s behaviour and culture.  Each professional organisation instructed to 
handle key duties is governed by its own industry’s competition forces which would 
influence the level of competitiveness the organisation undertakes in order to 
survive.  Additionally, competition is also driven in part by economic conditions – 
slow conditions would cause the organisation to streamline its operations and 
operate more efficiently.   
 Balanced with this competitive force is the duty to operate in accordance with 
the law and the rules of professional ethics.  Thus, it seems that in order to answer 
the question whether professionals in a securitisation transaction would be affected 
by the strain theory, one must look at the balance between competition forces and 
legal and professional duties – balance competition forces with legal and 
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professional duties.  Poveda fails to mention this point and focuses his discussion 
on the competition forces and the extent to which professionals would be influenced 
to undertake questionable behaviour. 
 The banker, the lawyers and the accountants involved are market leading 
organisations which experience competition forces daily.  Their organisational 
structure and operations are carefully monitored internally so that their market share 
and turnover does not take an unexpected drop.  Thus, organisations it seems 
promote their level of professionalism and expertise alongside maintaining their key 
clientele.  But how far would they go?  One commentator says that ‘corporations are 
criminogenic because if legal means are blocked they will resort to illegal means so 
as to maintain or increase profitability’ (Box, 1984: 258).  This can be true if it is the 
originator who is planning to use securitisation to launder proceeds of crime.  But to 
extend this beyond the criminal originator and say, in the absence of empirical 
research, other professionals involved would behave similarly would be unsafe and 
a mere generalisation.  It is however, believed that professionals working for 
powerful corporations learn to justify questionable behaviour on the basis that 
business is business (Pearce, 1976).  Moreover, Professor Punch believes that 
‘organisations may create climates where collective deviance is an acceptable 
answer to perceived institutional dilemmas, and where organisational culture, 
resources and facilities are intrinsic to the development of the deviance’ (Punch, 
lecture: 17-19th April, 1991, cited in Nelken, 1996).   
It is interesting that he uses the word “collective” to say that any intention to 
and actually undertake white collar crime is a group effort which they justify to 
themselves easily because each individual involved is supported by his/her work 
peers which, it seems softens the guilt – and perhaps softens the guilt to the point 
that Weisburd concludes – ‘white collar criminals do not view their actions as 
criminal and themselves as criminals and that the reasons for committing the crime 
were to further the interests of the company’.   
But would such professionals risk so much just to achieve profit?  The 
answer, author believes, starts by saying that professional organisations would only 
in great exceptional circumstances risk their reputation and undertake questionable 
behaviour just to profit.  Further, as some research shows some big organisations 
with so much to lose will ensure that they abide by the law.  This research, although 
not directly relevant to securitisation and perhaps dated, nevertheless shows how 
corporations will, in the face of competition, still act with the law and the rules of 
professional ethics – US pharmaceutical companies who act according to what the 
Federal Drug Administration expects, ensure that they maintain the lucrative 
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markets in which they are authorised to test and sell their drugs.  Abiding by the law 
and rules of professional ethics ensure that corporations do not lose their credibility 
and reputation in an industry in which they wish to develop or maintain their 
dominance (Braithwaite, 1984).  A damaged reputation can certainly impact upon 
profitability and lead to a loss of key clientele – Enron exposed the questionable and 
unprofessional activities of some Arthur Andersen executives which resulted in 
unreparable damage.   
Additionally, the introduction of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) aims to 
ensure that professionals in vulnerable industries are compelled to report suspicious 
or questionable behaviour.  A cynical response to this policy is that any report made 
is made to an internal officer who may not be independent from the questionable 
culture of the organisation.  In the absence of any updated reported statistics it is 
difficult to say whether the policy behind SARs is in fact working.  But the effect of 
this policy to compel employees to report certain activities needs to be balanced 
with a reluctance to report certain activities if such reporting will stifle the employee’s 
success.   
However, this point should be balanced with Professor Mars’ view which 
concludes that ‘perks, fiddles and neglecting regulations that can be seen as 
cumbersome and slowing down the pace of work may be undertaken to keep up 
with production schedules or to secure a fair day’s pay’ (Mars, 1982: 98).  So it 
seems the duty to abide by rules is balanced with the duty to effectively produce 
results – and the author concludes that professionals may be forced to waver in 
favour of producing results and not place the same amount of emphasis on the 
rules.   
A securitisation transaction is a specialism which is practised by market 
leaders in a given profession.  The author believes that such professionals would 
balance the risk of losing their credibility and reputation with producing results for 
the employer.  Any questionable behaviour would be done inconspicuously to such 
an extent that the professionals use their credibility, reputation and name to mask 
the questionable or suspicious element of their actions.  Doing it this way, however, 
places the professionals in a dangerous position in that they have more to lose.  
Firstly, the very credibility, reputation and name they use to mask the white collar 
crime can be damaged irreparably – Arthur Anderson is a good example.  Secondly, 
such use implies deception.  Thus, where the professionals are operating in a niche 
market any damage can rock the boat of the whole industry – investors may lose 
faith in the securitisation market.   
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By operating in a niche market these professionals are still subjected to the 
market’s forces of competition and this would trigger Stotland’s theory – that motives 
and reasons for committing white collar crime are more connected with desire for 
money, threat of loss, sense of superiority, ego and power.  But does this theory 
apply to an organisation operating in a niche market?  The answer would depend on 
the whether one follows Stotland’s school of thought.  The author believes that in a 
niche market this theory would still apply even though the professionals and any 
potential offenders have more to lose in terms of market share.  A niche market 
allows a small group of players to enjoy the fruits of that niche market, and 
maintaining credibility, reputation, trust and name is vital in order to remain a player.  
Thus, it would be highly damaging to risk one’s credibility, reputation, trust and 
name particularly if operating in a niche market.   
However, the vulnerability of securitisation which the author exposed in the 
preceding chapter is such that it has very little, if any, chance of detection.  
Proceeds of crime which are mingled with legitimate receivables cannot be detected 
unless a very detailed audit of the pool of receivables is conducted.  But a detailed 
audit may not detect the proceeds of crime since paperwork can be manufactured or 
manipulated.  Additionally, such proceeds of crime are more likely to materialise into 
cashflow than legitimate receivables because the launderer wants to get the 
proceeds into the financial system – thus, what loss can this cause to investors?  
Given that securitisation can be abused in this way and the chances of detection are 
low, it can be successfully believed that professionals operating in a niche market 
can be tempted to play along with the abuse.  In other words, there is nothing 
stopping them from committing a white collar crime when their reasons are more 
connected with desire for money, threat of loss, sense of superiority, ego and power. 
Returning to the question of whether professionals in a securitisation 
transaction would be affected by the strain theory, the answer it seems derives from 
balancing competition forces with duties to act lawfully and professionally.  There 
are strong motives to act within the law and according to ethics in order to maintain 
credibility, reputation, trust and name within a given industry.  There is also a proper 
system in place which allows individuals to report questionable activities to the 
authorities.   However, against this is the desire of employees to succeed within their 
organisation, and reporting, although encouraged by employers, can also have a 
detrimental impact if the employers are engaged in questionable behaviour – 
grassing on the boss may be dangerous.   
In contrast, the competition forces also dictate the level of questionable 
activity undertaken in an organisation.  But it seems that since securitisation is a 
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specialism practised by the market leaders, only these market leaders are running 
the race to secure profitability.  In practice, these market leaders will have an 
established client base which would instruct them in the absence of any major 
fallout.  Thus, external competition forces are still dictating the professional’s 
behaviour.  Internal competition forces also exist which can cause fellow employees 
to be competitive with each other.  Thus, it seems the strain theory does apply to the 
securitisation market and may lead a professional to cut corners or contribute to 
questionable activities.   
Does the “rationalisation” theory apply to other professionals?  The short 
answer, and perhaps a generalisation, is that it does apply to other professionals.  In 
order for a professional to engage in what it knows and believes is a criminal activity 
it must be confronted with an alternative path – the right path and the wrong path.  
The moment the professional chooses to commit the offence is the exact moment 
when the rationalisation theory is triggered and explains the suppression of the guilt 
and awareness of criminality.  The professional neutralises the guilt and awareness 
of criminality by believing that what it is doing is not criminal – it seems it too 
believes that the reward it is to receive is justified by the risk it is taking.   
An interesting point can be made in respect of whether the theory has full 
impact on the criminal acts of the lawyer involved.  On the one hand the lawyer is 
fully aware of the rules in place and what the right path is.  In contrast, any 
neutralisation that occurs can be the result of “lawyerly thinking” – cleverly 
manipulating the rules so that they read in accordance with the lawyer’s actions.  So 
does the theory apply to the lawyer?  It seems where the lawyer can justify its 
criminality by believing that it is not committing a crime because the rules do not 
make it a crime – interpret the rules in accordance with the act – then the theory 
would not apply.   
The theory, it seems, applies only when the person knows an alternative 
path but chooses not to follow it because he/she believes the crime is justified for 
some reason.  The alternative path is the act of avoiding criminality.  So an 
employee who thinks about dishonestly appropriating property belonging to his/her 
employer is faced with two options, either appropriate the property or choose not to 
do so.  The alternative path here is choosing not to appropriate.   
Likewise, a lawyer can report any suspicious activity to the authorities or 
choose not to do so.  The alternative path is to act lawfully and report the suspicious 
activity.  The lawyer, however, can interpret the alternative path as not being an 
alternative path.  For example, a lawyer must report any suspicious activity to the 
authorities.  Though the client/lawyer privilege is triggered, the lawyer must override 
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this and report any money laundering activity which it believes its client is engaged 
in.  However, the rules only require the lawyer to report what it suspects or knows 
which, in short, may be met by reasonable due diligence – the rules only require the 
lawyer to act reasonably.  The test under the rules is however, subjective (do the 
authorities believe the lawyer acted reasonably?).   
Thus, it seems that reasonable due diligence may hide the alternative path – 
after conducting due diligence the lawyer did not suspect anything therefore there 
was no need to report anything and consequently there was no alternative path.  In 
contrast, where due diligence has not been exercised correctly then it seems an 
alternative path exists.  So in conclusion it seems that this theory does not have the 
same impact on the lawyer as it does on other professionals – the accountants and 
bankers do have an alternative path just like any employee would have.  The lawyer 
however, can manipulate the alternative path.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS   
 The author concludes his reasons why an originator and the professionals 
would use and abuse securitisation to launder proceeds of crime as follows: 
 
1. Securitisation is a complex financing process which involves two complex 
transactions and several professionals.  The complexity of securitisation and the 
credibility and reputation of the securitisation market both help to mask an important 
vulnerability which an originator can potentially abuse.  The originator is more likely 
to abuse a process which it believes will facilitate its laundering process.  There is a 
very low risk of detection, if any.  The professionals involved are known widely and 
hold undoubtful credibility.  To undertake a detailed audit of the pool is not possible 
given the timetable of a typical securitisation.  False receivables can be 
manufactured.  Proceeds of crime mingled with legitimate receivables are more 
likely to materialise into cashflow.  If investors lose out then blame lies with the 
underlying obligors and the professionals who composed the securitisation.  Thus, 
which criminal would not want to abuse a process that has such vulnerabilities?   
 
2. In the context of securitisation and more specifically, money laundering, 
Professor Sutherland’s theory is nothing more than a good introduction to white 
collar crime.  Sutherland theorised that criminality is learnt through association with 
criminals and this association will dictate the development of criminal characteristics.  
Sutherland believed that unless an alternative and conflicting behaviour was 
introduced to the individual, the individual is more likely to develop criminal 
characteristics which would ultimately lead to participation in white collar crime.  The 
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author accepts this theory to the extent that criminality is more likely to be learnt 
through association but disapproves Sutherland’s point that an alternative and 
conflicting behaviour can prevent criminality.  Money laundering is a crime that has 
grown regardless of what rules have been introduced.  Launderers cleverly work 
around the rules.  Thus, if such rules are seen as the alternative and conflicting 
behaviour then it seems that the growing concern relating to, and the reported facts 
about money laundering refutes Sutherland’s point.   
 
3. Professor Stotland introduced what, the author believes, is a good 
explanation for why white collar crime may be undertaken.  Stotland theorised that 
the criminal commits the crime because there is a desire for money and superiority, 
and a threat of loss.  This helps to explain why a launderer participates in the 
laundering process.  The launderer wants to keep the proceeds of crime that have 
been generated through illegal activity – this is the desire for money and the threat 
of loss.  The justification for keeping the proceeds of crime is the high risk the 
launderer is taking when generating and cleaning such proceeds.  Stotland also 
adds that the criminal undertakes the white collar crime in order to achieve a sense 
of superiority – this, it seems, again refutes Sutherland’s point on the alternative and 
conflicting behaviour preventing criminality.  The launderer would still launder the 
proceeds even though there are rules in place, and in part would do so to achieve a 
sense of superiority – he has cleverly worked around the rules and evaded 
detection. 
 
4. It is important to also understand how white collar crime seems to develop 
within an organisation given that there are rules in place which aim to prevent such 
behaviour.  There are theories that attribute to the development of white collar crime 
within an organisation.  The author believes that organisations which desire to 
commit white collar crime will do so in an environment which it has developed itself 
– organisations will recruit individuals who can be easily moulded to work in its 
culture and environment.  This was researched by Professors Duffield and 
Grabowsky who conclude that that a corporate is likely to recruit an individual who 
can be moulded into the employee the employers wants.  The author also 
highlighted the case of Robin Greenburg.  Once conforming individuals are recruited 
they are then exposed to the culture of competition which is characterised by an 
intense desire for wealth and success and an overwhelming fear of failure to the 
extent that occupational positions virtually force their occupants to violate the law in 
order to succeed.  Weisburd goes further to say that where criminality becomes part 
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of the workload then ‘white collar criminals do not view their actions as criminal and 
themselves as criminals and that the reasons for committing the crime were to 
further the interests of the company’.  But Weisburd’s theory is limited to the 
employee knowing that it is doing wrong and consequently denying the criminality of 
the action.  This research, however, also demonstrates the extent to which 
employees would push themselves within the culture of competition which would 
trigger the “rationalisation” theory.  This theory it seems would apply to the criminal 
behaviour of the originator who uses securitisation to launder proceeds of crime.  
Regardless of the rules in place and the various deterrents, the criminal originator is 
still motivated to launder the proceeds of crime because it “neutralises” the guilt and 
awareness of its actions before committing the crime by believing that it is not 
committing an offence.  Thus, the structure and culture are important contributing 
characteristics which dictate the level, if any, of white collar crime committed by the 
organisation and its employees.  
 
7. WHO IS LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN WHITE COLLAR CRIME? 
 White collar crime theories have also been developed and extended to 
answer the question: who is likely to engage in white collar crime?  Although, it 
important to have an understanding of what motivates criminality and how this 
understanding relates to securitisation, the author believes it is equally important to 
have an understanding of the type of individual who is likely to drift into criminality 
when involved in a securitisation transaction.  The crime which anyone involved in a 
securitisation is capable of committing is that of money laundering. 
 A good starting point for the discussion is to look at the types of 
organisations which actually involve themselves in this complex transaction.  Earlier 
parts of this work mentioned that bankers, trading corporations, accountants, 
lawyers, and credit rating agencies are actively involved in a typical securitisation 
transaction.  It would be unsafe and perhaps defamatory to generalise that these 
individuals would certainly abuse securitisation to launder proceeds of crime.  
However, history has given examples which inspires thought and causes a closer 
look at these individuals and their duties.   
 For example, the failure of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(BCCI) exposed a number of key points and vulnerabilities - BCCI's criminality 
included fraud and money laundering operations in Europe, Africa, Asia and the 
Americas.  Among BCCI's mechanisms for committing crimes were its use of shell 
corporations and bank confidentiality and secrecy havens; layering of corporate 
structures; its use of front-men and nominees, guarantees and buy-back 
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arrangements; back-to-back financial documentation among BCCI controlled 
companies; and bribes.  This highly publicised criminal operation teaches us that 
bankers are capable of laundering money in the face of rules and regulations.  It 
teaches us that professionalism is not always a squeaky clean image.  It teaches us 
that those involved in criminality are determined to achieve what they set out to 
achieve.  Additionally, Enron exposed more vulnerabilities of the financial system 
and reinforced the belief that criminals too can dress up in nice suits and hold a 
respectable office.   
 So what type of person becomes vulnerable to drifting into criminality?  The 
discussion on the motives can be integrated into or linked with a discussion on the 
type of person likely to become a white collar criminal.  In other words, what type of 
person is more likely to be motivated to drift into criminality?  The author believes 
that if motives can be understood then this can indicate the type of person who will 
stoop to criminality.  But what should be considered first - their motives or their 
personality in order to ascertain the type of person more likely to assist in laundering 
proceeds of crime?  For example, what type of personality is likely to fall prey to 
internal competition and resort to criminality in order to succeed?  Aside from 
personality other factors should be brought into the debate – gender and situational 
influences.  This broadens the debate so that a better understanding of issue can be 
achieved. 
 
1. Personality  
 Researchers have studied the ways in which certain personality 
characteristics interact with “situational variables” and result in occupational crime.  
It is believed that ‘personality characteristics shape behaviour by moderating 
decision-making in the face of unique contextual influences’ (Terpstra et al., 127(4): 
375-389).  Moreover, the following variables lead to involvement in criminality: 
interpersonal competitiveness, narcissism, impulsivity, external locus of control, high 
need for achievement/praise, low self-esteem, and low levels of religious conviction.  
 In their study of insider trading and ethical decision-making Terpstra et al., 
concluded that individuals with high levels of competitiveness and “external locus of 
control” were more likely to engage in unethical decision-making. They suggest that 
‘the competitive drive to win at all costs impacts upon ethical decision-making’.  In 
other words, it seems that they are theorising that those who have a strong desire to 
succeed are more likely to “bend the rules” and unethically play their part in a 
transaction.  It is unclear what is meant by “external locus of control” although they 
mention ‘the outer circle’ which the author believes includes those who are outside 
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of the “inner circle” but strive to gain access into it – a junior attempting to gain 
access into management circle.  The Hogans' study (1997) of mid-level managers 
attempted to identify the personality characteristics associated with workplace 
betrayal.  They advanced the ‘theory of the hollow core’ which characterises 
betrayers as ‘outwardly self-confident and charming and inwardly self-doubting and 
rash’.  They theorise that ‘betrayers hide their competitive and self-promoting nature 
behind a charming and persuasive veneer and selfishly view others as tools for 
satisfying their personal and material need’.  Although a good theory and supported 
with empirical research, the theory itself is limited to those who commit against the 
employer – ‘betrayal in the workplace is betrayal against the employer’.   
 There is very little research which links personality characteristics and 
financial crime.  The abovementioned research focused on insider dealing and 
crimes against the employer.  Money laundering is also a financial crime of major 
concern, however, the author believes that attempts to understand the personality 
characteristics of money launderers has to be pieced together from existing 
research on insider dealing.  There is, of course, the danger that any findings may 
amount to nothing more than interpretations of existing findings – understanding the 
personality of an insider trader and transmuting it to the money launderer.  However, 
both insider dealing and money laundering are crimes that manipulate others and 
the financial system.  Thus, to a certain extent there are commonalities between the 
two which can be used as a basis for understanding the personality of a money 
launderer.   
 The starting point is that, ‘money laundering is not conceived by wicked 
individuals in some Dickensian ‘den of crimes’.  Rather it is planned, executed and 
concealed in clean, respectable, warn and well lit city centre offices, by quiet 
men/women in smart clothes who do not raise their voices and keep a relatively low 
profile’ (Sikka, 1996).  So is it a personality characteristic that is added to the 
individual which leads him/her to launder money? 
 The research of Terpstra et al is perhaps the most authoritative discussion, 
to date, on white collar crime and personality.  They say that having a personality 
which makes an individual conform in the face of competitive forces is a personality 
characteristic which can lead to criminality.  Coleman opines that, ‘white-collar crime 
is perhaps best theorised as an activity that is increasingly undertaken by organized 
groups, corporations and elite occupations which operate within the values of 
capitalism and provide competition and conflict.  ‘Bending the rules’ is often 
regarded as a sign of business acumen’ (1989: 85).  The Hogans’ study also 
strongly mentions competition as a causative factor which leads to criminality.  Thus, 
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it would seem that those who are competing against others (whether internally or 
externally) can be isolated into the category from which white collar criminals will 
develop.  But this category contains just about anyone and everyone with 
employment.  Thus, there must be a particular factor or ingredient which is causative 
of white collar crime.   
 It is widely known that money laundering is undertaken by those who are 
connected with the financial system or have knowledge about how it works.  Thus, 
this reduces the size of our category from which money laundering white collar 
criminals will develop.  Weisburd concludes that, ‘white collar criminals do not view 
their actions as criminal and themselves as criminals and that the reasons for 
committing the crime were to further the interests of the company’ (cited in Nelken, 
1996).  Add to this Stotland’s theory that white collar crime is not motivated solely by 
financial gain but also includes reasons more connected with desire for money, 
threat of loss, sense of superiority, ego and power.  And, from this it can be deduced 
that those who wish to (1) further the interests of their employer and (2) who have a 
strong desire to profit and (3) gain a sense of superiority, are now the remnants of 
the category from which white collar criminals can develop.   
 The author accepts that such a description is still vague to single out 
conclusively the type of person or personality which leads to criminality.  However, 
the author does believe that such a description is a good starting point to ascertain 
links, if any, between personality and criminality.  Moreover, the author also believes 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to provide a clear criterion of personality 
characteristics which can be attributed to criminality.  The reasons for this belief is 
that firstly, there is no evidence, to date, which suggests that money launderers 
have abnormal psychological characteristics or other mental difficulties, and 
secondly, Mr Abedi of BCCI and the professionals involved in the Enron scandal, for 
example, were intelligent businessmen who had a strong desire for money and 
power and wanted to gain a sense of superiority that they have “beaten the system”.  
This characteristic is not abnormal since greed lives in all of us.  Perhaps the 
answer would lie in analysing links between criminality and non white collar 
offences.  However, this throws up another debate as to whether white collar crime 
should be viewed as “normal” crimes committed outside of the office.  If one takes 
the view that there is no disparity between these two categories of offences then it 
may be possible to study the personality characteristics of non-white collar criminals 
and transmute the characteristics over to white collar criminals.  But the interesting 
point is that the category and definition of white collar crime was invented primarily 
to disassociate crimes of the respectable office holders from other offenders known 
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as “street criminals” (Mars, 1982).   
 There is research which comparatively analyses white collar offenders and 
street offenders to identify areas of overlap and divergence.  Wheeler et al believe, 
in short, that, occupational criminals and ordinary offenders share similar deviant 
characteristics’ and that, ‘white collar offenders have higher levels of educational 
attainment than both common criminals and the general public and higher rates of 
employment than non-violent common criminals’ (Wheeler et al, 1988: 331-357).  
Gottfredson and Hirschi say that occupational criminals do not differ from common 
criminals since ‘both engage in criminal acts because of deficits in self-control, a 
desire for self gratification, certainty about outcome, and an opportunity to commit 
offences’ (1990).  However, they presented no new data to support their views and 
instead loosely reviewed existing research that supported their paradigm. 
 Wheeler et al focuses on motivations for offending and concludes with four 
categories of motivations: greed, fear of failing, ideology, and revenge seeking.  He 
says that ‘greedy offenders are risk seeking and motivated by getting more of what 
they already have. These offenders relentlessly pursue personal advancement, with 
each increase in income or assets creating a greater willingness to engage in 
unethical and/or illegal behaviour’.  Those offenders motivated by the fear of failing 
or losing what they already have worked so hard to achieve evaluate ‘all gains or 
losses against their current position.  This evaluation process tends to magnify 
losses and minimize gains, thus perpetuating the fearful stance of the offender.  For 
these individuals, the utility of the illegal act is determined by the net balance of 
gains and losses, and not by their final asset position’.  Whereas, ‘ideologically 
driven offenders’ engage in white collar crime ‘to make a statement about their 
beliefs and values’.  This motivation or personality is often seen in tax protesters and 
embezzlers who see their behaviour as a ‘resistance against and/or moral 
condemnation of powerful organizations’.  Finally, revenge seekers use their 
‘unhappiness and anger to justify their criminal actions against corporate or 
governmental entities’. 
 Benson and Moore (1992: 251-272) conclude that white collar criminals have 
‘at least moderate, if not considerable self-control’ and that ‘their involvement in 
crime occurs only when this self-control is overridden or redirected’.  They further 
propose that some complex interaction of motive (greed, fear of failure) and 
opportunity causes individuals to act criminally.  Although, there are numerous 
studies which in their own way authoritatively link personality and criminality, the 
studies do lack association with money laundering.  As said earlier, there is little 
research, if any, which links personality and money laundering so that a better 
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understanding of characteristics can be achieved.  The author concludes that 
existing research does direct an answer – that a money laundering white collar 
criminal will have characteristics which cause (1) a strong desire to profit and 
succeed, and (2) the motivation to take a risk, and (3) the ability to recognise a risky 
yet profitable opportunity, and (4) the ability to cleverly conceal the illegality of an 
action.  Though this conclusion is arguably vague and perhaps transmuted from 
personality characteristics of non-white collar offenders, it is, however, a good 
starting point in understanding the type of person likely to use securitisation to 
launder proceeds of crime. 
 
2. Gender  
The myth that women are less likely to engage in criminality than men has 
also been examined in order to ascertain any differences.  Zietz (1981) examined 
gender differences in the nature of and motivations for white collar crime.  She found 
that ‘women continue to be at significantly less risk for criminal involvement than 
men’.  Her research centred on arrest data that suggested women constitute 35-43 
percent of the arrests for embezzlement and fraud.  In her judgement this figure 
surpassed female arrest rates for “street crimes” (aside from prostitution).  Daly 
(1989) also studied gender differences and expanded on Zietz's work.  Daly 
concluded that ‘females' crimes resulted in smaller losses and were less complex, 
shorter in duration, and more likely to be carried out independently’. Furthermore, 
women were ‘significantly under represented in antitrust or SEC violations, the two 
most common corporate crime violations’.  Given these findings, Coleman proposes 
that ‘differences in opportunity and moral reasoning result in gender disparities in 
the motivations for and scope of white collar offending’ (1989).  
In the context of securitisation the author believes that Coleman’s conclusion 
is accurate given that websites of the leading players in the securitisation industry all 
have a tendency of showing men occupying senior positions.  Women are under 
represented in securitisation teams in law and accountancy firms, banks and credit 
rating agencies.  So does this mean that women are less likely to abuse 
securitisation to launder money?   
It seems that that the answer is affirmative for two reasons, firstly, the 
abovementioned research, though limited, however, shows the trends in gender 
differences, and secondly, except in exceptional situations, women unfortunately are 
still the victims of working in a building with a “glass ceiling” – they are not given 
equal opportunities of promotion to senior positions.  Though this is arguably a 
generalisation, the author, however, does take the view that women are less likely to 
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abuse securitisation to launder proceeds of crime.     
 
3. Situational influences  
The author has discussed personality characteristics and gender as possible 
signs that identify a class of people who are likely to abuse securitisation.  As a 
follow on it is worth looking at situational influences which may affect those who 
engage in securitisation.  “Being in the right place at the right time” denotes the 
seizure of an observed opportunity. This seizing of an opportunity is also an 
important consideration when determining who is capable of abusing securitisation.  
 In order to work out which persons in which occupations are at risk of 
abusing securitisation, the discussion needs to be based on the motives for abusing 
securitisation.  An understanding of the motives can help to ascertain which persons 
would abuse their professional position.  Those engaged actively in a typical 
transaction are the banker, lawyer, accountant, and the rating analyst.  The previous 
chapter analysed their duties and whether each of these professionals were capable 
of abusing securitisation to launder money.  The banker is the producer and director 
of a typical securitisation.  It has the know-how and the contacts.  The preceding 
chapter discussed and concluded that the banker is in a position to abuse 
securitisation – it can assist a criminal originator to launder proceeds of crime by 
cleverly structuring the transaction to evade detection.   
The accountant is also in a position where it can assist in concealing certain 
financial information to facilitate the laundering process.  The lawyer and the rating 
analyst can only assist in the laundering process if they have knowledge about the 
laundering activity.  They are not in a position to detect whether receivables are 
proceeds of crime.  They can, however, assist in structuring the transaction so that it 
can evade detection.  These professionals are highly intelligent individuals who 
enjoy high levels of respect, credibility, trust and authority.  And, they can use and 
abuse their professional position to facilitate money laundering.   
But which of these professionals have the characteristic that will lead to 
criminality?  As stated earlier, Stotland introduced a good explanation for why white 
collar crime may be undertaken.  Stotland theorised that the criminal commits the 
crime because there is a desire for money and superiority, and a threat of loss.  
This, as said earlier, helps to explain why a launderer participates in the laundering 
process.  The launderer will want to keep the proceeds of crime that have been 
generated through illegal activity – this is the desire for money and the threat of loss.  
The justification for keeping the proceeds of crime is the high risk the launderer 
takes when generating and cleaning such proceeds of crime.   
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Stotland also adds that the criminal undertakes the white collar crime in 
order to achieve a sense of superiority – the launderer would still launder the 
proceeds even though there are rules in place, and in part would do so to achieve a 
sense of superiority – he has cleverly worked around the rules and evaded 
detection.  This theory helps in that only those who are not highly regarded in the 
industry but have a strong desire to gain recognition will be tempted to participate in 
a transaction which would cleverly conceal money laundering – the professional 
wants to be part of the sophisticated plan.  The fact they are not recognised in the 
industry may justify their motivation – they feel a threat of loss if they do not gain 
recognition in this niche market.  In the author views, such a professional would 
demonstrate characteristics which reflect greed, craftiness, the desire to achieve a 
reputation at all costs, and the ability to find solutions without considering their 
legality or morality. Those who have these characteristics are more likely to 
manipulate junior employees – an organisation recruits individuals who will fit into its 
culture and environment, and who will conform easily.  These juniors, as said earlier, 
face internal and external competition which will influence their work behaviour.  The 
junior employee may not know that it is participating in criminality, and the seniors 
would be careful to keep the criminality concealed for fear of any potential whistle 
blowing by a junior. 
Again, the author admits that these conclusions are arguably vague simply 
because it is difficult to accurately compose a list of individuals who would engage in 
abusing securitisation.  Further, every professional is uniquely designed and money 
laundering is a sophisticated crime which does not require conspicuous traits.  The 
author has, however, attempted to provide a conclusion, based on existing research 
which is a good starting point for ascertaining who is capable of using and abusing 
securitisation to launder proceeds of crime. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The introduction and continuous evolution of securitisation has certainly 
made a significant contribution to the world of corporate finance.  Since its inception 
a number of commentators have contributed to the field of securitisation.  There 
were nevertheless issues which required an in depth examination so that knowledge 
surrounding these issues became clear and comprehensible.  The author has 
attempted to clarify and expand some of these issues – some in a subtle way and 
some as a clear contribution to knowledge.  This part of the work puts forward the 
findings: 
 
1. The correct nature of securitisation  
2. How securitisation has evolved 
3. The legal problems associated with the transfer of the receivables 
4. The problems associated with the SPV  
5. Securitisation can facilitate money laundering 
6. Securitisation and its relationship with white collar crime 
 
1. The correct nature of securitisation  
 Many commentators have provided definitions for securitisation.  Some of 
these reflect securitisation while some seem to be based upon reiterations of a 
misplaced focus.  In chapter one the author examined several definitions which, in 
the author’s view, inadequately reflected securitisation.  They each had their own 
inaccuracies which, the author critically examined for two reasons.  Firstly, to add an 
element of critical analysis into the discussion, and secondly, to clarify the correct 
nature of securitisation.    
The author’s definition of securitisation is ‘utilising the historical and 
predicted performance, the collateral, creditworthiness and cashflow of an entity’s 
assets as security to raise finance from the capital markets’.  A misunderstanding 
relating to securitisation is that it is the originator that undertakes the actual 
securitisation.  This was examined using the author’s definition to conclude that the 
party that actually undertakes the securitisation is the party which ‘[utilises] the 
historical and predicted performance, the collateral, creditworthiness and cashflow 
of…[its]…assets as security to raise finance from the capital markets’.  
 Where the transfer is drafted as “true sale” then the SPV becomes the legal 
and beneficial owner of the receivables.  And as owner it has the right to grant a 
security interest in the receivables in exchange for funds.  Thus, as the legal owner 
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it has the right to use ‘the historical and predicted performance, the collateral, 
creditworthiness and cashflow of…[its]…assets as security to raise finance from the 
capital markets’.  However, where the transfer agreement is not drafted to reflect 
“true sale” or is recharacterised as secured lending, the party undertaking the 
securitisation is the originator since it remains the legal and beneficial owner of the 
receivables.  It has the right to use ‘the historical and predicted performance, the 
collateral, creditworthiness and cashflow of…[its]…assets as security to raise 
finance from the capital markets’.  The originator either sells the receivables under 
what is known as “true sale” or pledges them under a “non-true sale” transaction.  
What is the difference?   
The originator will use securitisation to achieve one of two objectives – either 
to remove risk-embedded intangible assets off its balance sheet or raise favourable 
rated finance from the capital markets (which may be restricted due to its credit 
rating or balance sheet).  In the former, the originator will aim to sell the receivables 
under a “true sale” agreement so that the receivables no longer appear on its 
balance sheet – the receivables are legally sold in a manner that satisfy the 
accounting requirements.  In the latter, the originator may just be seeking favourable 
rated finance so it pledges the receivables to the SPV which uses the receivables as 
the source of repayment for the borrowed funds.  The majority of securitisations that 
take place are structured to achieve “true sale” so that the funds borrowed from the 
capital markets do not appear on the originator’s balance sheet – hence off-balance 
sheet finance. 
 
2. How securitisation has evolved 
The two key reasons why securitisation has experienced phenomenal growth 
are that it allows an entity either to raise finance which is favourably rated or to 
remove risk-embedded assets off its balance sheet.  A common reason for using 
securitisation in both scenarios is competition.   Financial institutions strive to profit 
by offering a range of financial products which require a good balance sheet.  For 
example, discounted loans and pensions funds require the financial institution to 
have sufficient capital and financial reserves.  Thus, securitisation allows the 
financial institution to remove risk-embedded assets off its balance sheet and free 
up capital to cover another type of risk.  It also provides finance instantly which can 
be invested in new projects.  Globalisation (and the surge in cross border activities) 
has increased competition among financial institutions, and consequently has 
created opportunities for financial engineering.  Securitisation allows the financial 
institution to increase its lending capacity without having to find additional deposits 
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or capital infusion.  The financial institution becomes more visible to the outside 
world and investors through the process of securitisation. 
A non-financial entity also strives for profit and seeks new opportunities to 
prosper.  Securitisation allows this entity to remove any risk-embedded assets off its 
balance sheet and gain access to instant funds.  Further, the entity can gain access 
to favourable rated finance which is not limited by its corporate rating.  Moreover, 
any dips in the economy may cause an entity to re-think and restructure its 
operations so that any loss can be compensated for by gaining from other 
opportunities.  Securitisation allows an entity to gain funds to invest in new projects.    
Another strong reason for the growth of securitisation is the increasing shift 
towards seeking alternative financing sources as opposed to the traditional 
commercial loans from financial institutions.  Downgradings in corporate and/or 
sovereign ratings have led entities to seek alternative financing options.  Raising 
finance through securitisation does not rely on an entity’s business operations – the 
focus is on the strength and reliability of the receivables which act as support for the 
bonds.  A bond issue created through securitisation is rated according to receivables 
as opposed to the entity generating the receivables. 
 
3. The legal problems associated with the transfer 
 The most significant issues facing the originator are firstly, whether the 
transfer agreement accords with the parties’ intentions, and secondly, that the 
transfer is not nullified on the grounds that it constitutes a sham.   
A true sale transfer can be challenged as invalid by the courts regardless of 
what the lawyers, the credit rating agency and bankers opined when constructing 
the transaction.  Although English law currently lacks any direct rulings regarding 
true sale transfers, the research examined the US rulings in order to gain some 
familiarity with how the US courts view true sale under securitisation.  The US 
rulings show that a court will firstly, look beyond the wording used in the transfer 
contract by examining the actual business activities, objections and the relationship 
between the parties.  Wording such as ‘sale and purchase’ do not satisfy the court 
that the contract depicts a sale.  Instead words such as ‘assigns, sets over and 
transfers all rights, title and interest’ must be used since such wording defines and 
describes the parties’ obligations in respect of true sale.   
Secondly, the courts also look at the actions of the parties in order to 
determine whether the wording correlates with their actions.  Where the wording 
differs significantly courts have been quick to strike down an intended transaction 
and deem it secured lending.   
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Thirdly, case law was examined in order to gauge judicial understanding of 
securitisation.  The case of Major highlighted the court’s view in respect of recourse 
provisions in the transfer agreement.  The recourse provisions were viewed as 
excessive and contrary to properly transferring credit risk yet the court failed to 
indicate what an acceptable level of recourse would convince judges that a 
securitisation with recourse provisions is still a securitisation. 
Thus, it seems that in the US, recourse provisions which are “excessive” are 
interpreted as not transferring all risks whereas, in England and Canada it has been 
held that ‘full recourse is not incompatible with a concept of a legal sale’.  But the US 
ruling did not indicate whether it would find recourse provisions that fell below ‘full 
recourse’ as excessive.  It seems the recourse question needs a further examination 
by the US courts.   
The decision in Octagon Gas shows how a court misinterpreted the U.C.C. 
Article 9 in finding that an assignment of accounts merely creates a security interest.  
Under this judicial interpretation of Article 9, a seller and SPV can never effectuate a 
true sale of receivables.  Without the ability to transfer full title of ownership, 
securitisation will cease to exist because the transferred accounts will always be 
subjected to the potential bankruptcy of the originator as part of its estate. 
The Days Inn case raised a number of significant yet disturbing points. 
Despite the presence of several factors mitigating against consolidation, the 
bankruptcy court ordered substantive consolidation of the assets of the issuer with 
the estate of DIA.  The court failed to recognise that the SPV was a separate entity – 
it failed to recognise the presence of an independent director – it failed to recognise 
that the Octagon Gas case caused controversy by failing to appreciate what 
securitisation was.  Nevertheless, the court recharacterised the transaction thereby 
voiding the asset transfer which, raises the question – do courts actually understand 
the mechanism behind securitisation?  
A perfectly structured transfer for securitisation purposes would not lead to 
recharacterisation, and further it would not cause controversy if judges had a better 
understanding of securitisation.  It seems that the courts have taken the process of 
securitisation and tried to fit it into established principles of law when in fact the law 
should be shaped around the process of securitisation.  Securitisation is a series of 
distinct transactions which are clearly recognisable if the law is shaped around the 
transactions.  But to attempt to fit this process into principles of law distorts and 
detracts from what the parties intend.  The author discussed possible solutions to 
this problem – the theories of Aicher and Fellerhoff, and Bjork – before concluding 
with a workable solution: analyse the whole structure; investigate the separateness 
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of the originator and the SPV; investigate the SPV; ascertain the market value of the 
receivables; closely read the transfer contract; whose duty is it to ensure income 
passes to the SPV?; who bears the risk in excess of all credit enhancement? 
  
4. The problems associated with the SPV  
The author examined the legal issues facing the SPV: correct form and 
location; it acquires a bankruptcy remote status; independently controlled and 
operated; perfection of security interest in the purchased receivables. 
  
i. The correct form and location of the SPV is crucial so that it corresponds 
with the law and content of the contract, the type of security the SPV will issue, the 
investor base the bonds are targeted at and the desire to minimise the imposition 
and amount of taxation.  The correct form of the SPV determines what kind of 
securities it will issue.  In the UK, for example, a SPV created specifically for 
securitisation takes its initial form as a private limited company – a special purpose 
vehicle.  It lies dormant until the securities’ offering has been arranged.  Prior to 
launching the issue the private limited company is re-registered as a public limited 
company.   
In the US, the SPV is either structured as a General corporation, ‘S’ 
corporation or Limited liability corporation (LLC) depending on the desired tax 
treatment and the type of payment structure.  A General corporation is liable to pay 
tax on any earnings made whereas, the “S” corporation was designed as a tax-free 
entity with an important restriction – income can only pass through the entity in order 
to elect a tax-free status.  The LLC was born from the advantages of its alternatives, 
for example, a General corporation is subjected to double taxation, once at 
corporate level and again at a personal level whereas, the LLC is only taxed once at 
a personal level – investors pay at their personal rate.  Other advantages include, no 
citizenship requirement – the ‘S’ corporation restricts non-residents as shareholders 
thus, those who own the equity of the SPV must be US residents which can prevent 
foreigners from owning a SPV in the US.  Further, the LLC has no limitations on the 
size and number of its members, no tax penalties upon its liquidation, no limitation 
on ownership of other corporations and allows limited liability to all members 
including those who participate in management.  Thus, this became an ideal SPV for 
securitisation purposes.   
 A trust is also a useful SPV – in the UK, the trust established for purposes of 
securitising receivables takes the form of an express trust created via a trust deed.  
The US has created three types of trusts, grantor, owner and master trust.  A 
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grantor trust is structured specifically so as to enable it to acquire a non-taxable 
status.  An owner trust will not qualify as a non-taxable trust because the trust 
manager is empowered to deal with the cashflows of the receivables.  A master trust 
is used so as to give the issuer access to multiple markets simultaneously. 
 In a private offering, one which is accepted by sophisticated purchasers, 
participation certificates are offered giving investors interest in the receivables, 
rather than in the trust, as is the case in a public offering.  The important distinction 
between private and public offerings is that in the former, the investor has a direct 
link with the receivables due to the interest he or she acquires in the receivables and 
can enforce rights without an intermediary whereas, in the latter, the investor 
normally has an indirect link with the receivables as he or she owns an interest in 
the trust only.  This is because the link with the receivables is through an 
intermediary (normally a trustee) who is utilised by the issuer to handle the physical 
administration of the issue for reasons of convenience and cost effectiveness.  In 
the event of a default the trustee will enforce rights on behalf of the investor.   
 
ii. The “doctrine of substantive consolidation” means ‘the merger of separate 
entities into one action so that the assets and liabilities of both parties may be 
aggregated in order to effect a more equitable distribution of property among 
creditors’.  It is triggered if the originator is so closely related to the SPV that if the 
originator faces bankruptcy proceedings the SPV’s assets can be used to pay the 
originator’s debts.  The rating agency will insist that the SPV is not owned or 
operated by an entity that is far from bankruptcy remote.   The rating agency as well 
as the courts will analyse the relationship between the SPV and its parent or 
disguised parent by utilising an “alter ego” approach.    
In the UK, the case of Smith, Stone & Knight deals with consolidation, 
although not in the context of securitisation but offers useful guidance.  But English 
law in relation to consolidation goes back to the authoritative case of Salomon v 
Salomon & Co Ltd.  The case established the principle that a company upon 
incorporation is a new and separate artificial entity – a distinct entity with its own 
personality separate from and independent of the persons who form it, who invest 
money in it, and who direct and manage its operations. Thus, the rights and duties 
of a company are not the rights and duties of its directors or members who can be 
hidden by a corporate veil surrounding the company. 
However, the US has witnessed a different picture regarding consolidation. 
In the case of Re Vecco the court stated that a determination of whether to allow 
consolidation should be based on the following criteria: firstly, the degree of difficulty 
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in segregating and ascertaining individual assets and liability of the companies.  
Secondly, the presence of consolidated financial statements.  Thirdly, the 
‘profitability of consolidation at a single physical location’.  Fourthly, the commingling 
of assets.  Fifthly, the existence of parent and inter-corporate guarantees on loans 
and finally, the transfer of assets without formal observance of corporate formalities.   
The concluding disparity in how the UK and US courts approach 
consolidation is notable – the UK courts are reluctant to order consolidation in the 
absence of a sham or fraud whereas, in the US, the courts will seek out links 
between the SPV and the originator and order consolidation.  It seems that there is 
presumption of consolidation unless proven otherwise. 
In order to avoid consolidation, the author discovered that parties must 
ensure the SPV maintains separate books and records pertaining to its operations; 
there is no commingling of assets, funds  or accounts; the SPV holds itself out to the 
public as a separate and distinct entity; the SPV prepares its own tax returns (if 
relevant); an independent director is seated on the SPV’s board; the SPV’s assets 
are clearly shown on its financial statements; the SPV will not pay or guarantee the 
debts or obligations of its parent or affiliate and vice versa; any transaction between 
the SPV and the originator should be at arm’s length and, the SPV utilises its own 
letterhead, telephone and operational offices.   
 
iii. Aside from the SPV ensuring that the receivables are purchased correctly 
from the originator, it also needs to ensure that it itself is “bankruptcy remote” – 
which means that the SPV is not threatened with potential bankruptcy.  The SPV 
can be made to hold a bankruptcy remote status but it can never be made 
bankruptcy proof. Many commentators concisely restated how such bankruptcy 
remote status is achieved, however, the author discussed bankruptcy remoteness at 
length and concludes:  
 
a. The incorporation documents should list which party(ies) the SPV can 
transact business with.  Where the SPV is created for a “one-off” 
securitisation then its ability to purchase additional pools of receivables 
should be restricted so that it does not expand its list of creditors (which in all 
cases should be kept to a minimum).   
b. The documents should also include details of the activity the SPV is 
permitted to undertake.  Since it is created for a special purpose with limited 
operational parameters, which are dictated by the rating agency’s analysis, 
these should be included together with all restrictions so that the SPV cannot 
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transact business which it is not permitted to undertake.   
c. Steps should be taken to minimise any threat of involuntary bankruptcy that 
can be posed by creditors – but the author examined US case law which 
shows how creditors can cause difficulties internally – SPV’s bylaws are 
easily circumvented.   
d. The inclusion of an independent director to operate the SPV alongside its 
existing directors.  The author questioned the independence of such a 
director and concludes that as a director of the SPV he/she owes fiduciary 
duties to the shareholders which need to be balanced with his/her obligation 
to protect investors from leading the SPV into voluntary bankruptcy.  Thus, in 
reality, he/she owes duties to both the shareholders and the investors – a 
conflict of interest.  The shareholders may bring an action against the 
independent director for breach of fiduciary duty based on a refusal to sign a 
petition when it is in the best interest of the SPV.  The investors too can bring 
claims against the originator and the SPV’s directors for failing to protect 
investors if such provisions fail to protect.   
 
5. Securitisation can facilitate money laundering 
 The author believes that the process of securitisation is open to abuse and 
can potentially be utilised to facilitate money laundering.  Enron is an example of 
how the structure of securitisation was abused.  The author put forward a theory 
that: 
 
i. there are no rules prohibiting criminals or launderers from securitising 
legitimate rights to payments; 
ii. the receivables sold or pledged can be proceeds of crime; 
iii. there is no method for determining or verifying whether the receivables 
are proceeds of crime; 
iv. the professionals involved cannot detect whether a pool contains 
proceeds of crime; 
v. the receivables are placed into the financial system when they are 
transferred to the SPV.   
 
Is this theory true?  A step by step guide towards the answer: 
 
i. The originator will approach a banker with the intention of raising finance 
either by removing receivables off its balance sheet or keeping the receivables and 
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using them as security for finance.  The process begins with an analysis of the 
originator’s business operations.  The originator will present itself as a business with 
a balance sheet of receivables.  The receivables will appear as figures in the 
balance sheet – though supplementary information with the balance sheet will state 
the nature of the assets and explain the figures.  Aside from this the balance sheet 
will not detail the receivables.  
 
ii. The next step in the process is isolating the receivables into a pool so that 
the banker can calculate how to structure the securitisation.  The isolation is 
discussed with the banker who will want to ensure that it is satisfied that firstly, the 
receivables exist, secondly, the originator is the legal and beneficial owner, thirdly, 
the originator is not breaching any prohibition clauses in other agreements by 
disposing the receivables, fourthly, the originator can transfer the receivables 
without causing loss to its operations, fifthly, the receivables have a legitimate 
source.   
 
iii. The receivables are presented as computer printouts which list the account 
numbers representing the underlying contracts together with outstanding amounts 
owed by the obligors.  The banker relies very much on the representations given by 
the originator and the supporting documents presented (though the banker warns 
that should the receivables not exist or they are removed in breach of any 
restrictions or such removal would economically damage the originator, then this 
would amount to fraud.)  How much can the banker verify?  Firstly, it is impractical to 
verify each receivable in a pool.  Secondly, the legal title can be verified by 
assumptions – if the receivables exist on the balance sheet then look to who is the 
owner of the balance sheet.   
 
iv. Can the banker verify the source?  The banker will examine the originator’s 
business operations to ascertain its productivity, prosperity, and legitimacy (based 
on the financial statements (including tax filings) and general knowledge within the 
originator’s industry).  However, it is possible for the originator to have business 
operations which do not appear in its financial statements.  The banker will examine 
the originator’s financial statements and any other documents given by its 
accountant and banker in order to work out the extent of the originator’s business 
operations.  The financial industry relies very much on trust and the integrity of the 
parties who utilise it.  The receivables are intangible property which only exist as 
computer printouts and thus, can be falsely manufactured – so is it difficult for the 
banker to recognise the difference between proceeds of crime and legitimate 
  185 
earnings?  The banker can only exercise due diligence and investigation to a certain 
extent before the investigation becomes impractical – ‘it’s a tough position to be in, 
particularly when dealing with a less known originator, but given the pressures we 
are under we have to go with what the originator will tell us’.  Add to this the fact that 
every bond issue is structured according to a deadline which is often dictated by the 
capital markets.  Thus, in most cases the banker may be working against the clock 
whilst ensuring that reasonable and practical investigations are undertaken.  Add to 
this the fact that the contents of the pool are under constant change – the 
receivables are exposed to prepayment and default risk which can be controlled by 
allocating reserves but nevertheless motivates the banker to act speedily. 
 
v. The next step in the process is analysing the pool from a credit rating 
perspective.  The credit rating agency will closely analyse the receivables for any 
credit, structural and legal risks.  Since dirty money mingled with clean money does 
not cause any detrimental financial effect upon, or reduces or impacts upon, the 
cashflow or value and collateral of the pool, the criteria under the testing scenarios 
does not consider the effects of dirty money mingled with clean money.  The author 
contacted the leading rating agencies and posed the question – Is it possible for a 
credit rating agency to recognise or detect proceeds of crime which may have been 
mingled with legitimate earnings in an isolated pool of receivables?  If so, how? 
Moody’s stated that ‘many agencies would be reluctant to give a detailed 
answer’.  The reason for this is ‘because [I am] exposing vulnerabilities of an 
established and trusted mechanism that adds credibility to a securitization 
programme’.  However, Standard & Poor’s admitted that a ‘portfolio is clearly open 
to fraud and crime at many levels’.  Moreover, although their analysis takes into 
account that a pool may contain proceeds of crime, Standard & Poor’s admitted 
again that ‘we don't have the ability to detect the fraud/crime being experienced but 
the originator/servicer does’.  Thus, the onus is on the originator to detect any fraud 
or crime that may allow it to mingle dirty money with clean money.  The rating 
agency relies largely on what the originator informs it with regards to any risks 
associated with fraud, and the rating agency uses what the originator informs it in its 
testing scenarios.   
Moreover, Weiss Rating responded – ‘the only way a credit rating agency 
can detect fraudulent receivables is by analyzing each of the underlying assets in 
the pool’.  They also added that ‘receivables in a securitization program will not be 
individually examined’.  The rating agency examines only the quality of the pool and 
does not go further to inquire whether they could be proceeds of crime.  This is 
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certainly a shortfall of the rating criteria which the author has exposed – Standard & 
Poor’s are now conducting research into this area. 
 
vi. A major part of the accountant’s task is to undertake a “collateral audit” 
which is a sieve like audit that weeds out any non-performing or defaulting 
receivables from the pool.  This collateral audit involves analysing the pool’s 
contents for changes in performance and levels of liquidity.  The frequency of this 
audit depends largely on the term and payment pattern of the receivables.  The 
collateral audit only seeks to weed out non-performing and defaulting receivables – 
it is not designed to weed out proceeds of crime or other suspicious looking 
receivables.  Any suspicious looking receivables are weeded out because they are 
non-performing or defaulting, and not because they may be proceeds of crime.  
Interestingly, receivables which are in fact proceeds of crime are more likely to 
materialise and generate the income evidenced by manufactured paperwork.  The 
launderer will want to place the proceeds of crime into the financial system.  Thus, 
does the collateral audit fail to detect proceeds of crime?  It seems it does – ‘a 
collateral audit which is also referred to as a pool audit is simply a periodic process 
that helps the pool maintain its financial strength.  It is, as you say, not designed to 
catch illegitimate receivables…and I agree with you when you say illegitimate 
receivables are more likely to materialise into cashflow than legitimate receivables’.  
Aside from the collateral audit there is no other analysis undertaken by the 
accountant.  Another task undertaken by the accountant is to document the pool’s 
behaviour in annual accounts – how much income was received and how much of 
this was paid out to investors. 
 
vii. The conclusion of this empirical research depicts justification for the author’s 
theory that securitisation can be used and abused to launder proceeds of crime.  
The originator who isolates the receivables can easily be tempted to include 
proceeds of crime into the pool because paperwork can be manufactured.  The 
professionals who analyse the pool for quality and strength admit the impracticality 
of analysing each receivable, and moreover, their duties are confined and are 
executed within a small window of time.  The intangible nature of a pool makes it 
difficult to verify the true source of each receivable.  The two worrying effects of this 
conclusion are, firstly, given that the securitisation market has been in existence for 
more than two decades, how many of the hundreds of transactions have been 
merely used to launder proceeds of crime?  Secondly, given the nature of this 
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vulnerability, what mechanism can be introduced to limit or prevent the damaging 
effect of using securitisation to launder proceeds of crime?    
In the author’s view, the transaction would need to be amended to include 
separate recourse provisions against the originator in the event that the pool is later 
found to contain proceeds of crime.  However, this solution may not be workable at 
present given the current standpoint on “true sale” where the originator must 
relinquish all risks associated with the pool and any recourse must be accounted for 
in the originator’s balance sheet.  Including separate recourse provisions to cover 
the risk that a pool may contain proceeds of crime (which if, at a later date, freezes 
the pool) will certainly alter how “true sale” is currently defined and can potentially 
recharacterise the transaction as a secured lending.  These concluding effects were 
also discussed with Standard & Poor’s, who agreed with the author’s theory and 
have now commenced new research analysing this vulnerability.   
 
6. Securitisation and White Collar Crime 
 The author, using established theories on white collar crime, concluded his 
reasons why an originator and other professionals would use and abuse 
securitisation to launder proceeds of crime as follows: 
 
i. Because it is easy to use and abuse.  The complexity of securitisation and 
the credibility and reputation of the securitisation market all help to mask an 
important vulnerability which an originator can potentially abuse.  There is a very low 
risk of detection, as the author demonstrated in chapter four.  If investors lose out 
then blame lies with the underlying obligors and the professionals who composed 
the securitisation.  Thus, which criminal would not want to abuse a process that has 
such vulnerabilities?   
 
ii. Sutherland theorised that criminality is learnt through association with 
criminals and this association will dictate the development of criminal characteristics.  
Sutherland also believed that unless an alternative and conflicting behaviour was 
introduced to the individual, the individual is more likely to develop criminal 
characteristics which would ultimately lead to participating in white collar crime.  The 
author accepts this theory to the extent that criminality is more likely to be learnt 
through association but disagrees with Sutherland’s point that an alternative and 
conflicting behaviour can prevent criminality.  Money laundering is a crime that has 
grown regardless of what rules have been introduced.  Launderers cleverly work 
around the rules.  Thus, if such rules are seen as the alternative and conflicting 
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behaviour then it seems that the growing concern relating to, and the reported facts 
about money laundering refute Sutherland’s point.   
 
iii. Professor Stotland theorised that the criminal commits the crime because 
there is a desire for money and superiority, and a threat of loss.  This helps to 
explain why a launderer participates in the laundering process.  The launderer wants 
to keep the proceeds of crime that have been generated through illegal activity – this 
is the desire for money and the threat of loss.  The justification for keeping the 
proceeds of crime is the high risk the launderer is taking when generating and 
cleaning such proceeds.  Stotland also adds that the criminal undertakes the white 
collar crime in order to achieve a sense of superiority – this, it seems, again refutes 
Sutherland’s point on the alternative and conflicting behaviour preventing criminality.  
The launderer would still launder the proceeds even though there are rules in place, 
and in part would do so to achieve a sense of superiority – he/she has cleverly 
worked around the rules and evaded detection. 
 
iv. The author believes that organisations which desire to commit white collar 
crime will do so in an environment which it has developed itself – organisations will 
recruit individuals who can be easily moulded to work in its culture and environment.  
This was researched by Professors Duffield and Grabowsky who conclude that a 
corporate is likely to recruit an individual who can be moulded into the employee the 
employer wants.  The author highlighted the case of Robin Greenburg.  Once 
conforming individuals are recruited they are then exposed to the culture of 
competition which is ‘characterised by an intense desire for wealth and success and 
an overwhelming fear of failure’ to the extent that ‘occupational positions virtually 
force their occupants to violate the law in order to succeed’.  Weisburd goes further 
to say that where criminality becomes part of the workload then ‘white collar 
criminals do not view their actions as criminal and themselves as criminals and that 
the reasons for committing the crime were to further the interests of the company’. 
But Weisburd’s theory is limited to the employee knowing that it is doing wrong and 
consequently denying the criminality of the action, but nevertheless, demonstrates 
the extent to which employees would push themselves within the culture of 
competition.  This in turn triggers the “rationalisation” theory which, it seems, would 
apply to the criminal behaviour of the originator who uses securitisation to launder 
proceeds of crime.  Regardless of the rules in place and the various deterrents, the 
criminal originator is still motivated to launder the proceeds of crime because it 
“neutralises” the guilt and awareness of its actions before committing the crime by 
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believing that it is not committing an offence.  Thus, in the author’s view, the 
structure and culture are important contributing characteristics which dictate the 
level, if any, of white collar crime committed by the organisation and its employees.   
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